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Abstract 
This thesis offers an exploratory investigation of public order policing in the 
context of events that are staged for members of different types of communities. 
The research utilises a qualitative case study methodology that combines 
observational fieldwork conducted during the planning and staging of four events 
with the interviewing of 27 participants involved in this process. Relative to other 
public order contexts (e.g. political protest, industrial disputes, community 
disorder), academic research on the type of • community-based' events that formed 
the basis of the field research is lacking. The presented empirical findings reveal 
that a number of micro, meso and macro factors impacted on the prospects for 
safety and order at the observed events. An evaluation of existing public order 
related analytic accounts highlight both opportunities and limitations in explaining 
these factors. In response, an analytic framework is developed which employs 
Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of the habitus and the field. This reveals that the 
prospects for safety and order are enhanced when the police and organisers are 
engaged in close working practices which increase trust, cohesive decision-
making, communication and consistency. The resulting policy implications are 
intended as 'good practice' guidance for both the police and organisers in relation 
to planning and staging community-based events, and identifying potential 
'beyond the event' benefits. Although this thesis is exploratory and care is 
required in making generalisations, future research could determine whether the 
presented analytic framework and the policy implications are applicable to other 
public order contexts. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1. Thesis Introduction and Structure 
Public order policing has attracted considerable interest from the academic 
community. This is not surprising given that it represents an important and at 
times controversial component of police work (P.A.J Waddington, 2001). The 
majority of this academic interest has been focussed on contexts that broadly 
encompass the policing of protest / industrial disputes and forms of community / 
festival disorder (King and Brearley, 1996). In contrast, the general aim of this 
thesis is to explore public order policing from a different and under-researched 
perspective. To provide appropriate context, it is pertinent to quote an inter-faith 
advisor writing two days after an outbreak of significant community disorder in 
Bradford during the summer of 200 1 : 
-Where were the cameras last weekend when 130,000 people of all 
cultures enjoyed a trouble-free Mela - an Asian part of Bradford's 
popular annual festival?,} 
This quote laments the lack of media interest in a large and orderly event that 
occurred almost simultaneously with the disorder in the same city. Following this 
incidence of community disorder, the government granted considerable attention 
and resources to understanding two issues: what happened and how could it be 
prevented in the future (Cantle, 2001; Ousley, 2001; Community Cohesion Unit, 
2002)? In comparison, the Mela event attracted no national media attention apart 
from the quote above. 
From an academic perspective, Benewick and Holton (1987) argue that there is 
potentially much to be gained by understanding the processes associated with the 
. peaceful ' crowd. However, it is a perspective that has received little academic 
attention. One possible reason for this is presented by Reicher, Stott, Cronin and 
Adang (2004, p558) who argue that "'No Riot at Demonstration" is hardly a news 
1 The Independent. 9th July 2001. 
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headline'. By implication, an orderly public event presents fewer opportunities for 
the academic or policy maker compared to the more pressing demands of 
accounting for and responding to disorder. P.AJ Waddington (1994a) presents an 
impressive analysis of why order is maintained during the majority of public order 
operations but this work predominantly focuses on political protest and industrial 
dispute. In addition, P.AJ Waddington (1994a, p208) states that 'my research is 
distinctly skewed towards the more problematic operations and under-represents 
"nothing jobs"'. Therefore, a gap exists to generate greater understanding of 
public order policing that culminates in safe and orderly events and is conducted 
in a different context to political protest / industrial dispute and community 
disorder. 
This thesis aims to address this gap by presenting an exploratory analysis of 
public order policing that accompanies the planning and staging of 'community-
based events'. In broad terms, these types of events are arranged for members of a 
community and occur on a regular and predictable basis (i.e. at publicly-
announced times). Four such events represent the basis of qualitative 
observational fieldwork and interviewing that informs this current research. These 
include a Solstice celebration, a Gay Pride festival, a Mela festival and a 
Multicultural Festival. Although taking different forms and sharing varied 
histories, each of these events is characterised by a planning process involving the 
police and a diverse array of organisers that culminates in an ultimately safe and 
orderly staging process.2 The thesis will outline both the practice that is associated 
with these planning and staging processes, and present an explanatory analytic 
account to further understanding of this particular public order perspective. 
To achieve this, the remainder of the thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 
two presents an overview of public order policing and social research. This allows 
for an evaluation of the relevant literature and policy relating to public order 
policing. The chapter starts by addressing the ambiguities that are associated with 
defining and conceptualising 'public order'. This is followed by consideration of 
2 This work predated the terrorist attacks that occurred in London, July 2005. Despite this, it is 
important to note that these attacks could impact on future public order policing (e .g. resourcing 
officers to police events, possible challenges to freedom of expression). This demonstrates the 
continually evolving political/social context in which public order policing operates. 
the different contexts in which public order policing is practiced and the 
exploration of a variety of analytic perspectives that attempt to account for it. 
Finally, there is discussion of contemporary policy for the police and organisers in 
relation to the planning and staging of public events. The issues that are raised in 
chapter two both inform the subsequent analysis and allow for the identification of 
gaps in knowledge. The chapter ends with five specific research aims for this 
thesis. 
Chapter three outlines methodological considerations in relation to the thesis. 
This includes a summary of the origins and context of the research topic through 
the Collaborative Awards in Science and Engineering (CASE) PhD structure and 
rationale. Within this there is acknowledgement of the guiding role that the CASE 
Proposal had on the research process and an overview of the National Crime and 
Operations Faculty (NCOF) which provided financial and logistical support. The 
chapter also explains the employment of a qualitative research strategy and 
reflects on the use of observational and interviewing techniques in the field. The 
chapter concludes by addressing methodological criticisms associated with 
general public order policing research and outlining the analytic framework that 
accompanied the fieldwork process. 
The next four chapters present the empirical findings that originate from the 
fieldwork. This process starts with a case study analysis of the four observed 
events which is presented in chapter four. This exercise allows for the 
identification of important contextual information and this leads to the 
demarcation of both differences and commonalities across the four events. This 
process also outlines areas for further thematic analysis. Chapter five focuses 
specifically on the planning processes associated with the four observed events. 
This starts with the exploration of "event safety' as a uniting function for the 
police and organisers. Following from this, consideration is given to how each 
planning group identified and responded to a variety of threats to safety, order or 
the event future. The chapter ends by briefly considering these findings in light of 
partnership working in other policing contexts (e.g. community safety and crime 
reduction). Chapter six considers how the police and organisers worked together 
during the staging of the obseryed events. This includes an analysis of policing 
operations and the identification of different police / organiser event management 
strategies. There is also reflection on the role of private security personnel and 
stewards in relation to order maintenance and crime prevention. Chapter seven 
concludes the empirical phase of the thesis by engaging with the 'post-evenf 
issues associated with the observed events. The chapter presents a number of 
processes that impact upon the prospects for order and safety at future events. It 
also opens up the possibility of good practice avenues that can enhance safety and 
order in this, and other, public order contexts. 
Chapter eight explores the empirical findings within a theoretical context. A 
holistic model is presented that identifies the relevant processes that are associated 
with maintaining safety and order at the observed events. This is followed by 
consideration of the model in relation to the public order related analytic 
perspectives highlighted in chapter two, resulting in both theoretical opportunities 
and limitations for understanding the empirical findings. The chapter concludes by 
developing an alternative theoretical framework to account for the public order 
policing of community-based events by drawing on the work of the French 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. 
The thesis concludes with chapter nine which reflects on a number of policy 
implications that are rooted in the empirical research. These include the 
identification of good practice for the planning and staging of community-based 
events and other policing contexts. The chapter also speculates on how these good 
practice recommendations might be implemented into other public order contexts. 
Future research avenues are also considered in addition to these policy 
implications. The chapter ends with the thesis conclusions. The specific research 
aims presented in chapter two will be evaluated in relation to the empirical 
findings, theorising and policy implications. This allows for speculation on the 
policy and academic prospects in relation to contemporary and future public order 
policing. 
Chapter Two: Public Order Policing and Social Research 
1. Introduction 
Barton and James (2003) have observed that a characteristic of contemporary 
Britain is a growth in the staging of special events and festivals that require a 
public order policing response. The aim of this thesis is to explore the policing of 
such events through an analysis of the planning and staging of a Gay Pride 
festival, a Mela, a Multicultural Festival and a Solstice celebration from the 
perspective of organisers and the police. l To place this research into context, this 
chapter will review the literature pertaining to public order policing in general. 
This presents an opportunity to identify characteristics from existing research and 
policy literature that can reveal gaps in our understanding of public order policing 
and inform the analysis presented in later chapters. 
This chapter will start by defining and conceptual ising public order policing 
which requires consideration of issues that relate to more general police related 
research findings. Consideration will then be given to the diverse contexts in 
which public order policing is practised. This will be followed by presenting a 
series of analytic accounts that aim to gamer greater explanatory understanding of 
public order policing. In light of the findings from these sections, there will then 
be reflection on contemporary policy for both the police and organisers in relation 
to staging public events. Finally, the chapter will present a set of research aims to 
be pursued as the thesis develops that are based on gaps in the literature on public 
order policing when applied to community-based events. 
2. Making Sense of Public Order Policing 
It is logical to begin this chapter by analysing what is meant by the term 'public 
order policing'. P.AJ Waddington (2003, p394) suggests that the phrase evokes 
"an image of riot-clad officers engaged in forceful confrontation with political 
dissidents, pickets and those engaged in ""community disorders"'. However, the 
I The rationale behind the choice of these events is explored in the methodology chapter (chapter 
three) whilst the characteristics that determine these four events as being 'community-based' - and 
differentiate them from other public order policing contexts - are explored in detail in chapter four. 
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reality of research findings concerning public order policing reveals that it is 
characterised by a lack of arrests and / or disorder and underenforcement of public 
order legislation (e.g. P.AJ Waddington, 1994a; della Porta and Reiter, 1998). 
Therefore, rather than purely a police response to disorder, it is important to note 
that the subject area is conceptually ambiguous: 'the term "public order" gives a 
superficial coherence to a particularly broad range of circumstances and 
situations' (Newburn, 2003, p284). Before considering this 'broad range' in more 
detail, the remainder of this section will identify a degree of conceptual clarity to 
what public order policing encapsulates. 
It is first worth acknowledging that public order policing is associated with the 
category of 'order maintenance' and that this differentiates it from other forms of 
police work such as criminal investigation and emergency service (P .A.J 
Waddington, 1999a; Bowling and Foster, 2002).2 However, Reiner (2000a, p114) 
notes that in itself, the concept of order maintenance as a facet of police work is 
problematic in terms of 'definition, equity and accountability'. Broadly speaking, 
order maintenance encompasses those aspects of police work that are 
characterised as being non-enforcement oriented. For example, Bayley (1994) 
notes that the majority of police patrol work is spent either restoring order (e.g. 
dealing with a troublesome drunk in a bar) or providing a service (e.g. what 
Bayley refers to as 'cats-in-a-tree' situations) and that arrests (i.e. enforcement of 
the law) are a rarity. In addition, this is a trend that is consistently found across 
different policing jurisdictions around the world (Bayley, 1994) and has been 
mirrored over time through empirical research concerned with the apportionment 
of police time (Punch and Naylor, 1973; PA Consulting Group, 2001). Although 
Reiner (2000a) notes definitional difficulties in attempting to group these non-
enforcement tasks into discrete categories, it is possible to identify a distinctive 
function through the order maintenance conceptualisation that underpins all police 
work. 
Bittner (1974) argues that the police respond and intervene in a diversity of 
situations. The type of situation is not important; it is the fact that 'the policeman, 
2 The 'realisation' that police work encompassed more than simply law enforcement is attributed 
to the classic work of Banton (1964) which represented a watershed in terms of police research 
(Reiner, 2000b). For a detailed overview of the role of the police in terms of their aims and 
objectives, see HMIC (1999). 
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and the policeman alone, is equipped, entitled, and required to deal with every 
exigency in which force may have to be used, to meet it' (Bittner, 1974, p35). 
Therefore, in any encounter with the public, there is the potential for coercive 
force or arrest - which is sanctioned by the state - to be employed even though it 
is rarely invoked. It is this underlying characteristic of the police function that 
unites every conceivable situation where the police are called upon to intervene. 
P.A.J Waddington (1999a) expands upon the work of Bittner and argues that, in 
addition to holding the potential to use this authority as state sanctioned 
monopolists of force, the police exercise symbolic authority (i.e. the authority of 
the state) through everything they do, even if they are not specifically intervening 
in a situation. 
Therefore, in relation to order maintenance and, by default, public order policing, 
a crucial question in this research relates to Reiner's (2000a) concerns regarding 
equity and accountability: what form of 'order' is being maintained and through 
what mechanisms is this being achieved? It must first be acknowledged that the 
concept of 'order' is difficult to define and conceptualise (Wrong 1994; Reiner, 
1999). However, useful guidance comes from Marenin (1982) who differentiates 
between two different forms of order that link the state with the police: • general 
order' and 'specific order~. The former relates to the state's responsibility to 
facilitate public tranquillity and safety whilst the latter relates to the preservation 
of prevailing political interests and / or institutions (i.e. the state). Marenin argues 
that these two forms of order are a necessity if any form of state is to function. 
Walker (2000, p6) notes that the police hold a position within the state that 
requires them to maintain both forms of order and that this in turn creates a 
paradoxical position: 
• In a nutshell, it is the capacity of the police to use force and their 
complex dual mandate which marks them out as indispensable to the 
protection of institutions and interests endorsed by the constitutional 
order: yet it is these same attributes which makes them more liable 
than any other agency within the executive branch of the state to 
endanger or corrupt that order. ~ 
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Walker's argument is that the police are both guardians and threats to general and 
specific forms of order. For example, within the context of general order it is both 
important and a requirement that safety and tranquillity is offered to all sections of 
society. This is compromised if the police deal inconsistently with different 
sections of society. Likewise, there are potential tensions if the interests of 
specific order clash with the interests of the wider general order. Finally, the 
police present a threat to specific order if they represent sectionalised interests 
(including themselves) which in turn may hold the potential to undermine the 
state. Walker (2000) concludes that resolving this paradox relies on the state being 
able to both constrain and enable the police. The mechanism for achieving this lies 
in police governance (i.e. the regulatory powers of the state). 
Before focussing specifically on public order policing, it is important to highlight 
ambiguities that exist at both an individual and organisational level within the 
police. This is important as these ambiguities have implications for accountability 
and regulation in relation to both general and specific forms of order. Starting at 
an individual level, it has been previously noted that a characteristic of police 
work (including public order policing) is that the law is typically under-enforced. 
The mechanism for deciding when 'coercive force' is to be sanctioned is therefore 
rooted in discretion. To understand this concept, it is useful to draw on the work 
of Manning (1977) who argues that the police mandate presents a number of 
contradictions. Manning's argument is that, a) the law is deficient as a resource to 
guide police work, b) police work is therefore bound by . practical decision 
making' which is influenced by factors in addition to the law and that, c) the law. 
when enforced, is directed disproportionately against different sections of society. 
Starting with the first point, Lustgarten (1986, pi 0) argues that 'the police are 
guided by virtually no legal standards at all. .. they act within an almost infinite 
range of lawful possibilities'. Where order has been breached (e.g. a fight on a 
street), the police officer(s) attending may decide to arrest all participants 
potentially invoking a variety of public order / assault charges or they may arrest 
some but not all of the participants. Alternatively, they may resolve the dispute 
through negotiation and not invoke the law at any stage of the incident. This is 
particularly pertinent to public order related legislation: Reiner (1999) argues that 
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it is often vague and subjective, rendering it an 'all purpose resource' for a wide 
range of situations.3 
Given that the law is lacking as a resource to guide police work, it is important to 
consider the second and third points raised by Manning (1977). Firstly. 'practical 
decision making' in the context of discretion is most common at the lowest level 
of the police organisation and occurs in conditions of 'low visibility' where the 
actions of officers are hidden from regulation in the form of supervisors and other 
agencies (Goldstein, 1960). Within this context, and in relation to the majority of 
incidents, a number of factors in addition to the law will influence the use of 
discretion such as the seriousness of the incident and weighing up the pros and 
cons in terms of the costs in potentially invoking the law (Lustgarten, 1986). 
However, there are other factors that, within the conditions of "low visibility' (the 
fact there is no direct supervision of much patrol work), undermine the order 
maintenance function in the context of general order: 
'The "'common sense" which tempers full enforcement may readily 
become a cloak for conscious or unconscious discrimination on the 
basis of political opinion, personal appearance, demeanour, social 
status or race. Under-enforcement becomes selective enforcement.' 
(Lustgarten, 1986, p 15) 
Reiner (2000a) suggests that individuals from groups such as ethnic minorities, 
gays, and the unemployed constitute examples of 'police property·:t This 
conceptualisation posits that these groups hold a lower status and / or are viewed 
as problematic compared to a dominant majority in society. As such, the police 
'control' and 'segregate' these groups through order maintenance (Reiner, 2000a). 
3 Left-realist criminologists proposed that the issues raised by a multitude of 'lawful possibilities' 
could be avoided by the adoption of 'minimal policing' (Kinsey, Lea and Young, 1986). This 
position argues that the police should focus reactively and exclusively on crime that is brought to 
their attention by the public. However, as Johnston (2000) notes, whilst this approach might limit 
the occasions on which the police act, problems occur in relation to 'common-sense' decision 
making - how does an officer respond to a situation where a violation of the law has not occurred 
but in their judgement it is about to occur? For this reason, Johnston (2000) argues that discretion 
in relation to applying the law is evident even in a minimal policing model which effectively 
undermines Kinsey et ai's (1986) argument. 
4 Explanations for why this should be the case have dominated the literature in terms of attempting 
to understand the police occupational culture. For an overview of this work, see Chan (1997), 
P.AJ Waddington, (1999b) and Reiner (2000a). For an historical analysis of the police relationship 
with different social groups / classes, see Brogden (1982). 
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This is perhaps best exemplified by disproportionate rates across ethnicity 
concerning 'stop and search' - Bowling and Phillips (2003) state that in 2001-2. 
black people were eight times, and Asian people three times, more likely to be 
stopped and searched compared to white people. Lustgarten (2002) echoes his 
earlier views on 'lacking legal standards' in relation to these disproportional 
statistics. In addition to the presence of both direct and indirect forms of 
discrimination, Lustgarten (2002) argues that much 'stop and search' practice fails 
to satisfy the standard of reasonable suspicion that is located within PACE and 
that Codes of Practice require amending (i.e. emphasising the illegality of 
searches lacking reasonable suspicion) if the problem is to be appropriately 
addressed. Bowling and Phillips (2003) also stress that ethnic minority 
communities have been subject to discrimination as victims of crime as well as 
suspects (i.e. they have received a poorer service compared to other groups). The 
most high profile example of this is the account of the Macpherson Inquiry into 
the murder of Stephen Lawrence (Macpherson, 1999). 
The important point to be made is that a number of factors will influence police 
decision making that are not wholly dependent on legal powers. Instead, 
discretion is exercised through conditions of low visibility 'on the street'. If this 
discretion to enforce the law is applied selectively, there is the potential for 
general order to be corrupted. Returning to the theme of addressing the 
mechanism and regulation of order maintenance, it is now pertinent to address 
similar concerns that occur at an organisational level. 
The regulation of the police as an organisation is rooted in police governance 
which can be defined as 'the constitutional arrangements for framing and directing 
police policies' (Jones, 2003, p605). The nature and form of police governance 
has constantly evolved since the inception of the 'new police' in 1829 (Joyce, 
2001). However, for the purposes of this section, it is relevant to briefly draw 
upon the principle of 'constabulary independence' and the tripartite framework of 
governance that facilitates police policy and practice. Constabulary independence 
relates to the notion that chief officers are autonomous from political interference 
concerning police policies and operations (Jones, Newburn and Smith 1994). 
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Although the principle holds a foundation in legal judgements,5 Lustgarten (1986) 
argues that these are beset with flaws. For example, the 'Denning Doctrine' fails 
to account for nuances which demonstrate that police policy making is entwined 
with direction from political bodies rather than being a wholly independent 
process (Lustgarten, 1986). Despite these ambiguities, Savage, Charman and Cope 
(2000, p31) argue that the principle of constabulary independence holds 
'discursive and political power. .. inside and outside of the police service.' 
Although the principle of constabulary independence is vague, it is worth 
examining in more detail how the political process impacts on the affairs of the 
police through central and local government. The important milestones concerning 
the relationship between these parties are the 1962 Royal Commission which 
reported on the ambiguous nature of this relationship and the subsequent 1964 
Police Act that attempted to delineate the boundaries of responsibility between 
these parties and led to the tripartite framework of governance (Walker, 2000). In 
summary, the 1964 Police Act outlined that the chief officer of each force in 
England and Wales holds responsibility for the direction and control of their force 
whilst the local police authority (consisting of magistrates and elected councillors) 
are charged with maintaining' an adequate and efficient force' and hold the power 
to appoint new chief officers (Jones, 2003). The final part of this framework is the 
role of central government (through the Home Secretary) that holds the power to 
approve the appointment of chief officers and can ask them to resign on the 
grounds of efficiency, and also provides funding that enables the individual forces 
to function (Jones, 2003). 
Subsequent to the 1964 Police Act, the relationship between the police, central 
and local government has evolved through a combination of social change and 
new legislation (Joyce, 2001; Jones, 2003). An important shift occurred with the 
introduction of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 (consolidated through 
the Police Act 1996) which changed the composition and function of the local 
police authority within the tripartite framework (Loveday, 2000). With regards to 
composition, this legislation reduced the membership levels of local police 
authorities and required for the first time that independent members must be 
5 The principle is most closely associated with the outcome of Fisher \'. Oldham Corporation 
[1930] and Lord Denning's judgement from R v MPC. ex parte Blackburn [1968]. 
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locally appointed to serve with councillors and magistrates (Jones, 2003). In terms 
of function, the responsibility for financial decision making devolved from the 
local police authorities to Chief Constables (Loveday, 2001). In addition. chief 
officers hold a responsibility for drafting local policing plans incorporating 
national (i.e. set by central government) as well as local objectives which the local 
police authorities then 'own' (Jones, 2003). The impact of this legislation is 
complex as Joyce (2001) argues that it can be interpreted as representing: a) an 
increase in central control through the setting of national objectives to be 
evaluated by the Home Office's Police Performance Unit; b) an increase in the 
autonomy of Chief Constables in respect of their financial and local policing plan 
responsibilities or; c) an increase in the power of the local police authorities due to 
independent members being assertive in promoting local issues within the local 
policing plan.6 
More recent legislation such as the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) - to be 
discussed in the final section of this chapter - and the Police Reform Act (2002) 
has also highlighted the changing nature of relationships within the tripartite 
framework. 7 As with the principle of constabulary independence, this framework 
represents ambiguity rather than certainty in relation to the regulation of the police 
at an organisational level. Having briefly outlined the nature of these ambiguities 
at a broad level, it is worth considering them within the context of tensions 
between general and specific order. 
Lustgarten (1986) presents an analysis of decision making during the 1984-85 
miners' strike and argues that the statutory function of the police authority was 
undermined by chief officers and central government in relation to the provision 
of mutual aid (i.e. the deployment of officers from one force area to assist in 
policing another force area). The 1964 Police Act allows for a Chief Constable to 
request additional resources from a colleague and this is supplemented by the 
Home Secretary's power to order a chief officer to provide assistance if this 
request is refused (Lustgarten, 1986). The role of the local police authority 
6 Savage et at (2000) note that the role of local police authorities may be enhanced through the 
Association of Police Authorities (APA) which is a national representative body and potential 
disseminator of good practice. 
7 For further discussion relating to police governance and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and 
Police Reform Act 2002 see Jones (2003). 
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concerns paying for this demand and given the extensive duration and scope of the 
miners' strike (which will be examined in more detail later) this proved to be 
expensive. Lustgarten (1986) further argues that the deployment of mutual aid left 
many force areas depleted in terms of policing resources and this in tum 
undermined the police authorities' ability to perform their statutory function of 
ensuring an adequate and efficient force. Therefore, the police authorities are left 
out of the decision making process and yet hold statutory responsibilities that are 
undermined. 
Lustgarten (1986) is careful to clarify that he is concerned purely with the legal 
implications in his analysis of mutual aid during the miners' strike rather than the 
'rights and wrongs' of the strike and the policing methods employed during it. 
This analysis demonstrates that constitutional ambiguities are not just the domain 
of 'low level' order maintenance but are present within the context of police 
governance: 'these (tensions and contradictions) had been concealed by the 
assumption that all elements in the tripartite structure would be pulling in the 
same direction' (Lustgarten, 1986, p115). In addition to Lustgarten's analysis, the 
proactive role of central government in directing policing operations during the 
miners' strike is alluded to by senior officers interviewed by Reiner (1991). Also, 
an article written for the Police Federation suggests that policing strategy (e.g. 
organising escorts for working miners) was determined by centralised pressures 
(Judge, 2004). Both Reiner (1991) and Judge (2004) also mention that additional 
pressures were placed on the police by local police authorities (especially Labour 
dominated ones). In summary, the policing of the miners' strike demonstrates 
sectarian problems relating to governance that the tripartite framework is meant to 
avoid. Therefore, the implication is clear: at this organisational level 'specific 
order' may be protected (i.e. policing the strike) at the potential expense of 
general order (i.e. local policing concerns), a notion that, as raised previously, is 
arguably the antithesis of effective police governance (Walker, 2000). 
The factors that have been raised thus far in relation to order maintenance and 
equity / accountability are replicated in debates concerning public order policing 
but before engaging with them in more detail, it is important to differentiate 
'public order policing' from other forms of order maintenance. Rickman (2001) 
13 
provides a definition of public order that emphasises the 'broad range' of 
circumstances in which it is practiced as a form of policing. At one level, it is 
concerned with 'keeping the peace' through 'patrols and other duties' (Rickman, 
2001, p 122). This aspect of public order policing is closely allied to the 
conception of order maintenance that has been explored thus far. However, 
Rickman (2001) suggests that it is also concerned with dealing with specific forms 
of disorder such as disorderly conduct and riot. These are specific offences and 
whilst it is acknowledged that public order legislation is ambiguous (e.g. P.AJ 
Waddington, 2001; MacKenzie and Plecas, 2001; Reiner, 1999) it does allow for a 
crucial distinction to be made. Disorderly conduct is located within section 5 of 
the 1986 Public Order Act and is applied in cases of abusive, threatening or 
insulting words and / or behaviour. This legislation is intended to deal with 'low-
level' disorder, such as drink-fuelled arguments (Brown, 1994). In contrast, the 
offence of riot requires twelve or more persons present together who use or 
threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose (Section 1, Public Order Act 
1986). Whilst the former is the domain of low-level order maintenance, the latter 
concerns groups acting with a collective purpose. Whilst both forms of legislation 
relate to 'public order', the focus of the remainder of this section will be on the 
policing of groups, rather than 'low-level' order maintenance. 
In respect of this, P .AJ Waddington (1996) suggests that public order policing 
contains a set of intrinsic characteristics that separate it from other forms of order 
maintenance / police roles. Firstly, it is highly visible and therefore 'open to 
external scrutiny' (P.AJ Waddington 1996, p130) and this differentiates it from 
the low-visibility of routine patrol work. Secondly, public order policing is 
characterised as encapsulating corporate action: groups of officers act under a 
command structure that encompasses senior officers therefore placing an 
emphasis on a collective police operation compared to officers working at an 
individual level. Thirdly, there is an inclination against arrests relating to 
criminality as this holds the potential to antagonise a crowd and promote greater 
criminality / disorder. Finally, and for P.AJ Waddington (1996) most importantly, 
these characteristics combine to make public order policing potentially 
contestable - a group is in a better position to challenge the police' s version of 
1.+ 
events compared to individuals (especially those considered as 'police property') 
and this is potentially enhanced if the media are present. 
At this stage it should be noted that the work of P.AJ Waddington in relation to 
public order policing is predominantly concerned with protest or, more 
specifically, the policing of contention (P.A.J Waddington, 2003).8 This presents 
him with the opportunity to develop a line of argument that encompasses the 
(morally ambiguous) relationship between the state, the police and • citizens with 
rights' (P .AJ Waddington, 1999a). It is useful to return to the concepts of general 
and specific order to briefly outline this position. P .A.J Waddington (1999a, 
2000a, 2003) argues that criminals are outside the 'bounds of the moral 
community', and as such the police response to this group is relatively 
unproblematic in terms of moral ambiguity. In relation to general order, one 
would argue that this role is crucial if public tranquillity and safety is to be 
maintained. However, it is also a condition of general order that citizens enjoy 
rights such as the freedom of expression, association and assembly (Walker, 
2000). The policing of protest or contention is potentially a challenge to police 
legitimacy, especially if coercion is being employed against groups that believe 
they are morally obliged to take collective action (P .A.J Waddington, 2003). In 
these circumstances, the police do not hold the moral 'high ground' in relation to 
the actions they take compared to when they are dealing with criminals (P .AJ 
Waddington, 2000a). This reveals a fundamental tension where the interests of 
general order conflict with the interests of specific order, thus rendering the 
policing of contention as being unavoidably 'political' in nature (P .AJ 
Waddington, 2003). 
Fielding (1991) argues that it is understandable yet limiting to consider 
contemporary issues as both 'unique' and / or ·pressing'. A review of the policing 
of contention and the tensions it raises reveals that it is not an issue unique to 
contemporary policing. Prior to the establishment of the 'new police' in 1829, the 
response of the state to any outbreaks of large scale disorder (e.g. the Gordon 
Riots in 1780, the Luddite disturbances in 1816) involved the deployment of 
8 P.A.J Waddington (2003) draws on the work of Tilly (1995) to suggest that 'contention' implies 
a range of activities that include, but are not restricted to, explicit political protest. This work will 
be expanded upon in greater detail in section four. 
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troops (Fielding, 1991). Although the initial instructions presented to the police 
stressed that their main objective was the prevention of crime, they were also 
involved in the policing of large scale disorder that equate to the concept of 
policing contention (Emsley, 1996).9 However, it should be acknowledged that 
not all forms of public order policing were ingrained in contention and this raises 
another crucial issue. Whilst Smith (1985) extensively documents the policing of 
contention related to Victorian London, relatively little consideration is given to a 
form of public order policing that encompassed the staging of the Great Exhibition 
in 1851. This event attracted millions of visitors and involved over 1000 officers 
(Smith 1985) thus meeting P.AJ Waddington's (1996) characteristics of the 
policing in this context being highly visible and operating at a corporate (i.e. 
group) level. In addition to maintaining order at this event, Smith (1985, p123) 
notes that: 
'The Great Exhibition could be considered another significant 
milestone for the Metropolitan Police. . . It strengthened their 
reputation with property owners and shopkeepers ... The pessimists 
that had feared that Hyde Park would become a magnet for hordes of 
riffraff, revolutionaries, and criminals were proved wrong.' 
The example of the Great Exhibition shows that the policing of crowds does not 
necessarily have to be contestable. One would argue that this example exemplifies 
'public order policing' as it meets the characteristics outlined by P.AJ 
Waddington (1996) with one crucial distinction: the moral ambiguity associated 
with contention is, for whatever reason, removed or diluted and thus reduces 
tensions between specific order (i.e. the state) and general order (i.e. public 
tranquillity and safety). However, it is also important to note that Smith~s extract 
implies that potential interests (e.g. property owners) could have been alienated 
from the police had there been problems associated with policing the event. 
This section has attempted to 'make sense' of public order policing. In doing so, it 
has reflected on the order maintenance role of the police. and the conceptual 
ambiguities associated with it. These ambiguities include problems of definition, 
9 For more infonnation relating to the origins - and controversies - surrounding the emergence and 
role of the New Police see Reiner (2000a, chapter 1). 
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equity and accountability which any account of public order policing must 
consider. P.A.J Waddington's (1996) work is particularly helpful in that it 
provides guidance on what characterises 'public order policing' in comparison to 
other forms of order maintenance. The following section explores the contribution 
of social research in relation to the 'broad range' of contexts in which it is 
practised. 
3. Public Order Policing in Practice 
The practice of public order policing is best conceptualised as occurring across a 
spectrum. If one were to consult public order related legislation, such a spectrum 
would range from the low level (e.g. anti-social behaviour) to "large scale 
conflicts with a manifest political dimension' (Reiner, 1999, p165). This extreme 
end of the spectrum would constitute the gravest threat to both specific and 
general forms of order. The aim of this section is to characterise different contexts 
in which public order policing is practiced as outlined in the previous section in 
relation to P.A.J Waddington's (1996) work. Therefore, the predominant objective 
will be characterising different contexts that involve the policing of different types 
of crowds. It is not the intention to offer analytical accounts of why disorder / 
order occur at this stage - that is the subject of the next section - but this exercise 
will demonstrate that some public order policing contexts have been well 
documented whilst others are comparatively under-researched. 
Returning to the previous section, it was noted that the policing of the Great 
Exhibition was perceived to be successful. The obvious but important point to 
make in comparing this event with occurrences of large scale disorder concerns 
the characteristics and motivations of the crowd. As Slaughter (2003) notes, a 
'crowd' might constitute protestors, revellers, spectators or mourners who could 
be well organised and ordered or alternatively spontaneous and chaotic. Similarly, 
King and Brearley (1996) distinguish between "mobs' (with an inclination towards 
forms of disorder) and 'audiences' (with an inclination towards order). However. 
an important point made by King and Brearley is that a crowd that is initially an 
"audience' (e.g. information seeking / recreational) can become a "mob' (e.g. 
aggressive / trying to escape a situation) depending on a number of factors such as 
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the actions of the police and / or the geography of the gathering (King and 
Brearley, 1996).10 Therefore, public order policing encapsulates the policing of a 
potentially endless list of circumstances in which a crowd is motivated to gather. 
It also occurs in a context where the dynamic of the crowd can potentially change 
from orderly to disorderly, which will be explored in greater detail in the next 
section with reference to Le Bon's (1895) 'classical' conceptualisation of the 
crowd. 
In the context of this diversity, the literature offers typologies of public order 
policing that provide a useful starting point for determining context related 
characteristics (Dunning, Murphy, Newburn and 1. Waddington, 1987; King and 
Brearley, 1996; Baxter 2001). This literature focuses on contexts where disorder 
occurs and thus potentially only tells half the story but it does at least provide 
guidance. For example, King and Brearley (1996) examine public order policing 
in the context of political, industrial, festival and urban (inner city / estate) related 
disorder since the 1960s. Dunning et al (1987) offer a similar typology but also 
consider sport related disorder and review a 75 year period. Baxtor (2001) follows 
a 'conflict typology' that again focuses on political and industrial conflicts but 
also includes the category 'single issue' conflict. These categories are useful but, 
as with crowds, they are not concrete. King and Brearley (1996) note that an event 
categorised as industrial (e.g. a workers' strike) could also be construed as 
political. Likewise, a festival such as Gay Pride might be celebratory but with a 
political component (e.g. campaigning for changes in government policy). 
However, the typology approach does allow for an exploration of different public 
order policing contexts and as such it is worth adapting the categories devised by 
the authors mentioned above to examine the policing of a) political protest / 
industrial disputes; b) community disorders and c) festivals. 
10 A high profile example of this process occurring concerns the Hillsborough disaster in 1989 
where 96 Liverpool fans died attempting to escape from an overcrowded terrace (Taylor, 1989). 
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3.1 Political Protest / Industrial Disputes 
The public order policing of political protest and industrial disputes has been well 
documented. 11 This section will outline four examples of occurrences of disorder 
in both the political and industrial context: 
Examples of 
Disorder: Political 
and Industrial 
Anti-Vietnam 
Demonstrations 
(Grosvenor Square 
1967/1968) 
National Front 
Meeting 
(Southall, 1979) 
The Poll Tax 
Demonstration 
(Trafalgar Square, 
Brief Summary 
Marches in October 1967 (5,000 protestors) and 
March 1968 (25,000 protestors) against the Vietnam 
war are subj ect to the breaching of police cordons 
and disorder (e.g. missiles thrown at police) - 280 
people are arrested in the latter demonstration (D. 
Waddington, 1992). 
In the run up to the 1979 general election, the 
National Front holds a meeting in Southall, an area 
which has a large Asian population. There is disorder 
close to the meeting location which the police blame 
on extremist right and left wing groups. One 
protestor, Blair Peach, is killed and 345 people are 
arrested. Asian community leaders call for an 
investigation into police behaviour during the 
demonstration and, in particular, the activities of the 
Metropolitan Police's Special Patrol Group (SPG) 
(D. Waddington et aI, 1989; Jefferson, 1990) 
A demonstration on March 30th 1990 against the Poll 
Tax is characterised by clashes that lead to over 500 
arrests and 542 police injuries culminating in 'the 
11 See Smith (1985); Dunning et al (1987); D. Waddington, Jones and Critcher (1989): Fielding 
(1991); D. Waddington (1992): King and Brearley (1996). 
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1990) 
The Miners' Strike 
(Orgreave, 1984) 
most senous outbreak of civil disorder in Central 
London since the Bloody Sunday riot of 188T (P.AJ 
Waddington, 1994b, p370). 
Over a number of days in late May 1984, police 
clash with pickets as the British Steel Corporation 
(BSC) attempt to move coke from a coking plant in 
Orgreave, South Yorkshire. At its peak, 7,000 
pickets clash with 3,400 police. The clashes are 
characterised by mounted police baton charges and 
riot shields are deployed for the first time in 
mainland Britain during the strike (King and 
Brearley, 1996). 
It is possible to draw out some common themes from these examples. Firstly, all 
were high profile in nature and the sources mentioned above all relate extensive 
media coverage of disorder. Secondly, the examples demonstrate changing police 
strategy and tactics in the light of new techniques and technologies (e.g. the use of 
riot shields). These changes, which can be conceptualised as a drift towards 
. paramilitarism , (Jefferson, 1987, 1990, 1993; P.A.J Waddington, 1987, 1991, 
1993), will be explored in the following section. Thirdly, these examples represent 
the extreme end of the spectrum in relation to public order policing, demonstrating 
challenges to both specific and general order culminating in . broken windows, 
broken bodies, broken expectations' (Reiner, 1999, pI64). 
It is also worth noting two other characteristics of public order policing in relation 
to political protest / industrial disputes. Firstly, as has been previously mentioned, 
the majority of public order operations are characterised by the general lack of 
disorder and few, if any, arrests, and this is consistent with the policing of the 
majority of political protests and industrial disputes (della Porta and Reiter. 1998). 
To illustrate this point, it is worth citing P.AJ Waddington's (199..J.a) research 
findings concerning public order policing in London: out of 82 events that were 
observed over nearly two years, only 9 (11 %) resulted in 10 or more arrests. A 
pertinent recent example that typifies this trend concerns the 'Stop the War' 
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demonstration held in London on 15th February 2003 - crowd estimates ranged 
between 750,000 (police estimate) and over two million (organiser estimate) and 
yet the event attracted no disorder and only 7 arrests were made. 12 
The second characteristic - evident in the 'Stop the War' demonstration -
concerns the changing dynamics of protest and industrial disputes. With regards to 
the latter, it is noted that large scale industrial dispute related protest has declined 
since the late 1980s (Reiner, 1998). In relation to the former, the last 15 years 
have seen an increase in 'single-issue' protest (Reiner 1998; Willis, 2001). 
Examples of this include animal rights protest (Critcher, 1996; Markham and 
Punch, 2004); environmental protest (Donnelly, 1996; Villiers, 1997); anti-
capitalism protest (Willis, 2001) and, more recently, pro fox hunting groups. It is 
argued that this form of 'single-issue' protest represents a shift from protest / 
industrial disputes that potentially threatened 'overall social order' (e.g. the 
Miners' Strike, the Poll Tax demonstration) to protest that reflects societies that 
'have experienced simultaneous processes of greater heterogeneity and economic 
fragmentation and global diffusion' (Reiner 1998, p48). In short, rather than 
threats to specific order that potentially undermine the (national) state, protest will 
be diffuse, potentially global and issue oriented: the 'Stop the War' demonstration 
typifies this, albeit on large scale, as 450 organisations demonstrated as a coalition 
with protests occurring simultaneously, and globally, on the same day (February 
15t \ 2003).13 
3.2 Community Disorders 
King and Brearley (1996) suggest that community disorder is characterised as 
being spontaneous in form and occurring in areas that have a history of social 
deprivation, unemployment and political marginalisation. Before exploring this 
further it is again worth presenting a brief overview of examples that constitute 
this form of disorder: 
12 The Sunday Times, February 16th , 2003 
I3 The Guardian, February 16th, 2003 
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Examples of 
Disorder: 
Community Disorder 
St. Paul's (Bristol, 
1980) 
Brixton (London, 
1981) 
Broadwater Farm 
(London, 1985) 
Brief Summary 
Disorder occurred following a police drugs raid on a 
cafe that culminated in a crowd gathering and stone 
throwing (Joshua and Wallace, 1983). This was 
followed by police withdrawal and large scale 
looting and destruction of a number of buildings until 
PSU (Police Support Unit) reinforcements arrived 
under the mutual aid scheme (D. Waddington, 1992, 
King and Brearley, 1996) 
Following a proactive police operation targeting 
street crime (Operation Swamp), disorder occurred 
over the weekend of 10th - 12th April 1981 resulting 
in 7,300 police officers being deployed, 450 people 
injured and damage to 145 buildings (D Waddington, 
1992; King and Brearley, 1996). The events 
surrounding this outbreak of disorder culminated in a 
public inquiry and the subsequent publication of the 
Scarman Report (Scarman, 1981). 
An Afro-Caribbean woman, Cynthia Jarrett, died 
during a police search for stolen goods. This was 
followed by a number of meetings between the 
Jarrett family, community representatives and the 
police, and (peaceful) demonstrations outside the 
local police station. At the same time, tensions were 
mounting on the Broadwater Farm estate as the 
police increased their presence and there were 
occurrences of confrontation and disorder. This 
escalated into a riot involving the throwing of petrol 
bombs, paving stones and knives and the deployment 
'I 
Burnley (Lancashire, 
2001) 
of police with riot shields. During this disorder PC 
Keith Blakelock was killed. Following the disorder, 
and for a period of weeks, between 1,000 and 10,000 
officers were deployed in an evidence gathering 
capacity culminating in 359 arrests (King and 
Brearley, 1996). As with Brixton, a public inquiry 
was launched into the events surrounding the 
disorder in Broadwater Farm, culminating in the 
Gifford Report (Gifford, 1986). 
Between June 23rd and June 25th 2001 there were 
violent clashes between members of the white and 
Asian heritage community in the centre of Burnley. 
This escalated and culminated in damage to both 
white and Asian heritage property totalling £1.4 
million and 101 arrests were made (Clarke, 2001). 
The first point to make for the purposes of this category is that, relative to political 
and industrial dispute' related disorder, the variables and reasons relating to why 
community disorder occurs are complex. 14 For example, Benyon and Solomos 
(1988) suggest that disorder occurs as a result of macro factors such as racial 
disadvantage and discrimination, high unemployment, widespread deprivation, 
political exclusion and powerlessness. These factors are all pertinent to the 
examples given above although it should be acknowledged that this form of 
disorder is not just restricted to minority ethnic communities: Bowling and 
Phillips (2003) note the outbreak of rioting in Oxford and the North East in 
predominantly white areas. King and Brearley (1996) refer to these as examples of 
. peripheral estate disorder' but they share many of the factors (e.g. economic 
recession and political tensions) relevant to St Paul's, Brixton, Broadwater Farm 
and Burnley. It is also important to note that the cited examples are not isolated 
. one offs': following the Brixton disorder of 1981 there was disorder in a number 
of other towns and cities including Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham within 
l.t For further analysis of the examples given above, and in addition to the cited sources, see 
Benyon (1984), Keith (1993), and King and D. Waddington (2004). D. Waddington (1992) and 
King and Brearley (1996) provide further examples of this form of disorder. 
the year (D Waddington, 1992). There was significant disorder, again in Brixton, 
one month before the Broadwater Farm disorder (King and Brearley, 1996). 
Similarly, there was disorder in Oldham and Bradford - both predominantly Asian 
areas - that occurred within weeks either side of the Burnley disorder (Cantle. 
2001). 
The role of the police in these forms of disorder is also complex. Unlike the 
policing of protest that is likely to be transient in terms of people gathering and 
then dispersing over a limited time, forms of community disorder are often 
characterised by the police potentially being a factor that leads to disorder and 
then having to deal with the consequences of policing communities post disorder. 
To put this into context, it is worth considering the findings of official inquiries. In 
relation to Brixton, the Scarman Report (1981) alludes to poor police / community 
relations prior to the disorder (e.g. there was no community consultation prior to 
the police instigating Operation Swamp). This is echoed in relation to 'police 
harassment' that is mentioned as a factor in the disorder at St Paul's (Reicher, 
1984) and Broadwater Farm (Gifford, 1986). Likewise, the findings of reports into 
the disorder in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford highlight potential problems 
between the police and local community in relation to allegations of police racism 
and the (mis)recording of racist crime: 'there can be no dispute that policing and 
the perception of policing was a contributory factor behind the riots.' (Ritchie, 
2001, P 13, emphasis added). As such, at the heart of recommendations made in 
these reports, there is an emphasis on the requirement for the police to display 
sensitivity and awareness in relation to the communities they serve to defuse 
potential disorder in the future (e.g. through closer working with the community). 
This spate of disorder in the North of England also led to the promotion of 
strategies to enhance 'community cohesion' with the aims of minimising the risk 
of community disorder and developing stronger and cohesive communities 
(Community Cohesion Unit, 2002). Although these strategies involve a number of 
agencies (e.g. housing and education) emphasis is placed on the police to achieve 
closer links with local communities through more effective community policing 
and the use of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships to achieve the above 
cited aims (Community Cohesion Unit, 2002). 
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With regards to public order policing, the important factors to note are similar to 
those mentioned in relation to the policing of protest and industrial disputes: King 
and Brearley (1996) and King and D Waddington (2004) outline evolving police 
strategies and tactics that were used to deal with the disorder per se which relate 
to changes in techniques and technologies. Once again, these issues will be 
considered in greater detail when examining analytic accounts of public order 
policing in the next section. However, these must be, and will be, considered in 
conjunction with other factors when attempting to understand why this form of 
disorder occurs. 
3.3 Festivals 
The public order policing of festivals has generated relatively little attention 
compared to the previous two categories. Speculation as to why this might be the 
case is given in the concluding part of this section following an outline as to how 
public order policing manifests itself in this context. A logical starting point is the 
Notting Hill Festival which is a carnival that is staged by and for the black 
community and has been held annually since 1964. King and Brearley (1996) note 
that the 1976 Notting Hill Carnival was subject to disorder resulting in 60 arrests, 
456 injuries and damage to 321 premises. With the exception of 1987 and 1989, 
there have been no outbreaks of disorder associated with the event (P.AJ 
Waddington, 1994a). Indeed, the focus of more recent literature has emphasised 
the police role in terms of maintaining public safety as opposed to accounting for 
disorder, especially given the location and popularity of the event (Cullen and 
King, 1993). It is also interesting to note that King and Brearley (1996) identify 
that recent disorder-free carnivals have been characterised by the police operating 
in a multi-agency capacity in relation to planning the event. This approach to the 
Notting Hill Carnival is also echoed by P.AJ Waddington (1994a) and Cullen and 
King (1993) and, in terms of contemporary carnivals, it is proposed by the Greater 
London Authority, Metropolitan Police Authority and London Notting Hill 
Carnival Limited (the main organisers) that multi-agency work should continue 
and that the route should be extended in order to increase public safety. IS 
15 Greater London Authority Press Release, 25 th November, 2004 
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King and Brearley (1996) also note that policing practices and priorities have 
evolved in relation to the policing of "alternative lifestyle~ festivals. They cite an 
example of disorder at Stonehenge in 1985, referred to as the "Battle of the 
Beanfield~ ~ which resulted in over 500 arrests and then compare it with the lack of 
disorder during the policing of a New Age Travellers gathering at Castlemorton 
Common, Worcestershire, in 1992. This latter instance of order being maintained 
was characterised by a 'softly softly~ policing strategy encompassing negotiation 
between different parties coupled with the use of proactive intelligence gathering 
methods to ensure a successful outcome (King and Brearley, 1996). 
In terms of public order policing and "orderly~ festival events, there is a dearth of 
literature compared to the public order policing of protest, industrial disputes and 
community disorder. However, two recent pieces of literature that focus on 
festival events that were characterised by a lack of disorder make some interesting 
points. Barton and James (2003) note the impact of commercial interests in the 
policing of festival events. In their analysis, Barton and James focus on the 
policing of the "Run to the Sun~ festival in Newquay, Cornwall. Rather than 
preparing for significant disorder, the police are placed in a position where they 
must protect the interests of the general community whilst also supporting 
'entrepreneurial action~. In the case of 'Run to the Sun~, this manifests itself as a 
difficult balancing act as the event brings significant revenue to the area but also 
rowdy behaviour and traffic congestion that, in another context (e.g. political 
protest), might lead to greater police intervention then was observed (Barton and 
James, 2003). The analytic implications of this work will be considered in the 
following section but it raises the role of partnership working as being important 
in relation to public order policing. Finally, it is worth highlighting the work of 
Valverde and Cirak (2003) that focuses on a Gay Pride festival in Toronto, 
Canada. This work notes that the festival is characterised by forms of self-policing 
and the use of volunteer marshals and private security in addition to the public 
police. During this event, the police role involves managing traffic and providing 
'site security~, the implication being that 'in recent years Pride Day has come to 
be policed not like an old-time demonstration but rather like a large scale 
construction site' (Valverde and Cirak, 2003, pi 07). 
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With reference to community disorder and public order policing~ it was stated that 
any analytical account must evaluate a number of factors in order to understand 
why the disorder occurred. The public order policing of festivals and the majority 
of protests suggests that analytic accounts must also explain why order is 
maintained in these contexts (e.g. the manifestation of 'softly softly~ approaches). 
This will be the aim of the next section. In this section it has been highlighted that 
public order policing is practiced in different contexts ranging from large scale 
disorder (e.g. the anti poll tax riots) through to the policing of events such as Run 
to the Sun and Gay Pride where order is generally maintained. In addition to 
providing this summary of different public order policing contexts~ the categories 
highlighted also point to gaps in the literature. These will now be briefly 
discussed. 
Firstly~ public order policing and disorder, whatever the context, is relatively well 
documented in terms of official reports and the academic literature. This is less the 
case for instances of public order policing where order is maintained~ although the 
work of P .A.J Waddington~ to be highlighted in the next section~ is a notable 
exception. To account for this~ it is useful to cite an appropriate analogy from 
Reiner (2000a~ p9): 'like riding a bike~ policing is the sort of activity that is 
thought about mainly when the wheels come off. When things are runnIng 
smoothly it tends to be a socially invisible~ undiscussed routine. ~ In terms of 
public order policing~ instances of disorder equate most dramatically to examples 
of the 'wheels coming off (e.g. high profile; large numbers of arrests and injuries; 
damage to property) and as such generate official~ public~ media and academic 
interest. Relatively speaking~ and as far as the literature is concemed~ instances of 
public order policing where order is maintained usually fall into the domain of the 
'undiscussed~ . 
Secondly, relative to protest / industrial dispute and community disorder. the 
public order policing of festivals is also under researched. Again, this is hardly 
surprising as the form these events take is unlikely to impinge dramatically on 
either general or specific order. Although 'Run to the Sun' might inconvenience 
the citizens of Newquay it does not represent a threat to the state and political 
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institutions in the same way that political protest might. 16 However, as Benewick 
and Holton (1987) suggest there is potentially a great deal to be gleaned from 
considering those occasions which are characterised as 'peaceful' (i.e. not yiolent 
or disorderly) as 'such crowds may offer vital insights to both social analysts and 
policy-makers, in the sense that they help to explain why protest and disorder are 
not endemic' (p20 1). With these themes in mind, the following section will 
explore analytical accounts of public order policing in relation to both disorder 
and order. 
4. Analytical Accounts of Public Order Policing 
This section will predominantly focus on analytical accounts that provide a 
framework to understand the role of public order policing in both cases of disorder 
and order. It will start by exploring the issue of . paramilitarism , (Jefferson 1987, 
1990,1993; P.AJ Waddington, 1987, 1991, 1993). This will then be followed by 
consideration of the 'flashpoints' model (D Waddington et ai, 1987: D 
Waddington et ai, 1989; D Waddington, 1992) which explores the factors which 
lead to disorder occurring in certain circumstances. Consideration will then be 
given to P.AJ Waddington's (1994a) work that focuses on negotiation and 
compromise within a public order context. As will be revealed, all of these 
approaches have generated controversy in relation to methodological procedures 
and conceptualisations. However, these accounts and their respective critiques can 
offer guidance as to what one should consider when seeking a comprehensive 
analysis of public order policing, whatever the context it is being practiced in. 
Following this discussion, attention will be briefly given to other (and more 
recent) analytical accounts that will set the appropriate context for the final section 
of this chapter that considers contemporary public order policing policy. 
-1.1 Public Order Policing: The Rise of Paramilitarism 
Despite holding polarised views on the consequences, both Jefferson (1987, 1990, 
1993) and P.AJ Waddington (1987,1991,1993) acknowledge that public order 
policing has been characterised since the late 1960s by a rise in ne\\ strategies. 
16 It does, however, raise interesting issues to be discussed later in relation to police accountability 
at local levels. 
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techniques and technologies that equate to the concept of • paramilitarism , . 
Examples of this include the development and deployment of mutual aid schemes, 
specialist public order units (e.g. the Special Patrol Group, now the Tactical 
Support Group), new command structures and equipment such as riot shields and 
flame proof clothing (P.A.J Waddington, 1987). P.A.J Waddington and Jefferson 
also agree that these developments present a number of dilemmas in relation to 
police legitimacy and the use of restraint in a public order context but this is 
where their agreement ends. P.A.J Waddington (1987, 1993) suggests that 
elements of paramilitarism are necessary if appropriate restraint (i.e. the use of 
'minimum force') is to be a reality in a public order context. In contrast, Jefferson 
(1987, 1990, 1993) argues that paramilitarism exacerbates the potential for 
disorder and presents a significant challenge to police legitimacy. Their respective 
arguments will now be briefly considered. 
P .A.J Waddington (1987) argues that legitimacy in a public order context takes 
the form of a two way process between the police and participants if the potential 
for disorder is to be reduced. Disorder is potentially more likely if the police are 
perceived by participants as partisan but "the more successful the police are in 
presenting themselves as impartial guardians of the peace, the more inhibited the 
crowd become' (P.A.J Waddington, 1987, p38). However, in those situations 
where disorder occurs it is the characteristic of corporate action (i.e. groups of 
officers acting under a command structure that encompasses senior officers) that 
presents the most effective mechanism for taking appropriate (i.e. legitimate and 
restrained) action: 
• In sum, one of the defining characteristics of militarism - the co-
ordination of squads under superior command - offers the prospect of 
policing disorder with restrained discipline. Paramilitary organisation 
is not a sufficient condition for ensuring restraint, but it is a necessary 
condition: disciplined co-ordination is simply not possible bv 
traditional means'. (P.A.J Waddington, 1993, p357) 17 
17 By 'traditional means', P.A.J Waddington (1993) is referring to ad hoc and reacti\'e types of 
intervention in a public order context. 
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P .A.J Waddington (1987, 1993) argues that this disciplined approach is preferable 
to an uncoordinated response where ill-equipped officers lacking coordinated 
strategic and tactical supervision might succumb to excessive force in a climate of 
fear and confusion when disorder occurs. In these latter circumstances, excessive 
force will in turn reduce both legitimacy and restraint. Although the police might 
use their 'paramilitary capacity' (e.g. shields) to restore order, the combination of 
discipline and co-ordination ensures that ultimately less force will be deployed 
more effectively compared to "traditional' (i.e. unorganised) methods (P .A.J 
Waddington, 1987, 1993). 
In contrast to P .A.J Waddington, Jefferson (1987, 1990) argues that the rise in 
paramilitarism presents fundamental questions relating to police legitimacy and 
might exacerbate the potential for disorder. Rather than taking a 'top down' (i.e. 
police perspective), Jefferson (1987, 1990) examines the issue of legitimacy from 
the "view from below'. This perspective argues that public order policing is no 
different to other forms of policing in that it encompasses the policing of 'de-
legitimated' sections of society and that these groups are subject to increased 
police attention. I8 It is therefore argued that any notion of impartiality and 
restraint (i.e. minimum force) in relation to the use of paramilitary policing 
methods is incomplete unless it applies, and is experienced, by these groups, 
which Jefferson (1987) argues is not the case. In short, the police cannot and do 
not fulfil the role of 'impartial guardians of the peace' in a public order context. 
In addition to taking the perspective of the "policed' in a public order context, 
Jefferson (1987, 1990) also argues that paramilitary policing might contribute to 
disorder in a public order context through a 'self-fulfilling prophecy', and this is 
outlined through four stages: 
1) Preparation - If 'trouble' is expected, the police anticipate the worst and 
deploy appropriately equipped and trained officers on standby. This is a time 
when nerves and frustration may take hold whilst the presence of massed 
police numbers, 'riot' equipment and special vans send out a message to 
18 This equates to the concept of 'police property' as presented by Reiner (2000a) and highlighted 
~arlier. 
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demonstrators of 'provocation~ - it is at this stage that the 'self-fulfilling~ 
prophecy starts to reveal itself (Jefferson, 1987, 1990); 
2) Controlling Space - Physical space is demarcated along lines between which 
protestors are allowed and excluded. This might be perceived as provocative 
by the protestors and induce a confrontational response thus confirming to the 
police that trouble will occur; 
3) Controlling the Crowd - The police now must contain and control the space 
and this can raise tensions further, once more confirming that trouble will 
occur. At this stage, the tactics and equipment associated with paramilitary 
policing may be deployed thus potentially escalating violence, as protestors 
will be getting angry (and possibly hurt) in response to the coercive tactics 
they are facing; 
4) Clearance - Once the demonstration has passed, the police want a quick 
dispersal and deploy paramilitary tactics and resources to achieve this. This 
leads to more confrontation until, at some point the police 'succeed~ (i.e. 
dispersal is achieved). During post event reflection, the police might request 
more resources and equipment for next time in anticipation of further ·trouble~ 
and the cycle continues: "in the profane world of paramilitary policing. the 
script for the next crisis in public order policing is thus, unwittingly, being 
prepared. ~ (Jefferson, 1987, p53). 
In addition to presenting this model Jefferson (1990) makes a number of 
recommendations that are pertinent to equity and accountability that he argues 
would restrain both the rise of paramilitary policing and the escalation and spiral 
of violence associated with it. This includes acknowledging that discretion. 
whether it is at the level of Chief Constable (e.g. in introducing paramilitary 
options) or constable (e.g. in exercising their powers) is selective rather than 
impartial. It is therefore imperative that there is input from those groups who are 
'routinely policed~ into the form this discretion takes and that this should 
culminate in guidelines that promote the rights of members from these groups at 
both the victim and offender level, whom Jefferson (1990) argues are 
overrepresented in both categories. At the operational level Jefferson (1990) 
argues that the police should analyse and monitor incidents and activities (e.g. 
increasing self-awareness of their potential in the "amplification' process. 
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identifying bias and discrimination in arrests). In addition, public order operations 
culminating in low arrests, complaints and injuries should be rewarded and a 
genuine dialogue with the 'policed' should incorporate both listening and learning 
on the part of the police. Finally, Jefferson (1990) suggests that public order 
policing should be more experimental and innovative with the aim of producing 
'non-discriminatory, trouble free and acceptable (to the policed) policing of public 
order' (P144). 
The arguments presented by Jefferson (1987, 1990) are criticised by P.AJ 
Waddington (1993) on analytical and factual grounds. Firstly, P.A.J Waddington 
(1993) argues that the use of protective clothing - identified by Jefferson (1987, 
1990) as a component of paramilitary policing techniques that is potentially 
provocative - is not problematic as the police have a right to protect themselves 
during disorder. 19 Secondly, P.A.J Waddington (1993) re-emphasises that 
disciplined and coordinated responses are preferable to traditional methods and 
that appropriate training in the use of force means that it can be used more 
effectively and less often compared to untrained officers facing disorder without 
training or supervision. Thirdly, P.A.J Waddington (1993) argues that, when force 
is necessary, the deployment of CS gas and water cannons is far less dangerous 
compared to 'traditional' methods such as horse and baton charges although such 
actions may undermine discipline and coordination. 
P.AJ Waddington (1993) also argues that Jefferson's four stage model is flawed. 
The first problem relates to generalisation - Jefferson (1990) applies the model to 
account for three occasions of public disorder and yet he implies that it is relevant 
to all public order contexts where 'trouble' might be expected.20 By referring to 
his own fieldwork, P.AJ Waddington (1993) argues that this is unrepresentative 
of public order policing per se where the conditions Jefferson describes are 
present (e.g. officers held in reserve, dispersal of crowds with officers with 
shields) but do not lead to disorder in the majority of cases: 'The more the police 
planned for the 'worst case scenario', the less disorder there was; when control of 
19 P.A.1 Waddington (1993) states that similar criticisms have not been levelled at the ambulance 
service who have used helmets / army fortified vehicles when dealing with disorder (e.g. during 
the Miners' Strike). 
20 These three instances of disorder include Broadwater Farm 1985, Orgreave 1984 and a protest 
involving the Manchester University Students Union, 1985. 
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space and the crowd was at its greatest, violence was its lowest" (P .AJ 
Waddington, 1993, p362). It is P.A.J Waddington's (1993) opinion that on those 
occasions when disorder occurs (e.g. the Poll Tax demonstration) the problems lie 
with a breakdown in command and control rather than as a result of paramilitary 
policing methods. Finally, P.A.J Waddington (1993) criticises the 'view from 
below' perspective, arguing that Jefferson is being selective in his choice of 
groups that fit this category: if it is applied universally then it must also include 
football hooligans and National Front demonstrators who have also been involved 
in disorder with the police. Therefore, in light of these criticisms, P .AJ 
Waddington (1993, p366) is left to conclude that 'what he (Jefferson) is actually 
registering is not the empirical connection between certain methods of policing 
and the likelihood of disorder, but a distaste for those methods and what they 
represent. ' 
Jefferson (1993) responds to these criticisms by stating that he and P.AJ 
Waddington will probably never agree on paramilitary policing. Indeed, Reiner 
(1998) suggests that disagreement is not in the analysis but in the political 
positions both authors hold. It has also been argued that the term 'paramilitarism' 
as defined by Jefferson and P .A.J Waddington is inaccurate as both authors fail to 
equate it with the role and relationship of the military to the police and state (Hills, 
1995). However, and for the purposes of this section, what is important to take 
away from this debate is that police responses to public order policing, in terms of 
equipment, strategies and tactics, will be influential in either encouraging disorder 
(if one takes Jefferson's viewpoint) or facilitating order (if one takes P.AJ 
Waddington's position). Likewise, this debate suggests that a complete account of 
public order policing must take into account the perspectives of both the police 
and those participating in public events, whatever the context. Regardless of 
political positions and the context in which it is being practiced, 21 these represent 
an important set of variables that an analysis of public order policing must 
consider. 
The pnmary focus of the 'paramilitary policing' debate concerns the police 
response and role in relation to public disorder. The arguments raised are 
21 In terms of the paramilitary policing debate. Jefferson and P.AJ Waddington focus 
predominantly on the policing of political protest and / or industrial disputes. 
important but it is also necessary to understand why citizens engage in public 
disorder if one is to assess how best the police should respond. In order to achieve 
this it is worth exploring the contribution of the • flashpoints model' to the debate 
on public order policing. 
4.2 Public Order Policing: The 'Flashpoints' Model 
The premIse of the 'flashpoints ~ model is based upon the assumption that 
psychology and sociology fail to offer a comprehensive account of why disorder 
occurs in certain circumstances but not others (D Waddington et aI, 1987). For 
example, it was noted in relation to community disorder that factors such as social 
deprivation, unemployment and political marginalisation might underpin this form 
of disorder and yet for every example where this is evident there will be occasions 
where similar circumstances are present but no disorder ensues. Therefore, D 
Waddington et al (1987) propose that to understand disorder it is important to 
analyse individual cases at six levels: structural, political/ideological, cultural, 
contextual, situational and interactional. D Waddington (1992) argues that this 
approach allows the identification of 'a number of factors most conducive to 
disorder~ (P205) and that they culminate, at the final 'interactional' level~ in a 
'flashpoint~ that 'crystallises grievances, encourages communication and provides 
an irresistible catalyst for disorder~ (P207). 
In terms of historical context, the 'flashpoints' perspective offers a 'multi-causal~ 
model of why disorder occurs through analysis of the six levels mentioned above. 
D Waddington et al (1989) argue that this offers the scope for a more systematic 
analysis compared to prior 'mono-causal~ (i.e. single cause) models which 
accounted for disorder through either psychological reductionism (for example, 
disorder as a result of the actions of a 'collective' crowd mentality) at the expense 
of cultural and social context or sociological approaches that offer general 
explanations (for example, unemployment and deprivation) but do not pinpoint 
why disorder should occur in one location / context and not another. Having 
introduced the rationale behind the 'flashpoints' modeL it is worth brietly 
addressing each of these six levels in more detail (D Waddington et aI, 1989: D 
Waddington~ 1992): 
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1) Structural - Societal inequalities (e.g. in terms of power, material 
resources and life opportunities) provide a basis for a shared perception of 
deprivation amongst a group. In another context, a group might not be 
affected by or experience these social inequalities per se but they perceive 
the state to be involved in policy / activity that they find unjust (what D 
Waddington et aI, 1989, term 'ideological alienation from the state'). If 
these inequalities or ideological alienation are not addressed by the state 
(either because it is unable or unwilling) there is the potential for the group 
to become estranged from the existing political order.22 This stage sets an 
important context for the next level; 
2) Political/Ideological - The relationship between the 'dissenting' group 
and political/ideological institutions is important at this level. This 
relationship will be determined by perceptions of legitimacy towards the 
dissenting group via media, politicians and commentators (what D 
Waddington, 1992, refers to as political and ideological institutions). The 
nature of this relationship may, a) increase the potential for the group to 
engage in violence (e.g. if the group is disenfranchised from democratic 
processes) and, b) impact on how the group is policed (i.e. the police take 
their cues from political and ideological institutions); 
3) Cultural - The focus at this level is the . accommodation' between 
members of the group and the police in certain situations (i.e. what each 
party will tolerate of the other). This works on the basis that social groups 
have different ethnic, regional and / or occupational cultures that could 
clash with those cultures prevalent in the police, for example, Reiner's 
(2000a) argument that certain groups are perceived by the police as 'police 
property'. This can result in stereotyping on the part of the crowd and the 
police towards each other but it does not mean that disorder is inevitable . 
. Accommodation' through compromise might allow for the setting of 
norms on what is acceptable. As an example, D Waddington et al (1989) 
22 It is at this level that . community cohesion' strategies could make a positive impact (e .g. 
Community Cohesion Unit, 2002). However, it is argued that the application of such strategies 
could be undermined by assumptions that, for example, a common set of principles and values can 
be identified and applied across diverse (i.e. multi-ethnic, multi-faith. multi-cultural) communities 
- see McGhee (2003) for more discussion. 
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suggest that behaviour such as pushing and shoving between police and 
pickets might be tolerated whereas throwing stones would not; 
4) Contextual - Communication is the key component in whether disorder in 
a certain situation will occur at this level. The media, rumours and / or 
prior police / group confrontation could shape the view that violence is 
inevitable. D Waddington (1992) suggests that negotiation and liaison 
between groups and the police at this level will decrease the potential for 
disorder as 'ground rules' for accommodative behaviour can be set; 
5) Situational - This level refers to 'spatial and social determinants of 
disorder relevant to the immediate setting in which interaction takes place' 
(D Waddington, 1992, pI8). Some locations will be more conducive to the 
potential for disorder due to, a) their 'symbolic significance' (territory to 
be claimed or preserved), b) if 'targets of derision' are present and, c) 
whether it facilitates police surveillance and / or how easy it is for people 
to leave the scene should the police attempt dispersal. Related to this is 
how the 'space is managed': the presence of stewards and peaceful (and 
publicised) intentions from the organisers combined with a low key police 
presence will reduce the potential for disorder. It is at this level that each 
side will, not necessarily correctly, interpret and judge the motives of the 
other; 
6) Interactional - This is the level where 'flashpoints' occur and its focus is 
the interaction between the crowd and the police. Actions such as a rough 
arrest or violence against a police officer violate the 'rules of the game' 
indicating that accommodation is decreasing and the potential for disorder 
is increasing. Disorder can still be avoided at this level if actions are taken 
that demonstrate a willingness to revert back to the 'rules' (e.g. the crowd 
rebukes a violent member, the police release an arrested prisoner). The 
important point to make is that everything occurring at this interactional 
level can only be understood with reference to the preceding five levels. 
Compared to Jefferson's four stage model, the flashpoint model has been applied 
to account for disorder through a number of case studies in different public order 
contexts (D Waddington et al. 1989: D Waddington, 1992). These include the Poll 
Tax demonstrations in March 1990, the Brixton disorder in 1981, and violent 
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disputes during the miners' strike (e.g. Orgeave, 1984). More recently, the 
'flashpoints' model has been applied to disorder at animal rights protests in 
Brightlingsea (Critcher, 1996) and the 2001 disturbances in Burnley (King and D 
Waddington, 2004) 
However, D Waddington et al (1989) also present case studies where disorder did 
not occur (the 'Thatcher Unwelcoming' demonstrations in Sheffield, 1983; 
picketing at Hadfields steel works in 1980). Therefore, in addition to accounting 
for disorder, the levels of analysis present in the 'flashpoints' model allow for the 
identification of factors that promote the likelihood of order, even in 
circumstances where there is the potential for disorder. These factors allow D 
Waddington (1992) to present a number of recommendations that decrease the 
chances of disorder. These include enhancing police community relations through 
improvements In police accountability (e.g. effective minority group 
representation on consultative committees), changes in public order legislation 
(e.g. counterbalancing the powers of the police at a demonstration with the rights 
and needs of the protestors) and alterations in police training (e.g. officers should 
be encouraged to analyse incidents). At a macro level, it is suggested that media 
institutions need to reflect on their reporting of disorder whilst the government 
must invest in eradicating the social inequalities that form the basis of the 
'flashpoint' model at the first level (i.e. structural) (D Waddington 1992).23 
The most prominent critic of the 'flashpoints' model is P .AJ Waddington (1991, 
2000b). P.AJ Waddington's (2000b) criticisms are based on conceptual and 
methodological concerns. In relation to the former, it is argued that in the context 
of disorder, 'flashpoints' 'can be invoked at will' (P.AJ Waddington, 2000b, 
p96). Rather than a single incident clearly and definitively precipitating disorder, 
P .AJ Waddington (2000b) argues that in cases of disorder there are potentially 
numerous interactions that can, retrospectively, be identified as a single 
flashpoint. To compound this, there could also be incidents of 'de-escalation' 
occurring between potential flashpoint incidents. Therefore, P .AJ Waddington 
(2000b) concludes that attempting to identify one single flashpoint from a 
23 It is important to acknowledge that these macro features are potentially influenced by 'political' 
knowledae, for example political appeal to the electorate or public opinion, which could have a 
greater i~pact on policy compared to research and / or the experience of relevant organisations 
(see Garland, 2001). 
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complex senes of interactions is condemned to be conceptually flawed in 
accounting for disorder: it is essentially a post-hoc account and is non-predictive. 
In terms of methodological concerns, P.AJ Waddington (2000b) argues that, 
despite being presented as an objective analysis, the " flashpoints , model relies on 
partial and subjective analysis. For example, P.AJ Waddington (2000b) notes that 
observing a large public event - the method employed by D Waddington et al 
(1989) to gather data for their analysis - is a complex task: two observers may 
present two very different accounts of the same event. In addition, P .AJ 
Waddington (2000b) argues that D Waddington et aI's triangulation of 
observational findings through the use of striking miners, journalists and "police 
watch' groups do not represent 'objective detachment' but rather reflect the 
political orientation of the authors concerned. 
Having identified the above conceptual and methodological concerns in relation to 
the 'flashpoints' model, it is also important to note that P.AJ Waddington (2000b) 
holds reservations concerning the ideological motivation for the findings of D 
Waddington and colleagues. These will be explored in greater detail during the 
evaluation of P.A.J Waddington's own analytical account of public order policing 
but, for the purposes of this section, the 'flashpoints' model does at least stress the 
importance of context in understanding why some occasions descend into disorder 
whilst others do not. Although P .AJ Waddington (2000b, p 1 06) dismisses the six 
levels as offering no more than • a checklist of background factors to take into 
account', they do highlight the fact that public order policing does not occur in a 
vacuum. Therefore, and in addition to acknowledging police strategy and tactics, 
any analysis of public order policing must also consider the wider context in 
which it is being practiced. 
4.3 Public Order Policing: The Work of P.A.J Waddington 
The previous two analytical accounts predominantly focus on public order 
policing in relation to disorder. The work of P.AJ Waddington (1993. 1994a) 
posits a different approach: his work, based on extensive fieldwork, attempts to 
understand why the vast majority of public order occasions are staged without 
disorder.24 Despite the police having recourse to significant legal resources (e.g. 
the Public Order Act, 1986) and paramilitary "muscle', P.A.J Waddington (1994a) 
argues that they are respectively not rigorously enforced or fully employed. 
Instead, underpinning P .A.J Waddington's thesis is the notion that the police 
avoid 'trouble'. Taking a lead from Chatterton (1979, 1983), P.A.J Waddington 
argues that the police strive to avoid 'on-the-job' and 'in-the-job' trouble. In a 
public order context, 'on-the-job' trouble refers to dealing with issues such as 
arrests whilst 'in-the-job' trouble refers to having to account for one's actions 
either to superiors or, at worst, independent public enquiries (e.g. post any 
incident of large scale disorder). The aim of public order policing is therefore to 
reduce the potential for both 'on-the-job' and " in-the-job' trouble (P.A.J 
Waddington, 1994a). 
This aim is primarily achieved through negotiation with organisers, a process that 
P.A.J Waddington (1994a) characterises on the basis of his observations as 
'ordinary and amicable'. In order to maintain as much control as possible (and 
thus decrease the potential for both 'on-the-job' and "in-the-job' trouble), it is in 
the interests of the police to succeed at this level and they do so by "winning over' 
organIsers through a combination of interactional ploys (e.g. 'spurious' 
friendships and favours) and compromise rather than overt coercion (e.g. 
enforcing public order legislation). 25 P.A.J Waddington (1994a) argues that these 
processes culminate in a lack of disorder because the police are offering a service 
to organisers and the net result of negotiation meets each side's aims: the 
organiser can hold their event whilst the police have significant input into 
controlling proceedings thus avoiding the potential for trouble. This process is 
referred to as 'institutionalisation', where 'dissident groups exchange their 
capacity to disrupt for the opportunity to exert modest influence on decision 
making' (P.A.J Waddington 1994a, p196). P.A.J Waddington therefore suggests 
that the police attempt to "institutionalise' protest whenever possible as the end 
result for them is the avoidance of trouble. However, it is interesting to note that 
P.A.J Waddington (1994a) highlights not a potentially troublesome protest but 
"Pavarotti in the Park', a free classical performance, as being problematic for the 
2-l P.A.J Waddington's (l994a) work focuses predominantly on the policing of protest I industrial 
dispute but attention is also given to events such as the Notting Hill Carnival. 
25 P.A.J Waddington acknowledges that he is unsure whether organisers thought coercion would 
have followed had they not complied during the negotiation stage. 
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police during the planning stages. The organisers of this event were not awed by 
the police as an organisation and were knowledgeable of the law thus resisting and 
challenging the police rather than allowing themselves to be 'steered'. In 
response, the police were confrontational during the negotiation stage (P .AJ 
Waddington notes to little avail) and demonstrated more antipathy to this event 
compared to others, including political protest (P.AJ Waddington 1994a). 
Maintaining control (i.e. avoiding trouble) is also a key concern for the police 
during the policing of an event (P.AJ Waddington 1994a). From the policing 
perspective, this is demonstrated by senior police personnel imparting strategic 
and logistical information to their subordinates via a briefing process prior to the 
staging of an event (although P.A.J Waddington cites senior officers' scepticism 
as to the briefing's effectiveness) and the command structure. As has been noted 
in relation to 'paramilitary' policing, P.A.J Waddington (l994a) argues that a co-
ordinated command structure is effective for the policing of public order 
operations. However, during an operation, and in contrast to the arguments of 
Jefferson, the emphasis is placed on facilitation and negotiation with event 
organisers / attendees rather than confrontation as this represents the best method 
of maintaining control (P.A.J Waddington 1994a). As a form of 'insurance' 
against losing control, trained (paramilitary) resources are available in the form of 
the Territorial Support Group (TSG) and / or S019 (the Metropolitan Police's 
firearms support unit) but these are rarely deployed: 'although the police 
frequently had the iron fist available, it was normally enclosed within a velvet 
glove' (P.A.J Waddington 1994a, p156). 
Although predominantly concerned with understanding the processes that ensure 
order is maintained in a public order context, P.A.J Waddington (l994a) suggests 
that the threat of disorder is heightened when the police decide that they must' die 
in a ditch'. This refers to a stage during an event when some form of confrontation 
is required to a) regain perceived loss of control and b) avoid potentially worse 
'on-the-job' and 'in-the-job' trouble. P.AJ Waddington (l994a) states that such 
occasions are rare (he notes two, one ending with disorder, the other without) 
because of the potential consequences of the unknown once this confrontational 
step is taken. As an example, the anti poll tax riot in March 1990 highlights why 
-+0 
senior officers are reluctant to take this step: . on-the-job ' trouble on this occasion 
is represented by hundreds of arrests and police injuries, whilst 'in-the-job' 
trouble ultimately came in the form of an inquiry - albeit from within the police -
and the potential of officers suing on the grounds that they had suffered needless 
injuries (P.A.J Waddington 1994a). 
P.AJ Waddington's (1994a) work - described by Reiner (1998) as 'seminar -
allows for the identification of motivations and processes that contribute to the 
maintenance of order in a public order context. However, D Waddington (1998) 
does present two criticisms. Firstly, and echoing P.A.J Waddington's criticisms of 
Jefferson's work and the 'flashpoints' model, it is argued that P.AJ Waddington's 
(1994a) own analysis is selective and partial as it is predominantly informed by 
observing the police: 'it is therefore inconsistent of (P.AJ) Waddington to 
demand that civilian accounts be treated with an "agnostic scepticism" when he 
remains so trusting of the more manufactured police perspective' (D Waddington, 
1998, p390)?6 D Waddington (1998) also criticises P.AJ Waddington (1994b) for 
displaying a reluctance to engage in a critical analysis of police conduct and 
tactics during disorder involving Poll Tax protestors in 1990. D Waddington 
(1998) argues that this is compounded by P.AJ Waddington's reluctance to 
consider perspectives other than the police. This leaves D Waddington (1998, 
p391) to conclude that the · partisanship, polemic and selectivity' that P.AJ 
Waddington criticises in others is in fact inherent within his own work. 
It is not the intention to dwell on whether P.AJ Waddington's work is 'pro-
police' or that Jefferson's arguments and the 'flashpoints' model are 'anti-police' 
in relation to public order policing. As has been highlighted, each account has 
something useful to offer in relation to guiding analysis in relation to public order 
policing. In summary, Jefferson's arguments highlight the need to consider 
strategy and tactics, the' flashpoints' model demonstrates that the context in which 
public order policing is practised is important. whilst P .AJ Waddington's work 
presents a number of factors (e.g. negotiation and compromise / facilitation) that 
contribute to order. The arguments raised in relation to It'here data is attained 
suggests that both the police and organiser perspectiYes together offer a more 
26 As noted previously, civilian accounts were used by D Waddington and colleagues to inform the 
. tlashpoints' model. 
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comprehensive appreciation of the issues compared to focussing on one at the 
expense of the other. Therefore, given that the accounts raised thus far hold 
entrenched positions in relation to each other. it is important that additional 
accounts are generated to examine the validity of the arguments presented which 
combine the perspectives of the police and organisers. 27 This thesis will attempt to 
achieve this although there are methodological considerations which will be 
addressed in the next chapter. However, for the purposes of the current line of 
argument, it must be concluded that all three analytic accounts presented thus far 
offer useful insights and suitable guidance. 
4.4 Public Order Policing: Recent Analytical Accounts 
From the three analytic accounts that have been explored, the literature would 
suggest that the work of P.A.J Waddington (1994a) is the most applicable to the 
general practice of public order policing. The trends that are noted (e.g. under-
enforcement of legislation, the promotion of facilitation and negotiation) in P.AJ 
Waddington's account have been documented in relation to public order policing 
internationally (della Porta and Reiter 1998; Willis. 2001). However. it must be 
noted that these trends have been predominantly documented in relation to the 
policing of protest. In this context, P .AJ Waddington (2003) suggests that the 
analysis of social movements presents an alternative paradigm to, for example, the 
"flashpoints' model. Drawing on the work of della Porta and Diani (1999), P .AJ 
Waddington (2003) argues that in order to understand when and why contention 
occurs (and possibly violence), one must explore three factors: political 
opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes. This approach then 
reveals changing dynamics in relation to contention. For example, a series of 
political opportunities may allow a social movement to form. 28 There then follows 
the concept of the 'protest cycle', where "early risers' may use innovative tactics 
to engage public attention and are met by a coercive state response. However. 
over time, radicalism is replaced by compromise in order for the movement to 
27 It is also important to note that these accounts were generated prior to legislation such as the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and banning orders under The Football (Disorder) Act :WOO. . 
28 P.A.J Waddington (2003) cites the civil rights movement in America as an example of a SOCial 
movement. In relation to political opportunities for it to prosper, P.A.J Waddington notes the 
miaration of labour to the cities from the South: black colleges and churches providing a 'ne~working' capability; and the rise of national organisations (e.g. National Association for the 
Advancement of Coloured People) that could promote civil rights issues. 
maintain momentum (i.e. public support) and this process is mirrored by the 
police who resort to less coercive tactics (P.AJ Waddington. 2003). Howeyer, 
compromise on the part of the movement may lead to factions emerging who 
engage in a new cycle of disruptive campaigning which will, again, be met by a 
coercive response (P.AJ Waddington, 2003).29 
The major point that P.AJ Waddington (2003) makes in relation to social 
movements is that the process mentioned above creates a great deal of 
heterogeneity within a movement that is reflected through mobilising structures: 
the organisation of a movement may contain both moderates and militants that 
lead to internal tensions which can impact on the framing process (i.e. how a 
'cause' is presented as important and worthwhile to the general public). In tum, 
this heterogeneity has important implications for the policing of social movements 
which is best explored through work with a social psychological orientation 
(Reicher et aI, 2004). 
Reicher et al (2004) acknowledge that D Waddington et al (1989) and P.AJ 
Waddington (1994a) recognise that crowds, in whatever context, should not be 
viewed from a . classical' perspective. The . classical' perspective is most closely 
associated with the work of Le Bon (1895) who argued that, when gathered as a 
crowd, individuals will lose their own identity with potentially disorderly results: 
'As a consequence they forget their normal values and standards, their 
ability to think and to reason and to judge. So when a suggestion 
comes along that normally they might consider and reject, crowd 
members no longer have the ability to resist. They are, quite literally. 
mindless. Ideas, and more particularly, emotions, become contagious. 
They spread through the crowd like wildfire. Sometimes crowd 
members may be heroic. More usually. like primitive beings. they are 
barbaric and destructive.' (Reicher et al. 2004, p559) 
29 This perspective can be applied to contemporary protest. For example, the Countryside Alliance 
_ a pressure group .which campaigns for the ,countryside. c~untry sports, and t~e 'rural \\:ay of I i.fe· 
_ has spawned splmter groups such as the Real Countryside ~lhance. and ~ountr) Side ActlO~ 
Network' which proclaim that they are more prepared to use Illegal direct actIOn to pursue their 
causes as opposed to lawful protest (The Times, November 20 th , 2004). 
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In contrast, Reicher et al (2004) reinforce the heterogeneity associated with any 
crowd and argue that there is a great danger in the police succumbing to a view 
that any crowd is homogenous, especially in the context of disorder. Echoing the 
work ofP.AJ Waddington (1994a), Reicher et al (2004) argues that it is important 
that the police interact as this allows for the identification of different dynamics 
within a crowd and allows trust to develop. In addition, and echoing Jefferson's 
arguments (1987, 1993), Reicher et al (2004) suggest that this is preferable to 
controlling and disciplinarian tactics as these may increase hostility towards the 
police and enhance disorder (Stott and Reicher, 1998; Stott and Drury, 2000; 
Stott, Drury and Hutchinson, 2001). Reicher et al (2004) also argue that 
interaction, as opposed to controlling and disciplinarian tactics, allow the police to 
deal more appropriately with crowd 'agitators' (i.e. by isolating them) and 
enhance self policing. Therefore, and acknowledging their importance as a factor 
in public order policing, Reicher et al (2004) suggest that the police, through 
interaction, can enable a crowd to maintain order. 
The next section will demonstrate the importance of Reicher et aI's (2004) work 
as it has been influential in determining contemporary public order policing 
practice through ACPO's (2001) 'Keeping the Peace' manual of guidance. 
However, there is one final important factor to consider. Reicher et aI's (2004) 
work is informed by research into disorder (e.g. the anti-poll tax riots and football 
related disturbances) whilst social movements are associated with contention 
(P.A.J Waddington, 2003). Whilst these accounts offer further guidance in relation 
to understanding public order policing (i.e. reinforcing the role the police play 
within a crowd context), a specific account for non-contentious (e.g. festivals) 
public order policing is lacking. Barton and James' (2003) work is useful in this 
context as it argues that the community will impact on policing strategies within 
certain public order contexts. In relation to their 'Run to the Sun' case study. 
Barton and James (2003) argue that the business community played an important 
role in determining police strategy. Within this research, the role of the business 
community is framed as potentially conflicting with other sections of the 
community. Although care must be taken in generalising from one case study. 
Barton and James' (2003) work suggests that even at this local level and away 
from overt contention, there are important issues concerning accountability in 
relation to public order policing as divergent interests compete for influence on 
policing strategies. 
This section has reviewed a number of analytic accounts that offer important 
insight concerning public order policing. Although the majority of this work is 
concerned with understanding the police role in relation to contention and / or 
disorder, it does highlight a number of factors and variables that can inform an 
analysis of public order policing in relation to non-contentious contexts such as 
festivals and / or community celebrations. These issues will be returned to when 
outlining the research objectives of this thesis but, before this can be done, it is 
important to outline factors that manifest themselves in relation to contemporary 
public order policing. This requires consideration of both police and organiser 
resources and this further illuminates the processes associated with public order 
policing and acts as suitable guidance for the framing of this thesis. 
5. Contemporary Public Order Policing: Resources for the Police and 
Organisers 
This section introduces the appropriate context for understanding the public order 
policing of community-based events. Whilst the accounts raised so far are useful 
for informing analysis of the empirical content of this thesis, none of them focus 
. specifically on non-contentious public order contexts. In addition, if one is to fully 
appreciate the context in which public order policing is practiced then, as D 
Waddington (1996) notes, the 'changing architecture of policing' must be 
acknowledged. Therefore, the aim of this section is to briefly outline the resources 
- specifically ACPO's 1999 Public Safety Policy; ACPO's 2001 'Keeping the 
Peace' manual of guidance and the HSE's (1999) "Event Safety Guide' - that are 
available to the police and organisers in relation to the planning and staging of a 
community-based event / festival. This in turn raises further issues that can inform 
the analytic processes that will be outlined in later chapters. 
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5.1 ACPO 's (1999) Public Safety Policy 
ACPO's 'Public Safety Policy' is concerned with public safety at events (ACPO, 
1999). This document stresses that a perception exists amongst the public that the 
police are the lead agency for approving public events. The reality is that the 
police do not have the authority to approve or ban public events nor the 
responsibility to 'preserve public safety... except where there are imminent or 
likely threats to life' (ACPO, 1999, pI). The document then suggests that the 
responsibility (i.e. potential litigation) for any public event could lie with the 
organisers, landowners and, if any aspect of the event should take part on the road, 
possibly the local authority (ACPO 1999). From this rather ambiguous starting 
point, the policy then suggests that a form of partnership working between various 
parties involved in the event should be established, and, in order for the 'public 
perception' mentioned above to be gradually changed, the police should not take 
the lead in planning: 
'The Police Service is often viewed as the first point of reference for 
those who organise public events, the assumption being that the 
Service can authorise or ban them. That is not the case, and it is vital 
that this perception is changed. The Police Service will, therefore, 
encourage Borough and District Councils and Metropolitan 
Authorities to establish a standing Safety Advisory Group. The Group 
should be comprised of Senior Officers or Executives from the Fire 
Service, Ambulance Service, Highways Authority and Police: it 
should be chaired by the Local Authority.' (ACPO, 1999. p2) 
The purpose of the Safety Advisory Group (SAG) is to assess an event's potential 
risks to public safety and then discuss and devise the methods to reduce these. 30 
However, there is currently no legislation stating that SAGs must be formed and. 
even if they do exist within a local authority, an event organiser does not, a) have 
to refer an event to it or. if they do, b) enact any of its recommendations (ACPO. 
1999). On this point, Sexton (2003) cites an unpublished ACPO survey that 
suggests only 50% of local authorities actually haye any SAGs operating. The 
30 The tenn SAG is not necessarily unifonn across the country. For example, some local authorities 
have Events Safety Groups (ESG) although the composition and intended function are consistent. 
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only suggestion offered by the ACPO document to solve this potential problem 
comes in the form of an appendix outlining a template from which the SAG can 
identify potential risks and what actions they intend to implement in order to 
moderate those risks. However, the conclusion to the policy reiterates the 
ambiguity concerning the public safety of events: 
'The current policing dilemma is created by a number of conflicting 
issues, although the lack of legislation to regulate public events is a 
major factor. Inconsistency has resulted. This has the potential to 
cause disaffection between the Police and the public and to 
significantly damage community relationships, which are vital to the 
Police Service... The Police Service will, therefore, encourage the 
promotion of legislation to properly regulate and control such events 
in the future.' (ACPO, 1999, p4) 
Sexton (2003) suggests that such legislation could come in the form of a 'Public 
Event Management and Safety Act 200?' with the SAG holding legislative powers 
to bring event organisers and other authorities (including the police) together to 
effectively conduct risk assessment and therefore enhance public safety at all 
types of events. At the time of writing, there are no published plans to develop this 
despite a flurry of recent legislation - both planned and on the statute -
concerning policing (e.g. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; The Serious and 
Organised Crime Act 2005; Police Reform White Paper 2004). 
The first point to make is that research relating to the conduct and practice of 
SAGs is lacking. However, there is a vast literature relating to partnership 
approaches in respect of community safety and crime reduction.31 This is perhaps 
best represented through the introduction of Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships (CDRP) arising from the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In contrast to 
Safety Advisory Groups, this legislation makes it a statutory requirement for the 
police to engage and work with other agencies (e.g. local authorities, health and 
probation services) to produce and implement a strategy that reduces crime and 
31 For a oeneral overview of this area, see Crawford (1997, 1998); Hughes, McLaughlin and 
b 
Muncie (2002); and Byrne and Pease (2003). 
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disorder in a local area VIa a process of consultation. audit and evaluation 
(Newburn 2002). It is now worth briefly exploring the processes that are 
associated with these forms of partnership. 
With regards to these types of partnership in practice, Crawford (1997, 1998) 
suggests a number of factors that impact on their effectiveness. Firstly, the 
agencies involved hold diverse cultures, ideologies and traditions that Crawford 
(1998) notes lead to underlying 'structural conflicts' that are present during the 
partnership process. Despite these structural conflicts - which manifest 
themselves through differential power relations - Crawford and Jones (1995) find 
it striking that overt conflict is conspicuously absent from partnership working. 
Rather than not occurring, Crawford (1998) suggests that those involved in 
partnership devise strategies to avoid conflict (e.g. senior members of a group re-
negotiating objectives / the setting of multiple aims and objectives), rather than 
resolving it. The net result is that differential power relations remain unchallenged 
and this can lead to erosions in trust which will impact on effective long term 
partnership working: in short, such avoidance strategies represent an ends oriented 
'quest for unity' (Crawford 1998). 
A second factor concerns 'informal' versus 'formal' partnership working. With 
regards to the former, 'informal' working practices are reliant on good 
interpersonal relations and the prioritisation of action over formal 'talking shops' 
(Crawford 1998). However, this presents a dilemma as these informal practices 
might enable greater flexibility and communication and yet they could also 
facilitate conflict avoidance strategies, and actions become unaccountable 
(Crawford 1998). In contrast, 'formal' partnership working with a 'top down' 
emphasis (i.e. strategy set amongst the higher echelons of organisations) might not 
translate to the 'front line'. Crawford (1998) suggests that effective co-ordination 
is therefore a key requirement of partnership working although it is essential that 
this process does not hinder collaboration (i.e. the 'co-ordinator' takes on too 
much responsibility and tasks are not devolved to the rest of the group). 
Another factor that Crawford (1998) considers as important in partnership 
working is trust. This is enhanced when indi\'iduals appreciate the limitations of 
48 
their own and other organisations and the project they are involved in. and there is 
mutual respect for the contribution that each agency can make. In addition. 
training and secondments can breakdown stereotypes that can form the basis of 
mistrust. For the partnership to work effectively. Crawford (1998) considers it 
imperative that these trust relations are monitored and nurtured. Further, Crawford 
(1998) identifies three remaining factors that could prove problematic for effective 
partnership working. These include, a) problems of accountability (i.e. who and 
what are responsible for outcomes is characterised as fragmented and dispersed). 
b) intra-organisational relations and conflicts that could impact on inter 
organisational process and finally, c) the principles of 'managerialism' which 
could foster narrow perspectives and competition rather than reciprocity. 
Phillips (2002) reVIews the impact of movmg from voluntary to statutory 
partnership working across three case studies. The findings suggest a commitment 
to partnership working at a strategic level with statutory agencies leading the 
process but not to the extent where other partners feel disempowered. The 
findings also suggest a lack of covert or overt conflict, although Phillips (2002) 
suggests that this could be a result of the partnerships being in a 'honeymoon' 
phase. On the negative side, Phillips (2002) highlights that the partnerships have 
been hampered by a lack of time, resources and appropriate expertise and an 
increase in administrative work to meet the demands of centrally set national 
targets, a factor that was not present prior to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In 
conclusion, Phillips (2002) suggests that the future for partnerships could 
therefore be subject to political pressures: 'quick' approaches prescribed by 
central government could undermine longer term measures to impact on crime and 
disorder. 32 
These observations about partnership working in the context of crime and disorder 
reduction may be useful in understanding the operation of SAGs in relation to 
community-based / festival events. Although the substantive outputs are different 
between crime reduction and public order policing, the practice of partnership 
working which is explored by Crawford (1998) and Phillips (2002) present a 
3~ For further discussion on more recent (and critical) evaluative work concerning the politics and 
practice associated with partnership working in relation to Crime Reduction, see HomeL :.Jutley. 
Webb and Tilley (2004). 
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number of factors that can be explored during the planning of such events, even if 
SAGs are not formally involved. It also raises the prospect of comparing the 
outcomes of partnership working in a public order context with the 
recommendations of Jefferson and D Waddington et al in relation to reducing the 
potential for disorder (e.g. through effective and consultative accountability 
mechanisms). It is also interesting to compare partnership working in a public 
order context with the findings of P.A.J Waddington (1994a) in relation to the 
planning stages (i.e. the negotiation between event organisers and the police) that 
he observed during the policing of protest. Within the context of this thesis. the 
combination of partnership practices from both the crime reduction and public 
order context offer an opportunity to explore this area in relation to the planning 
of events where contention appears not to be as explicit compared to the policing 
of protest. 
5.2 ACPO's (2001) 'Keeping the Peace' Manual afGuidance 
The 'Keeping the Peace' manual of guidance (AepO, 2001) is a resource that is 
available to the police and organisers in relation to the planning and staging of a 
community-based / festival event. The forward to this document illustrates that its 
remit includes public safety at events but in a wider context compared to Aepo's 
Public Safety Policy: 
"For many police officers the term disorder no longer reflects the 
serious urban violence seen in the 1980s. Instead, at the start of this 
new millennium, we may be facilitating the right to engage in or 
protest against lawful activity. or helping to ensure the safety at large 
scale public celebrations. Our commitment to law however requires us 
to be capable of dealing with significant disorder should it arise.' 
(AepO. 2001, Forward) 
It is important to note that Reicher et al (2004) were advisors to AepO during the 
drafting of this manual of guidance. As such, the themes that they raise in relation 
to the importance of interaction and an appreciation of cro\yd heterogeneity 
permeate throughout the document and these manifest themselves through the 
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highlighting of strategic and tactical considerations (specifically in the context of 
command and planning) that can aid the police as an organisation in preparing for 
the policing of a public event. These will now be briefly outlined in relation to 
strategic considerations; command issues; planning, information and intelligence. 
The strategic considerations essentially encompass pre-event preparation. It is 
important that the dynamics of the situation are understood, ranging from 
information such as the size and timing of an event through to wider issues such 
as community feeling and media interest. The manual also states that it is 
important for relevant stakeholders to be identified and partnerships developed 
and maintained. The logic is that this will enhance cohesion when it comes to 
identifying and promoting the intentions of both the police and organisers. These 
strategic considerations are a guide to good practice for a plethora of event types 
and situations and, although no explicit mention is made, any SAG would 
potentially be a vehicle from which these could be met. 
At the practical level for police planners, it is crucial that the correct resources and 
skills base are utilised and provision made for any subsequent financial 
implications. In addition, consideration must also be given to ethical and legal 
matters that may arise. As an example, a planning officer may consider the role of 
the police in the event from a human rights perspective. The manual states that 
whatever the form any partnership working and pre event planning takes it must 
be thorough and all necessary contingencies formulated. 
With regards to command issues, the chain of command that is implemented for 
any event is described by the manual as . a long established and nationally 
accepted structure' that is used by both the police and other agencies (ACPO 
2001, p35). It follows a 'metallic hierarchy' and was incorporated into the police 
in 1986 (Morrell, 1994). It also represents the coordinated and disciplined 
structure that P.A.J Waddington (1987, 1993) argues represents the best method of 
reducing the potential for disorder. Within this hierarchy, taking overall command 
and responsibility for the police involvement in an event or incident is a 'Gold 
Commander' who will oversee strategic development. Supplementing 'Gold' and 
next in the command chain is the 'Silver Commander" v;hose role is to develop 
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the relevant tactical planning to facilitate Gold's chosen strategy. It is the 
responsibility of the 'Bronze Commander' to implement the tactical plan 
formulated by . Silver' and implement the relevant tactical decisions at an 
operational level. It is also the responsibility of 'Bronze' to update 'Silver' on any 
relevant developments as an event or situation develops. At a large event, a 
number of 'Bronze' commanders may be given responsibility for a specific 
geographical area or specialism (e.g. traffic). Depending on the scale or nature of 
the event or situation, the Bronze Commander may have a number ofPSU (Police 
Support Units) under their command, comprising of an Inspector, three sergeants, 
eighteen constables and three drivers. It is important to note that this command 
structure is not rank-related, rather it is role related (e.g. a traffic bronze may be 
lower in rank than a geographical bronze). 
Referring briefly away from the ACPO manual, problems have been identified 
concerning the flow of information along this chain of command: it has been 
noted that on some occasions Gold will abandon their strategic role and start 
administering tactical decisions to Bronze commanders (P.A.J Waddington 1991). 
It is also suggested that if the Gold commander takes on both a tactical and 
strategic role during an operation, it could be at the expense of maintaining other 
key functions that are critical to their role (e.g. consulting with community 
leaders) (P.A.J Waddington 1991). Another important issue is to what extent this 
chain of command can effectively implement Gold's strategy and Silver's tactics 
to all officers involved in an event or operation. In this respect the briefing is 
critical but P.A.J Waddington (1994a) notes that it has little impact on 
determining the behaviour of officers 'on the ground'. However, and despite these 
issues, it is worth reiterating that P .A.J Waddington (1991) believes that this 
command structure is more effective compared to previous command mechanisms 
(e.g. officers being deployed as individuals rather than co-ordinated and 
disciplined squads). 
In relation to planning, information and intelligence, once notification of an event 
has been received it is essential that, through liaison with the organisers, the 
dynamics of the event (e.g. time, location, numbers) be ascertained as 
comprehensively as possible. This information can then be incorporated into 
strategy and tactical planning meetings, culminating in the generation of an 
operational order. In "Keeping the Peace' it is suggested that a strategy meeting 
should address the following 'IIRMAC' mnemonic that will form the operational 
order (ACPO 2001, p45): 
• Information / Intelligence (to include threat assessment for the event); 
• Intention(s); 
• Risk Assessment; 
• Method (in line with risk assessment and health and safety factors); 
• Administration; 
• Communication. 
It is expected that the order "should demonstrate resilience and cater for both the 
expected and unexpected. It must reflect the duration and complexity of the event' 
(ACPO, 2001, p46). Key to achieving this goal are effective communication 
processes, both within the police and through circulating information from the 
police and their partners to the wider community. On the first point, it is the 
responsibility of the Gold / Silver / Bronze command structure to ensure that 
strategy and tactics are disseminated to all officers through relevant briefings. 
Debriefings are also required to identify any applicable shortcomings or good 
practice that can be acted upon and incorporated into the planning of any future 
events. On the second point, an effective public relations strategy with clearly 
defined objectives (e.g. illustrating police professionalism) and arranged methods 
of communicating these objectives (e.g. identifying key audiences, agreeing key 
messages with partners) will facilitate the relationship with the media and aid 
wider dissemination. 
The manual suggests that effective intelligence can inform and guide the planning 
and communication processes prior to and during an event. This can be attained 
from both national and local sources. At a national level, the National Public 
Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) can be accessed through a force's own Special 
Branch and may be consulted in circumstances where "there is a substantial threat 
to public order, which arise from political extremism or protest activity' (APCO, 
2001, p49). The NPOIU offers operational support, strategic analysis (to assess 
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and develop trends) and contacts to other national police agencies (ACPO. 2001). 
At a local level, ACPO (2001) recommend that intelligence is assessed through 
the mechanisms associated with the National Intelligence Model (NIM). for 
example developing intelligence products that can inform the command structure. 
When the ACPO manual of guidance was published in 2001, NIM was the domain 
of national agencies such as the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) 
and the National Crime Squad (NCS) but it is now established as a model of 
policing that all forces adopted in April 2004.33 
Also at a local level, forward intelligence teams (FITs), evidence gatherers and 
local intelligence can contribute to an event / situation specific intelligence unit. 
This unit can utilise intelligence from both a national and local level to inform 
Gold and Silver prior to and during an event. As with tactical and strategic 
considerations, the intelligence gathering, assessing and dissemination processes, 
along with specific intelligence, may be employed post event to inform or guide 
the planning of any future events. 
Both the Public Safety Policy (ACPO, 1999) and this manual of guidance offer the 
police general principles from which to work. In respect of community-based / 
festival events, the police would ideally be part of a pre-established SAG, working 
well with other agencies and organisers, and, come the event, would be able to 
organise an efficient and effective police response that maximises safety and 
minimises the potential for disorder. It is now pertinent to briefly overview the 
resources that are available to event organisers. 
5.3. The Event Safety Guide 
The HSE's (1999) 'Event Safety Guide,34 is aimed specifically at event organisers 
and the intention of this document is to offer logistical and legislative advice that 
relates to health and safety management and risk assessment at events. The 
emphasis is on the organisers to consult this document rather than the HSE being 
33 The national implementation ofNlM across all forces was applied through the National Policing 
Plan 2004 - 2007 (Home Office, 2003). For more detail on the mechanisms and rationale ofNIM. 
see NelS (2000). For a critical evaluation of the implementation ofNlM in three forces prior to its 
national rollout in April 2004, see John and Maguire (2004). 
34 This is colloquially referred to as 'the Purple Guide'. 
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proactive in identifying organisers / events and alerting them to its existence. The 
focus is on guidance rather than a definitive formula for event planning and it 
includes recommendations relating to the following: 
• First Aid Cover. This involves assessing the nature of the event and then 
using this information to calculate appropriate cover - a chart is provided 
for this purpose within the 'purple guide'; 
• Developing a Safety Management Plan. This should consider relevant 
health and safety considerations and be conducted through regular event 
safety meetings with appropriate partners (i.e. liaising with police and 
local authorities, although the SAG format is not specifically mentioned by 
name.); 
• Stewards. The guide suggests the recruitment of a chief steward and senior 
supervisors to aid the safe staging of an event. It must also be ensured that 
all stewards are competent, trained and appropriately briefed; 
• Legislative Requirements. The guide states that consideration must be 
given to relevant legislative procedures that need to be observed and / or 
followed. For example, this could refer to a public entertainment licence in 
addition to Health and Safety at work legislation (e.g. the working hours 
and conditions for employees / stewards). 
In addition to emphasising general planning and partnership working, it is 
important to briefly reflect on the work of stewards and / or private security in 
relation to public order policing.35 Despite their analytic differences, D 
Waddington (1992) and P.A.J Waddington (1994a) highlight the important role 
that stewards potentially play during public order operations. At the situational 
level of the 'flashpoint' D Waddington (1992) suggests that the effective 
marshalling of a crowd by stewards is a factor that can reduce the potential for 
disorder. P.A.J Waddington (1994a) suggests that the organisation of stewarding 
arrangements reinforces the issue of responsibility on the organisers during the 
preparation and staging of an event. Organisers are reminded that they require 
effective briefing and the implicit message is that if anything goes wrong the 
35 Both 'stewards' and . security' are mentioned in the Event Safety Guide but no distinction is 
made between the two. 
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consequences will rest with them rather than the police. P.AJ Waddington 
(1994a) notes from his observational fieldwork that the stewards often deal with 
what the police perceive as 'extremists' (i.e. potential troublemakers) during an 
event. Although the police welcome this aspect of the stewarding role. P.AJ 
Waddington (l994a) suggests that stewards are perceived by officers as being 
generally poor and are a constant source of police complaint. 
In relation to the use of private (i.e. commercial) security, P.AJ Waddington 
(2003) notes that this resource is increasingly being used in the private sphere 
(e.g. forms of protest that occur on private land). Button (2002) states that in the 
context of environmental protest, private security has been used to evict protestors 
leading to confrontation. It is suggested that this tactic is problematic as the 
security personnel have minimal training and the attitude of managers can be 
overtly confrontational; this therefore raises issues of accountability (Button, 
2002). Within this context, Button and John (2002) argue that the police are akin 
to 'referees' between protestors and private security personnel operating under the 
direction of an under-sheriff who enforces evictions as a result of civil litigation. 
In a different but more recent context, it is also interesting to note that private 
security personnel who are involved in events (including festivals) after March 
2006 require a security license issued by the Security Industry Authority (SIA) 
under legislation from the Private Security Industry Act 2001 although this does 
not apply to stewards (Security Industry Authority, 2005).36 However. from an 
empirical perspective, the role of private security has not been explored in relation 
to other public order policing contexts (e.g. community-based / festival events). In 
addition to the use of stewards, this is another variable that is explored in this 
thesis. 
It is pertinent in an analysis of contemporary public order policing to draw on 
Loader's (2000) work that outlines the relation that different forms of policing 
hold to the state which in turn emphasises the 'pluralisation' of contemporary 
policing.37 Loader's (2000) conceptualisation of this pluralisation raises issues of 
36 Other sectors within the security industry (e.g. Security Guarding; Cash and Valuables in 
Transit: Public Space Surveillance CCTV and Close Protection) will also require licensing under 
the Private Security Industry Act - to obtain a license, applicants must undertake specialist training 
(Security Industry Authority, 2005) 
.,7 See also Jones and Newburn (1998) and Crawford (2003) 
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accountability. For the purposes of this thesis the focus will be on policing beyond 
government (i.e. commercial security) and policing through government (i.e. 
multi agency partnerships; the role of volunteer stewards) in addition to policing 
by government (i.e. the public police) in maintaining safety and order at 
community-based / festival events. 
This section has provided an overview of contemporary public order policing 
policy (ACPO 1999,2001) and resources for event organisers (HSE, 1999). This 
in turn has raised a number of additional variables that are worthy of exploration 
in the context of this thesis (i.e. the role of partnerships; the role of private 
security and / or stewarding arrangements). In relation to understanding the public 
order policing of the types of events raised in the introduction, these factors 
provide fruitful leads for subsequent analysis. 
6. Conclusion and Research Aims 
This chapter has demonstrated that, as a concept, public order policing forms part 
of the police's order maintenance function. Whilst this is an ambiguous and 
contested facet of the general police function, the issues of equity and 
accountability are important in considering public order policing. In addition, 
there is a large volume of social research pertaining to public order policing in 
practice. However, the majority of this research focuses on the policing of 
contention and / or disorder. Therefore, there is scope for greater exploration of 
public order policing in (relatively) non contentious circumstances and this is 
essentially the focus of this thesis. 
It is also the case that the majority of analytical accounts are concerned with 
contention and / or disorder (with some notable exceptions such as P.AJ 
Waddington 1994a and Barton and James 2003). These are useful as they allow 
for the identification of factors and variables that could prove insightful in relation 
to the public order policing of community-based events. However. it was also 
noted that some of these accounts (i.e. Jefferson's arguments, the 'flashpoints' 
modeL P.AJ Waddington's work) have generated debate that reflect polarised 
opinions on public order policing. At this stage, it is useful to note that Reiner 
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(2000b) equates police related research in the late 1970's and 1980's as 
representing a conflict stage in the (40 years plus) history of police research. 
Reiner (2000b) argues that this stage was characterised by radical 
conceptualisations (e.g. Marxist) and criticisms of the police and this perspective 
permeates through Jefferson's arguments and the "flashpoints' mode1.38 In contrast 
the objective of this thesis is to take the philosophy of Banton (1964) and attempt 
to understand the processes that appear to make some forms of public order 
policing work (i.e. the maintenance of order and safety, even when there exists 
potential conflict to be resolved between different parties). Therefore, the aims for 
the thesis are as follows: 
• To investigate the processes associated with the planning and staging of 
'community-based events', which as a category can be placed within the 
context of the public order policing of festivals; 
• To explore the input and role of the police in relation to such events; 
• To explore the input and role of organisers in relation to such events; 
• To analytically account for the above factors and their relation where 
appropriate to either issues of order and / or disorder, drawing where 
necessary from existing accounts; 
• To generate "good practice' for both the police and organisers that can be 
used to inform community-based / festival events and other public order 
policing contexts in relation to planning and staging that minimises the 
potential for disorder. 
38 This is made explicit through P.A.J Waddington's critiques of these analytic accounts. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an account of the logistics associated with 
conducting the research process. It therefore explores the origins and context of 
the CASE PhD process and acknowledges the importance of the research proposal 
in guiding this work. As a qualitative methodology was used, the specific field 
methods (i.e. observation and interviewing) used to collect data are also examined. 
There is also consideration of sampling in relation to the choice of field sites and 
each of the events that formed the basis of the field research is introduced. In 
addition to the logistics associated with these aspects of the methodology, 
reflection is provided on how the research process progressed "in the field'. 
Pinally, the analytic process is introduced and examined. This section highlights 
the methodological criticisms that have been directed at previous public order 
policing research and considers how these have to an extent been avoided in this 
work. This is followed by presenting an overview of grounded theory which 
provided the analytic framework that accompanied the data collection process. 
2. The Origins and Context of the Research 
Before exploring methodological issues in relation to this thesis, it is important to 
introduce the origins and context surrounding this research. To achieve this, it is 
relevant to provide an overview of the rationale and structure behind the ESRC 
CASE studentship. This will be followed by outlining the work of the non-
academic partner involved in this research and, finally, there will be discussion of 
the research proposal that was developed prior to the commencement of the PhD. 
2.1. Overview o/the ESRC CASE Doctoral Process 
This thesis is the product of a full time ESRC CASE studentship involving the 
University of Surrey and the National Crime and Operations Paculty (NCOP) who 
are based within the National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) at Centrex. 
Before examining in more detail the nature of the NCOP"s work, it is worth 
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briefly outlining the aims and objectives associated with this form of studentship. 
CASE studentships place an emphasis on collaboration between a Higher 
Education institution and commercial/public sector / voluntary sector partner. It 
is this collaborative approach which distinguishes CASE awards from other types 
of postgraduate funding. The ESRC identify a number of benefits associated with 
this collaborative approach including the provision of 'real life' research 
experience for the student and the opportunity for partner organisations to explore 
projects which, for any number of reasons, might not be a~hievable 'in house'. 1 
This process also differs from other types of studentship in that additional funding 
is provided to the student and academic institution from the non-academic partner 
and the research proposal is designed exclusively by these parties rather than there 
being an input from the student, although the student can revise this as the 
research progresses. In relation to this research, the CASE studentship has been 
supervised by Professor Nigel Fielding (University of Surrey) and Dr Kate 
Paradine (NCPE). The supervision process (i.e. meetings, discussion of progress, 
and feedback on work) is no different to structures that exist with other forms of 
doctoral studentships. In addition to this, and as recommended by the ESRC, a 
document will be produced post PhD specifically for the NCOF which will 
contain an overview of the research findings and policy recommendations. 
2.2. Overview of Centrex and the National Crime and Operations Faculty 
(NCOF) 
As has been previously mentioned, the non-academic partner for this research is 
the National Crime and Operations Faculty (NCOF). It is worth briefly outlining 
the nature of the work that this department is involved in. The NCOF is part of 
Centrex2 which was established on April 1 st 2002. Prior to this date, the 
organisation was collectively known as National Police Training (NPT). As a 
result of the Police Reform Act 2002, the NCOF is now part of the NCPE 
(National Centre for Policing Excellence) which was established in April 2003. It 
should also be noted that in April 2002 Centrex gained the status of a non-
I Further infonnation on the CASE rationale / fonnat can be located at the postgraduate funding 
opportunities section of the ESRC website (wwv .. '.esrc.ac.uk). An overview of advice and 'good 
practice' in relation to this fonn of studentship is also available from the ESRC (Bell and Read, 
1998). 
2 Centrex is the working name for the Central Police Training and Development Authority. 
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departmental body (i.e. funded by central government but not managed by it). 
From their website, the stated aim of Centrex is to . define, develop and promote 
policing excellence'. Tasked with achieving this are a series of departments 
including: 
• the NCOF; 
• National Specialist Law Enforcement Centre (NSLEC); 
• National Police Leadership Centre (NPLC); 
• The International Faculty; 
• National Training Centre for Scientific Support to Crime Investigation 
(NTC); 
• Foundation Training. 
Each of these departments has their own specialist remit and work in collaboration 
with police services, other police organisations (e.g. ACPO), HM Inspectorate of 
Constabulary, central government, the private sector and academia. The 
departments listed above are located at a number of sites across England and 
Wales but there is also an emphasis on international collaboration.3 
The NCOF represents the amalgamation of two separate departments, the National 
Operations Faculty (NOF) and the National Crime Faculty (NCF) who merged in 
December 2001. The NCOF comprises of a number of teams and is involved in a 
number of tasks including training, operational support, serious crime analysis, 
reassurance, incident management and information services. The NCOF can be 
consulted on these areas by any force in the country and it provides a resource for 
the dissemination of good practice. During this research, I collaborated most 
closely with the Public Order Team which provides training and operational 
support in a number of areas related to both strategy and tactics. Reference will be 
made to the benefits and implications of this collaboration as the chapter develops. 
2.3. The CASE Proposal 
Marshall and Rossman (1995) suggest that a formulated research strategy will act 
as a 'road map' that will guide the research process. Before presenting a detailed 
J For more information on Centrex and th~ departments mentioned, S~~ www.centrex.police.uk 
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exploration of the research methods utilised in this thesis the role of the CASE , 
proposal must be acknowledged as influential in dictating the route taken during 
the research. As mentioned previously, the CASE proposal was formulated prior 
to the commencement of the studentship. In broad terms, this proposal offered a 
starting point in terms of identifying a number of aims and objectives along with 
research methods to be used. In relation to the aims and objectives, the proposal 
identified the requirement to focus on three different community-based events. As 
a term of reference, the proposal suggested that these events should be organised 
and supported by 'significant minority interests in the community, occur at 
predictable and publicly-announced times, and require some form of police 
involvement. The proposal also stated that the Notting Hill Carnival would not 
form one of the chosen events due to potential logistical difficulties associated 
with the size of the event. In addition, the proposal recommended that one event 
would involve a minority religious and / or ethnic group and that another event 
would be organised by a minority sexual preference group. Finally, for the 
purposes of comparative analysis the proposal suggested that at least one of the 
three events would be observed over two consecutive years. With regards to 
specific research methods, the proposal recommended a qualitative methodology 
encompassing interviews with key players involved with each event and some 
form of observational fieldwork. The proposal provided a robust starting point 
from which to work. The next section will explore how the research progressed 
and explain why a qualitative methodology presents the best approach to address 
the research aims and objectives mentioned at the conclusion of the previous 
chapter. It will also explore the contribution of existing research literature on 
public order policing in guiding the research process. 
3. Developing a Research Strategy: The Potential of a Qualitative 
Methodology 
It is important to recogmse that a number of options are presented when 
considering different forms of research strategy and consideration of these in 
respect of this research highlights the suitability of a qualitative methodology. For 
example, Yin (2003) suggests that the researcher needs to ask three questions 
when choosing a relevant research strategy. a) what is the form of the research 
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question, b) does the researcher have control over behavioural events and, c) is the 
research focused on contemporary (as opposed to historical) events? 
In consideration of questions b) and c), the previous section highlighted that a 
qualitative methodology encompassing interviewing and observation was 
recommended. It is worth noting at this stage that by engaging in these forms of 
field research a 'naturalistic' position would be adopted (Bryman 1988). This 
position equates to understanding the phenomenon (i.e. the public order policing 
of community-based events) without imposing experimental controls on the 
settings I would choose to participate in. By adopting this position there would be 
no control over behavioural events. The CASE proposal also stated that the 
research focus would be contemporary: the settings would be 'live' in the sense 
that they would be ongoing and ever evolving and not rooted in the past. From 
Yin's (2003) advice for formulating a research strategy, these decisions rule out 
an experimental, archival analysis and an historical based approach to the 
research. 
With reference to question a) and in the context of this thesis, there are a number 
of factors characterising the form of the research question. The previous chapter 
argued that whilst a large volume of research has been conducted on public order 
policing and contention, relatively little has focussed on the policing of events 
which are similar in nature to those under study in this thesis. Therefore, to gain 
knowledge of this area, I would have to explore something 'new' as no specific 
template exists that can be followed or tested. In respect of this, Marshall and 
Rossman (1995) elaborate on Yin's ideas on the research strategy by introducing 
exploratory, explanatory, descriptive and predictive typologies relating to the 
purpose of research. The questions this thesis addresses fall most comfortably into 
the exploratory (i.e. what is happening?) and the explanatory (i.e. what factors are 
causing this to happen?) categories. Marshall and Rossman (1995) suggest that by 
considering exploratory and explanatory forms of research questions, the most 
suitable methodologies include field research that in turn might include 
interviewing and observation. 
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Singleton, Straits and Straits (1993, p316) suggest that it is potentially possible to 
'build a general, abstract understanding of social phenomena' through field 
research. With reference to the exploratory approach embedded within the 
research strategy of this thesis, field research is considered as productive when 
relatively little is known about the phenomenon under examination (Jorgensen 
1989). Rather than holding pre-conceived ideas one is placed in the position of 
having to consider all possibilities and angles when in the field (Singleton et al 
1993). On a similar theme and if one is participating in a setting over a period of 
time, field research also provides the flexibility to cope with the potential ever-
changing nature of the phenomenon under investigation (Singleton et al 1993). 
This flexibility therefore allows the researcher to keep true to the exploratory form 
of research question (i.e. what is happening). It is also possible to simultaneously 
identify problems and concepts through exposure to settings which can enhance 
the answering of explanatory questions (Jorgensen, 1989). 
Having established that field research offers a framework to explore, it is worth 
further highlighting how it can contribute to explaining. Lofland and Lofland 
(1995) suggest that the researcher must achieve two important processes when 
attempting to collect the 'richest' possible data from the field. The first of these is 
to become well versed and familiar within the settings that one is investigating. 
Secondly, by interacting with those in the setting it becomes possible to 
'participate in the minds' of those who will generate the understanding that will 
ultimately lead to the research findings (Lofland and Lofland 1995). The 
combination of these two processes will leave the researcher in the best possible 
position to attain an 'insider's view of reality' (Singleton et al 1993, p318) and 
therefore answer with clarity the exploratory and explanatory forms of question. 
Insights from the methodological literature demonstrate the suitability of a 
qualitative methodology to address the research questions in this thesis. It is also 
important to acknowledge that the use of field research is well documented in the 
literature relating to police research. For example, the origins of this body of 
research are rooted in these methods (Fielding 2000) and in relation to public 
order policing the analytic accounts presented in the previous chapter (i.e. 
paramilitarism, 'flashpoints' model, the work of P.A.J Waddington, social 
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psychological approaches) have all used qualitative research methods. From this 
body of research, useful methodological insight is evident in P .A.J Waddington's 
(1994a) work on the policing of various types of events in London. 
As noted in the prevIOUS chapter, P.A.J Waddington (1994a) observed the 
meetings between the police and the organisers in addition to the actual staging of 
nearly 100 events. In relation to methodology, P.A.J Waddington (1994a, p208) 
argues that 'the greatest advantage of observational methods is their flexibility'. In 
the context of P.A.J Waddington's research this flexibility ensured that both the 
planning and staging of events were observed ensuring an insight that led to his 
main conceptualisations in relation to the issues under scrutiny. At another level 
this observational perspective led to the challenging of pre-conceived beliefs 
about public order policing, especially in light of the policing of ceremonial 
events: 
"It never occurred to me that the policing of ceremonials might be of 
such significance ... A methodology that did not allow for redefinition 
of the problem in the light of experience might have led this research 
seriously astray' (P.A.J Waddington 1994a, p208). 
As a methodological template to follow, P.A.J Waddington's approach is useful as 
it demonstrates the benefits of both flexibility and problem redefinition that are 
key components of field research. However, P.A.J Waddington (1994a) does 
present a number of potential limitations associated with observational methods. 
These limitations are not limited to P.A.J Waddington's account of public order 
policing and are relevant to this thesis. They will therefore be explored in section 
seven which explores the analytic process associated with this thesis. 
4. Selecting a Sample of Community-Based Events 
The potential of a qualitative methodology and its suitability to this research 
strategy has been outlined in the previous section. To summarise, participation in 
a setting over time offers an opportunity to answer "exploratory' and 'explanatory' 
types of research questions which form the cornerstone of this research. It has also 
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been acknowledged that there is a precedent in the use of qualitative methods in 
relation to public order policing research. This section will present an overview of 
how different events were chosen for the purposes of field research and will 
highlight the risks associated with embarking on research that potentially involves 
a lengthy period of time in the field. The section concludes with a descriptive 
overview of the events that were finally chosen to form the basis of the field 
research. 
Underlining the research strategy is the case study methodology. The advantage of 
adopting this approach is that it 'allows investigators to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events' (Yin, 2003, p2). This is particularly 
useful when the researcher wishes to asses the impact (or otherwise) of context in 
relation to the phenomenon under investigation (Yin, 2003). In this respect, the 
case study methodology allows for both 'exploratory' and 'explanatory' enquiry 
through the use of multiple research methods (Yin, 2003). With regards to this 
thesis, this was achieved by using observation and interviewing during the 
planning and staging of four community-based events. 
A 'purposeful sampling strategy' was utilised to select relevant field sites at the 
outset of the research process. The rationale behind purposeful sampling is 
defined as 'selecting information-rich cases for study in-depth' (Patton 1990, 
p 169) and a number of options are open to the researcher. Patton (1990) outlines 
sixteen different purposeful sampling strategies and this thesis employed two of 
them. The first and initially most important strategy to be employed was a 
'criterion-based strategy'. The logic behind criterion-based sampling is simple: 
identify cases where information is likely to be rich on the basis of certain 
characteristics. The guidance for selection using this method came from the CASE 
proposal and efforts were focussed on identifying potential events that: 
• Were promoted and supported by a minority section of the community 
(e.g. ethnic minority; gay / lesbian community); 
• Occurred on a regular and predictable basis: 
• Required the input and presence of the police during the planning and 
staging phases. 
66 
Having identified the criterion for selecting events the next staae was to try and 
, b • 
find relevant 'gatekeepers' to locate potential sites. This process reflects what 
Patton (1990) tenns the 'chain sampling strategy' where one identifies potentially 
infonnation rich sites by utilising the expertise of relevant practitioners. In the 
case of this research, initial contacts were made through the NCOF who employ 
police officers from a number of UK forces. These officers were asked if they 
knew of colleagues either directly involved in the planning of events fitting the 
criterion, or of colleagues who would know the right people to contact. 
This process yielded a number of possibilities and certainly aided in gaImng 
access to the final events that were chosen. However. it also highlighted a 
fundamental risk with the research strategy. Before entering the field it was 
anticipated that the planning and staging of an event could potentially take a 
number of months. However, as an observer I had no control over whether an 
event would progress from the planning phases to actually being staged and this 
did create logistical difficulties. 
U sing the criterion and chain sampling methods mentioned above, I had been 
presented with the opportunity to observe the planning and staging of an event for 
the gay community in the north of England. This opportunity arose during the first 
six months of the PhD process and access had been successfully negotiated with 
both the main police representative involved in the planning process and the main 
organiser. Just as I was set to embark on observing the first planning meeting, I 
received an e-mail from the main organiser stating that the event would in all 
probability be cancelled due to a lack of funding. I acted on the organiser's advice, 
along with that of the police representative, not to pursue this as one of the main 
events. 
The short-tenn impact of this experience culminated in having to find another 
potential site. However. as it happened relatiyely early in the research process it 
added two new dimensions to the research strategy. Firstly, it became apparent 
that during the initial stages of negotiation as much infonnation as possible would 
need to be gathered concerning the likelihood of an event going ahead. All I could 
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go on was the word of the police and / or organisers but from this information I 
could withdraw at an early stage if the collective consensus was that an event 
might not realistically go ahead. 
Secondly, this experience effectively ruled out undertaking research at events that 
were being held for the first time as these represented the greatest risk of not being 
staged. It would have been interesting to have been involved in an event of this 
nature as there would have been the opportunity to compare it with more 
'established' (i.e. longer running) events. However, to have committed myself to 
an event for a number of months that did not ultimately go ahead would have been 
detrimental to the research process as it was confined to a finite timescale. 
Ironically and despite these precautionary measures an 'established' event that 
was chosen did present significant access problems during one cycle of 
observations and this is discussed later in the chapter. 
Following the 'near miss' mentioned above, the sampling strategy did yield three 
field sites that matched the characteristics outlined through the criterion sampling 
method. These events formed the basis of the observational fieldwork and 
subsequent interviews and will be referred to as 'Mela' / 'Multicultural Festival '"+' 
'Pride' and 'Solstice'. Chapter four presents a comprehensive overview of the 
characteristics associated with each of these events but for the purposes of this 
chapter it is useful to present a brief descriptive account. 
-1.1. Mela / Multicultural Festival 
The observed Mela event was held in the north of England and represented the 
first event where access was gained. Mela type events are held all over the country 
and are predominantly aimed at and attended by members of South Asian 
communities living in the UK. During the second year of observation, the 
organisers wished to integrate other parts of the community into the event hence 
the change of name to the 'Multicultural Festival'. On both occasions, the event 
was characterised by stalls, music and other forms of entertainment taking place in 
4 This event was followed over two consecutive years and the name / focus of the event changed 
during this period although it was held at the same location. 
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a large park. Approximately 5,000 people attended each of these events and both 
were staged over one day during the summer. 
Access to the initial event (i.e. Mela) was negotiated through a superintendent 
based in the force where it is held. This officer then put me in contact with the 
main police liaison for the event who invited me to an initial planning meeting 
with organisers. At this meeting I was able to secure permission from the 
organisers to observe the planning and staging of the event. This culminated in 
observing the two planning meetings that were held prior to the event. I observed 
the actual staging of the Mela by shadowing a number of officers who had been 
assigned to police it. 
Following the staging of the Mela, contact was maintained with the mam 
organisers who announced that the focus for the following year would change. 
This culminated in changes of personnel and increased frequency with regards to 
planning meetings. Having established links during the planning and staging of 
the Mela, access to the planning process for the Multicultural Festival was 
straightforward. The logistics of observing this event involved attending four of 
the five meetings prior to the event and observing the staging of the event by 
shadowing the main organisers rather than the police. 
4.2. Pride 
The observed Pride event was held in a city in the south of England and it is a 
celebration aimed at the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) 
community. The event consists of a parade followed by a large gathering on an 
open park and other spin off special events. The festival is held over a weekend in 
the summer. Access to this event was secured early in the first year of the PhD 
through a chief inspector who attended a NCOF organised conference and was 
due to be a silver commander at the event. Following this, I attended a planning 
meeting and secured permission from the event organisers to observe the planning 
process. For reasons to be explored later, fieldwork at Pride ceased after this 
planning meeting despite securing this initial access. 
A year later, I gained access to observe the same event through a different police 
officer who was acting as the main police liaison. There were four meetings 
between the police and the event organisers prior to the staging of the event and 
observation was conducted at two of them. The missed meetings were called at 
short notice as and when members of the planning group could assemble. On one 
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occaSIOn I was alerted to a change in dates after the meeting had occurred. 
However, I was able to obtain minutes for these meetings. The staging of the 
event was observed by following both the police and organisers during the parade 
and celebration on the park. The event attracted between 60,000 and 90,000 
people. 
4.3. Solstice 
Access to this event was secured through a chief superintendent who was the 
silver commander at the event and acted as a liaison between the police and event 
organisers during the planning stages. The observed Solstice event was held over 
one night / morning (twelve hours in duration) in the summer and it is an event 
that holds significance for members of pagan and druid communities although 
other members of the public attended. Over 30,000 people attended and I 
shadowed police commanders on site for the majority of the event. However, I 
was also able to observe some elements of the event as a member of the public. 
With regards to the planning process, meetings between the police and organisers 
were held on a monthly basis and the six meetings prior to the staging of the event 
were observed. 
5. Reflections on Observation 
Having presented an overview of the sampling procedures and introduced the 
events that fonned the basis of the fieldwork, the aim of this section is to reflect 
on the logistics of undertaking observational research. This requires consideration 
of the different types of roles that are adopted in the field and how these relate to 
ethics. The unpredictable nature of fieldwork will also be considered by 
elaborating on issues that led to the aborted attempt to observe Pride in my first 
year. 
With regards to the role of the researcher during observational fieldwork. Gold 
(1969) distinguishes between four types of observation: i) 'complete observer', ii) 
'observer-as-participanf, iii) 'participant-as-observer' and i\') 'complete 
participanf. These four types of observation occur along a continuum and it is 
acknowledged that an observer will shift between them depending on the 
opportunities that present themselves during their exposure to the field (Singleton 
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et ai, 1993). This typology has been adapted by Van Maanen (1978) in relation to 
police research and this will be discussed later with reference to research ethics. 
From Gold's typology, the first three roles were utilised at some stage during the 
observational fieldwork although the majority of time in the field centred on 
fulfilling and then moving from an 'observer as participanf to a 'participant as 
observer' role. I started from the 'observer as participanf role through initial 
logistic constraints as I had no prior knowledge of who might be attending the first 
Mela, Pride and Solstice meetings and none of these people would have known 
that there was to be a researcher amongst them (the exception being the 
• gatekeepers' who had facilitated access). In this respect I was entering the field as 
an 'outsider' and placing myself in a 'closed' setting (Jorgensen 1989) as these 
were not open meetings where it was possible to arrive and take notes without 
negotiating access. At the first Solstice and Pride meetings I was introduced to the 
group by the chair and police representative respectively whilst at the first Mela 
meeting I was able to introduce myself as a researcher before the meeting 
officially started due to a delay incurred by the late arrival of the police 
representati ves. 
At these initial and subsequent meetings I often sat either at the meeting table or, 
when numbers were high and space was limited, in a position that afforded a 
suitable vantage point for listening and observing events as they proceeded. This 
remained constant throughout the observation of the planning meetings at all the 
chosen events. However, as time passed I started to become a 'known face' and 
people would openly ask how the research was going. This was due in part to a 
consistency in attendance: it was routinely the same people attending on a regular 
basis. This process of integration marked the subtle shift from 'observer as 
participant' to 'participant as observer'. People were increasingly becoming more 
comfortable with my presence and would openly relay information and opinions 
outside the confines of a 'formal' meeting. 
The impact of this \yas twofold. Firstly, it allowed me to present myself as a 
person who was genuinely interested in how the planning proceeded (thus 
breaking down a 'formal' researcher image) and it provided the opportunity to 
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understand the roles of people involved in the planning process both formally 
(through the meeting) and informally (either before or after. during a break or 
even over e-mail). This process also helped identify possible participants for 
interviewing. Secondly, it became apparent through increased interaction with 
group members that decision making was occurring both inside and outside of 
these formal meetings. This is analogous to Goffman's (1959) conceptualisation 
of the -front stage' (i.e. the observed meetings) as it became evident that this was 
being influenced by a -back stage' (i.e. informal and 'unseen' discussion away 
from these meetings). 
To illustrate the growing awareness of a -back stage' it is worth outlining two 
examples from this phase of the research. The first example could be 
conceptualised as 'structural' as I became aware of a meeting involving 
representatives from the police and the main organising body (including the chair) 
that was separate yet related to the Solstice meetings I was observing. I was not 
allowed to participate in these and neither were members from the pagan or druid 
community. The second example could be conceptualised as 'attitudinal'. 
Following a Pride meeting, a member of the main organising committee confided 
that he believed the police were poor in dealing with a) the local LGBT 
community and b) demonstrating sensitivity in policing the event on previous 
occasions. Such comments were not made during the meeting and thus further 
potential avenues to explore were being presented as I became more immersed 
and familiar with the people in the settings I was observing. 
In general, this shift in roles from 'observer as participant' to 'participant as 
observer' did not impinge on the research settings. I cut an unobtrusive figure 
whose presence was never challenged, even when new people became involved in 
the planning process. However, there was one occasion at a Multicultural Festival 
planning meeting when I briefly skirted with the extremes of the 'participant as 
observer' role. At the start of my second year of observing the planning for this 
event the (then) committee had to dissolve their membership, be re-elected and 
then re-draft a constitution. The dissolution of the existing committee was simple 
enough but it was identified that a set number of people were required to 'vote in' 
new members before the constitution could be re-drafted. Unfortunately, the 
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combined number of people present, excluding myself as observer, was one short. 
One of the organisers asked if I would become a member of the committee to 
remedy this situation. To take this role would have seriously impacted on the 
organisation of the event that I wished to observe from as naturalistic a position as 
possible. I was ambivalent but fortunately a further reading of the constitution 
revealed that they did have enough people present. 
Lofland and Lofland (1995) suggest that in order to maintain access it is not 
unusual for the researcher to make a 'trade-off in return for acceptance in the 
research setting. With regards to this meeting, I was later asked if I knew of any 
police contacts through whom the committee might be able to secure additional 
funding for the Multicultural Festival. I explained that funding might be available 
through section 1 7 of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act and suggested they 
contact a local superintendent. This could be interpreted as "influencing' the field 
but I believed that they would a) have found the information through other 
contacts in time and b) this represented a reasonable 'trade-off for the access that 
this group had granted. 
In relation to observing the actual staging of Mela / Multicultural Festival, Pride 
and Solstice, I was granted access to 'closed' settings (e.g. police command posts) 
at the invitation of the police / organisers that I had met through the planning and 
this supplemented observations from "open' settings (i.e. where the public were 
allowed access). Given that so many people were involved in the running of each 
event, it was relatively easy to observe without having to obtrude on the setting 
and my presence was never challenged. However, there were some occasions 
during the staging of the events when I found myself again at the extreme of the 
"participant as observer' role. During the staging of the Multicultural Festival, I 
shadowed one of the organisers and effectively became an organiser for a few 
hours as I helped manage access to and from the park for a large number of 
vehicles prior to the start of the event. At the other extreme of the observation 
continuum, the staging of each event also presented the opportunity to fulfil the 
'complete observer role': I made sure that I found the time to walk around the 
sites away from the police and / or organisers and simply observe all that was 
occurring around me. To make myself as unobtrusive as possible I made sure I 
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was not wearing anything that could identify me with the organisers and police 
until I was ready to assume the role of a 'participant as observer~ once more. 
At no stage of the research did I adopt the 'complete participant~ role that requires 
deceiving members as to being a researcher. However~ this shift between different 
types of organiser role does hold ethical implications even though there was no 
need to conceal my identity as a researcher. Van Maanen (1978) presents an 
account of how these roles impact on ethics in relation to observational work that 
involves the police and it is worth considering here. Demonstrating a similar 
approach to Gold (1969), Van Maanen (1978) notes that as observational research 
proceeds, the researcher will switch between the roles of a 'fan~, 'member~, 
'voyeur' and 'spy~ and these fall into line with an 'overt~ or 'covert' position in 
relation to ethics. The roles of 'fan~ and 'member~ are overt positions. In the 
context of this research, I was predominantly a 'fan~ and the research was 'overt~ 
as group members at meetings knew I was a researcher and I had made them 
aware of my research topic from the outset. 
However, at no stage did I state that I would be writing up the observations as 
fieldnotes, to be later analysed, and there were inevitably moments when I was 
adopting the 'covert~ role of 'voyeur~ (e.g. by interacting with group members 
outside of the confines of the meeting, for example, getting a lift to the station) 
and 'spy~ (i.e. subsequently writing these observations as fieldnotes). This raises 
the important issue of informed consent, which leads to a delicate 'balancing act~ 
for observers in the field. Gaining formal informed consent from every member 
present at a meeting would have required ascertaining permission to note, write up 
and then analyse each meeting that was observed. This could have presented 
logistical difficulties given the time constraints placed on meetings and there was 
a chance that I could have been denied access to the settings from the outset. 
However, I was effectively deceiving members as to the true nature of my 
research by not gaining this formal informed consent despite the fact that every 
facet of the field that I observed was providing important data. 
Informed consent is complicated even further when the numbers attending the 
actual events are taken into account. During the observation of the staging of each 
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event, there were fleeting exchanges with tens, if not hundreds of people, and a 
combined total of over 100,000 people attended them. Securing informed consent 
from all these people, who potentially could have been the subject of my research, 
would have been impossible logistically. 
To overcome this problem, I was able to formulate a suitable ethical framework at 
an early stage of the fieldwork process. Norris (1993) notes that an ethical 
spectrum exists that ranges from a 'legalistic' position at one end (i.e. strict 
adherence to a professional code of conduct such as the British Sociological 
Association code of ethics) to an 'antinomian' position (i.e. the means justify the 
ends, whatever the ethical implications, in attaining knowledge) at the other. From 
this spectrum, Norris (1993) suggests that numerous field-workers opt for a 
'situational' position: the emphasis is on the researcher in the field to devise and 
work to their own ethical codes, based on their individual conscience. In the 
context of informed consent, this approach enabled me to proceed from an ethical 
framework that was neither constricted by guidelines that would make the 
research impossible to conduct or would reject the notion of ethics in the field. 
In terms of this approach in action, formal informed consent was not gained 
during the observational fieldwork. However, all other aspects of the research 
adhered to the code of research ethics as presented by the British Society of 
Criminology.5 For example, the names of people involved during this process 
have been anonymised (through the allocation of random initials) to protect their 
identity. In addition, any context that could identify them (e.g. names of places / 
organisations) has been removed from extracts that are presented in the 
subsequent analysis chapters. Given the confines noted above with attempting 
informed consent in all cases, this situational approach presented the most suitable 
ethical framework for this research. 
5.1. Difficulties in the Field 
It was previously noted that the observational phase of the fieldwork suffered 
from some difficulties in relation to the Pride event. This impacted on the research 
5 See http:ww\\.britsoccrim.or~ 'ethics.htm for more details. 
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strategy and it is worth reflecting on it before exploring the interviewing 
component of the research process. It also highlights the flexibility that is required 
to overcome problems with observational fieldwork. To summarise, I was invited 
to observe the planning of Pride by a police representative who was attending a 
conference run by NeOF. Although I had missed the initial meetings, I received 
permission from the members of the planning group that incorporated event 
organisers and the council to observe the run up to that year's Pride event. This 
initial meeting went well and I was set to return for the next meeting some weeks 
later. 
Unfortunately, this next meeting never transpired due to the staging of a large 
event in the same area that generated extensive media criticism. The event in 
question made the national news as there was serious overcrowding and two 
fatalities. This occurred prior to the next Pride meeting I was due to attend and I 
received an e-mail from the police representative stating that the situation between 
the police and local council was fraught in relation to who was to blame for the 
problems caused at this event. He advised that I should not attend the next 
meeting due to these tensions and I duly took his advice. 
After a number of weeks I re-established contact to try and attain access to the 
next Pride meeting. An e-mail from the same police representative stated that the 
situation was still tense but he did not mind me attending if I could secure 
permission from the council. This then prompted an ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to establish contact with the council. E-mails were unanswered and phone 
calls were never returned. Although the police representative was helpful in trying 
to overcome these problems, he contacted me to say that he was moving from his 
position and suggested that I abandon any notion of observing the remaining Pride 
meetings. This effectively ended my association with Pride during my first year. 
However, this police representative stated that he would help facilitate access for 
the following year which he did by giving me some relevant contact details a few 
months later. Fortunately, these tensions were not evident during the second year 
of observation and access was secured for a number of meetings in addition to the 
staging of the event. 
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The impact of this situation was unfortunate but manageable. The first 
consequence for the research strategy impacted on the timetable and logistics. I 
had hoped to track two events over consecutive years, but it was decided that I 
would focus only on the Mela to fulfil the comparative criterion of the research 
strategy. I have previously alluded to the second consequence: I was being made 
increasingly aware of the 'back stage' to the planning and staging of the observed 
events. As an observer I was conscious that there was a limit to what data I could 
glean from simply attending meetings and even though I knew from the outset that 
my membership was peripheral. To overcome this and attempt to elicit the richest 
possible data meant employing the second methodological component of the 
research strategy: interviewing. 
6. Reflections on Interviewing 
The aim of this section is to present an overview of the interviewing methods and 
procedures that were employed for this research. This includes exploring the 
rationale behind this method alongside issues of selecting an interview sample and 
logistical concerns. Starting with the rationale, the previous section highlighted 
that the existence of a 'back stage' became apparent as the observational phase of 
data collection progressed. Beyond the confines of a formal meeting, a group 
member might pass comment on an issue that in tum presented a context that 
would not have been available by simply limiting the data collection process to 
observing the meetings and the events that could be attended. 
Therefore, to maximise data collection from the sites, interviewing is a valuable 
research method as it can reveal information that cannot be observed and 'yield 
rich insights into people's biographies, experiences, opinions, values, aspirations, 
attitudes and feelings' (May 2001, p120). To advance the data collection process, 
an "unstructured' interviewing strategy was utilised. Part of the appeal associated 
with this approach is the relative flexibility it offers compared to 'structured' and 
'semi-structured' interview strategies: the interviewer has an interview guide but 
there are no 'set questions' that must be asked of each interviewee (Fielding 
1993). To restrict a diverse array of participants ranging from senior police 
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officers to pagan activists to a pre-detennined and non-changing set of questions 
would have been futile as the potential for rich data would be compromised. 
The adoption of the unstructured interview strategy and the flexibility associated 
with it is further enhanced when the timing of the interviews is considered. A 
conscious decision was made to conduct the interviews after the planning and 
staging of each event. It was possible to work out the roles of individuals during 
the observational fieldwork and, as a consequence, interview guides could be 
tailored for each interviewee depending on their role within the planning and 
staging of each of the events. Compared to conducting interviews during the 
planning / staging process, interviewing post event therefore increased what could 
be explored with each interviewee. For example, it was possible to gain reflection 
on the entire process taking into account the start, middle and end of the planning 
and staging of each of the observed events. In addition to gaining greater levels of 
insight, there is also a positive benefit of conducting the interviews post event for 
what Kvale (1996) terms 'validation in situ'. This process allows for factual 
validity as it is possible to check elements of an account against what I had 
witnessed myself during the observational phase of the research. 
There is also a pragmatic reason for staging the interviews post event and this 
concerns the rapport process. Spradley (2003) suggests that the ethnographic 
interviewer will move along four stages as rapport with interviewees develops. 
This process involves moving from 'apprehension' to 'exploration' which is 
followed by 'co-operation' and, finally, 'participation'. The first two stages are 
characterised by an uncertainty and then a gradual 'working out' by the 
interviewer and interviewee as to what they want and expect from each other 
(Spradley 2003). The timing of the interviews meant that I (and the interviewee) 
had passed through the first two stages as rapport had been developed with all 
interviewees during the observational stages of fieldwork. The interviews were 
therefore taking place in the context of . co-operation'. At this stage, both the 
interviewer and interviewee are clear as to what they expect from each other along 
with the purpose of the interview process. 6 It is also a characteristic of this stage 
6 The final stage, participation, occurs when the interviewee is taking an assertive role in the 
interview process and it is not reached in all cases - Spradley (2003) suggests that this could take 
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that the interviewee potentially finds interaction during the interview rewarding. 
F or example, the interviews allowed participants the opportunity to reflect on the 
processes that they had gone through and ascertain how the research might benefit 
them as individuals or organisations in relation to their work. 
In addition, developing rapport prior to the interviews also presents a practical 
benefit. By starting from the position of co-operation, valuable time is saved 
during the interview as neither the interviewer or interviewee have to 'work ouf 
each others roles which maximises the (often) limited time and culminates in 
'richer' data. 
6.1. The Interview Sample 
Finding a sample for the observational phase of the fieldwork involved the 
utilisation of 'criterion based' and 'chain sampling' strategies. With reference to 
the interviewing phase, 'stratified purposeful sampling' (Patton 1990) was 
adopted. The rationale behind this particular strategy allows comparisons between 
sub-groups to be made which highlights variation around a phenomenon (i.e. the 
public order policing of community-based events). To illustrate this in concrete 
terms, the observational fieldwork highlighted different roles and processes. To 
maximise the data collection I did not want to focus on primarily one 'sub-group' 
involved in the phenomenon (e.g. the police) and then use only this data as the 
basis for analysis. A myriad of different roles were identified during the 
observational phase and this sampling strategy allows for the exploration of 
different perspectives on the phenomenon. The inevitable impact of taking into 
account these different perspectives is a greater understanding of the phenomenon 
and therefore a more informed analysis. The benefit of the . unstructured' 
interview technique is that it widens the scope for this exploration to occur as it is 
not confined to • set' questions. 
weeks to occur and interviewees effectively become participant observers that the researcher can 
guide. This stage was not reached in this research. 
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6.2. The Logistics of Interviewing 
Relative to the observational fieldwork, the logistics of arranging the interviews 
was much more demanding. In a few cases it was possible to interview relatively 
soon (i.e. a couple of weeks) after each event but this was a rarity. In most cases I 
had to wait and this delayed the data collection process. For example, a key 
organiser from the Solstice event could only find a free slot four months after it 
had been staged. Another organiser from Solstice was enthusiastic about 
participating in an interview but I had to wait three months before he returned 
from working on a world cruise! This was not surprising as, post that staging of 
the various events, the people involved soon had other concerns such as relocating 
and finding new jobs; running businesses and councils; taking on new policing 
responsibilities and so on. Conducting interviews was therefore more demanding 
then was initially anticipated. 
However, despite these logistical difficulties it was at least possible to secure 
formal informed consent and this was achieved by sending each interviewee an 
information and consent form (see Appendix A). In all but one case, each 
interviewee consented to a tape-recorded interview which allowed for full 
transcripts to be produced. This significantly aided the analytic process as these 
accounts provide a complete account relative to note taking during an interview. 
The one participant who did not wish to be tape-recorded did so because he 
wanted to discuss some of the issues arising from the event that impacted on the 
aborted observation of the first Pride event. With permission, notes were taken 
during this interview (the participant would occasionally stop so that verbatim 
quotes could be noted) and these were written up after the interview. There was 
the option for interviewees to check typed transcripts post interview but this was 
only taken up on one occasion when the person concerned wanted to check a 
number of dates that he had referred to. In total, twenty seven interviews were 
conducted with the police and organisers involved with the planning and staging 
of the four observed events. The interview sample reflects the size of the 
respective events and the committees dealing with them: five interviews were 
conducted at the Mela (three police / two organisers); five interviews were 
conducted at the Multicultural Festival (one police / four organisers)~ eight 
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interviews were conducted at the Solstice (three police / five organisers); and 
finally nine interviews were conducted at the Pride event (three police / six 
organisers ). 
6.3. Reflective Considerations 
An important issue associated with interviewing is that, as Weiss (1994) notes, 
any information gained will always be context dependent and this must be 
acknowledged at two levels in relation to this research. Firstly, the interviews 
were arranged to suit the often busy schedules of the participants. This resulted in 
interviews being conducted at different times of the day and in a variety of 
locations which was not ideal when the aim was to try and gain the richest 
possible data. For example, one senior police officer was interviewed whilst he 
was simultaneously responding to a missing persons inquiry. This officer was 
keen to be interviewed at this time as a previous interview date had been cancelled 
even though it was not ideal for either party as there were frequent disruptions. 
Although this constituted the most extreme example, other interviews with 
working participants were also prone to distractions (e.g. phone calls, other people 
around). However, providing this level of accommodation to interviewees proved 
to be another example of an appropriate 'trade-off as all the interviews did 
generate additional and important data that supplemented the observational phase 
of the research. 
The second issue relates to a more individual context and concerns the potential 
impact of 'interviewer effects'. For example, prior to an interview with an 
organiser from Pride, I was asked upfront whether I was gay. I responded that I 
wasn't and the interview started and proceeded for over an hour and half.7 This 
interview yielded relevant and important data but I am aware that if I had been 
gay, a very different interview may have taken place. Of course, a similar point 
could be made concerning the fact I am not, for example, a Muslim or a pagan and 
yet I was interviewing people who were. Despite differences in personal 
biography, the rapport process that had been built up with participants prior to the 
interviews will hopefully have limited the extent to which this issue could be 
7 This represented the longest interview of all those conducted. 
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potentially problematic in relation to the quality of information gained. The fact 
the interviewee asked if I was gay demonstrates that both of us were comfortable 
with the issue of sexuality. Had I met him for the first time in a 'cold calling' 
interview context I very much doubt that this would have been raised but a very 
different interview might have resulted. 
To conclude this section, the observational fieldwork raised awareness of an 
important "back stage' context to the events that could not be directly observed. 
Interviewing enabled this 'back stage' to be explored and it has proved to be an 
important and valid method that has supplemented the observational fieldwork. A 
combination of these two methods allows for a robust analysis in respect of the 
research questions but it is now important to place these methods in the context of 
other public order policing research. This will be explored in the next section 
along with discussion of the analytic process that developed during the research. 
7. Reflections on the Analytic Process 
The previous sections have examined the origins and context of the research, the 
suitability of a qualitative methodology, selection of the field sites and observation 
and interview based research methods. This final section will focus on the analytic 
process that evolved during the research. Consideration will therefore be given to 
a number of methodological issues that have been highlighted in previous research 
on public order policing as these hold implications for this research. This will then 
be followed by discussion of 'Grounded Theory' which was employed as the 
analytic framework as this research progressed. 
Before focussing on methodological issues raised by prevlOUS research, it is 
relevant to acknowledge the position of the researcher during the research process. 
Brown (1996) distinguishes between four types of research investigator in relation 
to the police: "inside insiders', 'outside insiders', 'inside outsiders' and 'outside 
outsiders'. These types represent the position of the researcher in relation to the 
police as an organisation (i.e. 'insiders' = police officers, 'outsiders' = non-police 
personnel). Within the context of this thesis, the affiliation to the NCOF means 
that an 'inside outsiders' position was adopted. This position relates to non-police 
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personnel who are trained in research methods but work within a police 
environment (Brown, 1996). This position holds an advantage over 'outside 
outsiders' (i.e. the position that would have been adopted had there been no 
formal connection with the NCOF or the police) in that access to aspects of the 
police for research purposes is typically easier to gain. However, Brown (1996, 
p 183) notes that potentially "'inside outsiders" cannot step back and take a 
dispassionate view of institutional structures because they have a vested interest in 
the organisation that employs them' . 
As has been previously mentioned, the association with the NCOF allowed for the 
identification of potential 'gatekeepers' from the police in relation to the observed 
events. This was achieved by establishing good working relations with members 
of the NCOF who were happy to recommend colleagues in forces who could 
potentially accommodate me as a researcher. Securing access would at the very 
least have been more time consuming without these links and at worst might not 
have been granted without the association with the NCOF. In terms of the 
concerns raised by Brown (1996) in relation to the 'inside outsiders' position, 
there has been no pressure from the NCOF or the forces involved during the 
research process to amend either the research methods or emerging findings. It 
should also be stressed that the affiliation with the University of Surrey has also 
allowed me the opportunity to remain independent of the police as an organisation 
and develop research method skills. In this respect, the CASE structure has 
provided the opportunity to remain independent of the organisation (i.e. through 
the University of Surrey) whilst facilitating effective access to the police (i.e. 
through the NCOF). 
To summarise, the 'inside outsider' position provided benefits to the research 
process (i.e. access) but at no time was there any pressure from the NCOF or 
police service to produce anything other than an independent and critical account 
of the phenomenon under investigation. This is important to stress as previous 
research on public order policing has raised controversy concerning the positions 
adopted by researchers. This was explored in the previous chapter when outlining 
the analytical accounts of Jefferson, D. Waddington el al and P.AJ Waddington. 
To briefly re-iterate, P.AJ Waddington (1993) argued that Jefferson's (1987; 
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1990) work on 'paramilitarism' was undermined by a selective interpretation of 
the subject that focussed predominantly on the position of the 'view from below'. 
P .AJ Waddington (1991, 2000b) criticises the work of D Waddington et a!' s 
'flashpoint' model on the grounds that it presents a partial and selective analytical 
account (e.g. through the 'post-hoc' application of the flashpoint) that is 
ideologically driven. Finally, D Waddington (1998) argues that P.AJ 
Waddington's (1994a) analysis of public order policing is also selective, and by 
implication ideologically driven, as it only represents a police perspective. 
It is worth considering these issues in relation to this thesis. P.AJ Waddington 
(2000b) argues that D. Waddington et aI's (1987; 1989) 'flashpoint' model aspires 
to 'omniscience' as an analytic account. In contrast, P.A.J Waddington (2000b, 
p99) suggests 'all that participant observation can hope to represent, in my view, 
is a perspective'. This is an important point and provides a baseline for this 
research. It is logistically impossible to observe every facet of the planning and 
staging of an event and previous sections have highlighted that decision-making 
during the observational phase of the research was occurring at locations and in 
formats that could not be accessed. Therefore, the output from this research should 
not be considered definitive as much of the phenomenon under investigation was 
not subject to observation. 
This raises a related issue: how can the 'perspective' to be presented in this 
research be maximised to account for as much of the phenomenon as possible? 
The inclusion of interviewing at least increases the potential scope of this thesis' 
'perspective' but it serves another important function. Not only does it potentially 
access data which is impossible to directly observe (e.g. opinions, values and 
attitudes), it also negates the criticism that has been applied by D Waddington 
(1998) to P.AJ Waddington's work concerning the adoption of a perspective that 
is oriented around the police. In contrast to P.AJ Waddington (1994a), the 
research strategy employed in this thesis includes taking into account perspectives 
in addition to the police (i.e. organisers) through the interview process. 
The final issue concerns the ideological position of the researcher. It could be 
interpreted that the affiliation with the NCOF and the adoption of an 'insid~ 
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outsider' perspective might lead to a piece of work that is potentially perceived as 
'pro-police'. In response to this, the case has been made above that there were no 
pressures, or indeed expectations, to be anything but an independent researcher. 
To conclude, the issues raised in this section highlight that the analytic output 
from this research can only represent a 'perspective' and not a definitive account 
of public order policing. It is also hoped that by incorporating observation and 
interviews with both police and non-police personnel, this research can avoid 
some of the methodological criticisms that have been applied to other analytic 
accounts of public order policing. Having addressed these issues, it is now 
pertinent to focus in detail on the potential of 'Grounded Theory' as a suitable 
analytic framework. 
7.1. Grounded Theory as an Analytic Framework 
Grounded theory is most closely associated with Glaser and Strauss (1967) and 
was developed as a response to the prevailing epistemology in sociology towards 
the verification of theory. Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue that theory verification 
is often conducted at the expense of theory generation. When considering the role 
of theory, Glaser and Strauss suggest that it should predict and explain behaviour; 
advance theoretical knowledge in sociology; provide some form of practical 
application and guide further research. It is further argued that the best method for 
achieving this is through • an initial, systematic discovery of theory from the data 
of social research' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p3). To elaborate on these points, 
Charmaz (1983, P 110) suggests that 'the grounded theory method stresses 
discovery and theory development rather than logical deductive reasoning which 
relies on prior theoretical frameworks'. 
Grounded theory therefore presents an ideal analytic framework for this research 
as it can potentially cater for 'exploratory' and 'explanatory' research questions. 
Rather than testing a prior hypothesis (e.g. directly applying the 'f1ashpoints' 
perspective), the analysis aims to generate theory from the collected data which 
will provide an explanatory account of the phenomenon under investigation (i.e. 
the Public Order Policing of Community-based Events). It is also noted that 
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results of this anal)1ic approach are potentially beneficial to both the academic 
community and practitioners: 
'The sociologist thereby brings sociological theory~ and so a different 
perspectiye~ into the situation of the layman (sic). This new 
perspecti\'e can be yery helpful to the latter.' (Glaser and Strauss. 
1967~p34) 
As it is a requirement of the CASE process to produce relevant research and 
policy findings for the non-academic partner, this output from grounded theory 
presents an attracti \'e proposition. 
However, the process of actually undertaking grounded theory requires careful 
consideration. This is in part due to the divergence in opinion over what actually 
constitutes grounded theory. The original authors of this approach have 
subsequently published conflicting accounts over what the method entails (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990~ Glaser. 1992). In response to this, Dey (1999, p2) is correct to 
state that 'when even the major authors disagree over fundamentals, there seems 
little point in arguing over what is or should be regarded as the "correct"" or 
"authorised version" of grounded theory'. The remainder of this section will 
therefore explore ho\\" various facets of grounded theory were applied during the 
analytic process. 
Despite the divergence mentioned above, Strauss and Corbin (1990) offer a step-
by-step approach to grounded theory and to an extent this informed the analytic 
approach used in this research. The CAQDAS program Atlas Ti (yersion 5.1) \\'as 
used to store and analyse the collected data (i.e. completed field notes and 
interview transcripts) and this \\'as then subjected to a process of 'open coding'. 
F allowing Strauss and Corbin's (1990) advice, this procedure involyed the 
systematic identification of distinct concepts that were eyident in the data. The 
first set of field notes to be analysed in this manner resulted in the generation of 
approximately 70 different codes. These ranged from the specific (e.g. 'event cosf 
related to financial issues) to the more abstract (e.g. 'police / organiser 
relationship') and this process was repeated as more data \\'as collected and added 
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to Atlas Ti. This procedure ultimately culminated in the identification of 104 
different codes. 
Data collection and analysis was conducted simultaneously and as time progressed 
it became possible to compare codes across different contexts and develop them 
further. For example, the code 'police / organiser relationship' originated from 
field notes taken at a Mela planning meeting but it was subsequently explored 
across the other observed events. This process led to the code being developed to 
encompass different dimensions of this relationship (i.e. 'police / organiser 
relationship positive', 'police / organiser relationship negative' and 'police / 
organiser relationship neutral'). As the analysis continued, structure and process 
started to emerge from the data (i.e. how does a code manifest itself and why 
should this be happening). This process is loosely analogous to the concept of 
'axial coding' (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) although no formal paradigm was 
developed to systematically explore these two concepts. Instead, these ideas of 
structure and process were explored through diagrammatic experimentation on 
paper and through Atlas Ti. The ideas which surfaced from this process did 
however lead to some emerging findings which were subsequently explored by 
revising the coding (e.g. collapsing separate codes into one encompassing . super 
code') and collecting additional data that incorporated this emergence into 
interview guides. For example, as the data collection progressed it became 
important to ascertain why social order and safety was maintained at the observed 
events. The collected responses in turn allowed for greater insight and context 
relating to the earlier interview transcripts / field notes that had been analysed. 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) argue that analysis continues during the writing phase 
of a project. In relation to this research, this aspect of the analysis enabled further 
exploration of the data through the development of themes which could 
effectively answer the research questions. This involved further testing and 
revision (e.g. accounting for circumstances when a theme did not 'fif with the 
data from one context compared to others) so the building of theory continued 
during this phase. The culmination of these efforts is presented over the next four 
chapters in the form of an 'analytic story' (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) whilst 
chapter eight presents a model that encapsulates both the structure and process 
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associated with the sites that formed the basis of the observational fieldwork and 
interviews. 
To conclude this section there are a number of logistical concerns associated with 
grounded theory that require acknowledgement. Firstly, Bryman (1988) argues 
that the rigours associated with field research limits the scope for comprehensive 
grounded theory as it is simply too demanding. Although the approach of Strauss 
and Corbin (1990) was followed during this analysis, there was not complete 
adherence to all their procedures. For example, a 'conditional/consequential 
matrix' was not devised as it did not appear to significantly advance the analysis -
ironically Glaser (1992) criticises this device as potentially convoluting the 
analytic process. A second concern from Bryman (1988) relates to the role of 
'formal theory'. Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue that existing formal theory (and 
by implication potential pre-conceived ideas) should not dictate the development 
of grounded theory. However, Bryman (1988) argues that it is doubtful whether 
theory-neutral research / analysis can be conducted within this analytic 
framework. Strauss and Corbin (1990) recommend that the researcher maintains 
an 'objective stance' in relation to this issue. For example, if pre-existing theory 
offers an insight this should be tested by considering multiple insights as to its 
relevance (i.e. across events and across interviews). With regards to this research, 
academic literature (e.g. P .A.J Waddington etc) was consulted prior to the analysis 
as it is a purpose of this research to explore the relevance or otherwise of existing 
accounts to the phenomenon under investigation. The influence of this work on 
the analytic process must be acknowledged. For example, the code 'event context 
/ politics' was developed to account for important concepts arising in the data and 
yet it was partially inspired by the first stage of D Waddington et aI's (1987; 
1989) 'flashpoint' model. Preventing such pre-conceptions from 'fitting' the data 
required careful analysis and reflection: extraneous influence was avoided through 
this approach. 
These concerns are obviously compounded by the ambiguity that exists over what 
constitutes grounded theory. It might therefore be more appropriate to argue that 
the analytic process for this research represents a grounded approach rather than 
'strict' grounded theory. Whilst the philosophy and procedures of Glaser and 
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Strauss (1967) and Strauss and Corbin (1990) have been followed, there has been 
flexibility in terms of specific analytic procedures being employed. However. the 
employment of this analytic framework has generated an analysis that can 
effectively address the research aims and objectives. 
8. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an overvIew of a number of methodological 
components associated with the research process. The CASE proposal and the 
affiliation to the NCOF aided in guiding this process and it has culminated in the 
collection of both observational and interview data at three main field sites. 
Reflections on the research phase of the fieldwork demonstrate that there were 
some logistical difficulties but these were successfully overcome. Finally, 
consideration of the analytic process demonstrates that a 'grounded approach' was 
adopted in relation to the analytic framework that accompanied the data 
collection. A number of methodological concerns raised in relation to previous 
public order policing research have also been addressed. 
The aim of the data collection and simultaneous analysis is to provide a set of 
answers that inform a "perspective' on the phenomenon under investigation (i.e. 
the Public Order Policing of Community-based Events). This process is directed at 
the research aims that were established in the previous chapter. The endeavours of 
this work will now be presented over the following four empirical analysis 
chapters culminating in chapter eight with the generation of a model to account 
for this particular 'perspective' on public order policing. 
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Chapter Four: Case Studies of the Observed Events 
1. Introduction 
The format for this first analysis chapter will involve reviewing in detail each of 
the observed events that formed the basis of the fieldwork. Rather than present a 
thematic analysis from the outset, the presentation of each event as a case study 
provides the opportunity to highlight important background information and 
context that allows both differentiation and commonality to be identified across all 
four observed events. This exercise is also pragmatic: by outlining in detail 
various characteristics of each event, the following thematic analysis chapters can 
focus on the minutiae of various processes associated with the planning, staging 
and aftermath of each event without having to refer to swathes of background 
detail and context. This chapter therefore offers the opportunity to 
comprehensively 'set the scene' for the following analysis chapters by outlining a 
diversity of elements associated with each event relative to each other. In addition, 
this approach also allows for the drawing out of common characteristics and the 
presentation of topics for thematic analysis. 
In order to meet these objectives, the chapter will focus on the following features 
of each event: 
Event Purpose 
Event History 
The Planning 
Who the event is aimed at and what the event entails in 
terms of the character of proceedings. 
An identification of salient incidents that occurred at 
previous events. The focus in this chapter will be on 
highlighting these issues rather than explaining in detail 
how they have impacted on the present - this exercise 
will be considered in greater detail in forthcoming 
analysis chapters. 
The format of the planning process will be outlined (e.g. 
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Process 
The Police and 
the Planning 
The Organisers 
and the 
Planning 
The Community 
Organisers and 
the Planning 
Event Context 
The Staging of 
the Event 
Event Outcome 
and Event 
Future 
number of meetings) 
This will focus specifically on the police involvement in 
the planning process. 
This will identify the organisers' involvement in the 
planning process. Each of the four events had a diverse 
range of organisers - for the purpose of these case 
studies the 'organisers' for each event are those that are 
affiliated to agencies that facilitate the planning 
alongside members / groups from local communities. 
This is as above but will focus on those members of 
groups (or indeed just individuals) that are involved in 
the planning and are from the communities that each 
event is aimed at. 
This section identifies issues that impacted upon both the 
planning and staging of each event. These include both 
internal, event-related factors and external factors related 
to these processes. 
This will outline aspects of how each event was staged in 
terms of logistics. 
This is a summary of the outcome of the event and 
speculation on how the event might evolve in the future. 
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This template will now be applied to the following events: 
• Solstice 
• Pride 
• Mela 
• Multicultural Festival 
2. Solstice 2003 Case Study 
2.1. Solstice Event Purpose 
The Solstice is traditionally celebrated by different pagan and druid groups who 
gather at an open site (the Solstice location) to witness the sunrise (the focal part 
of the event) at the four equinoxes that fall during the year (i.e. spring, summer, 
autumn, winter). The largest of these gatherings, and the Solstice event that 
formed the basis of the fieldwork, traditionally occurs at the summer equinox. 
2.2. Solstice Event History 
The location where Solstice is celebrated has been of religious and ceremonial 
significance for thousands of years. The focal point of the event, namely 
witnessing the sun rise, has also remained consistent throughout this time. 
However, during the recent history of the event (from the 1970s to the present 
day), the act of celebrating Solstice, in particular the summer equinox, has been 
the centre of high profile controversy and at times disorder between event 
attendees and the authorities who maintain and police the Solstice location. 
Preceding the mid 1980s, the event took the form of a festival and it was not 
uncommon for event attendees to remain at the Solstice location for a number of 
weeks and then move on as a ·convoy'. As one of the community organisers from 
Solstice 2003, who has been involved in the Solstice since 1974, recollects: 
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"People would gather at [Solstice Location] from all over the place ... 
people were too paranoid to leave on their own so it was the evolution 
of the peace convoy as such and yes, it was invasive to any community 
it landed on. .. so it gradually became for the authorities in [Solstice 
County] a thorn in their side, it would cost a lot of policing and yet 
nobody would do anything about it politically" - KM (Community 
Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
This period referred to by KM marks a time when the event was growIng In 
attendee numbers and taking the form of a festival around Solstice rather than an 
event specifically focussed on the summer equinox. These gatherings were 
tolerated by the authorities in that there were no overt moves to ban gatherings. 
However, by the mid 1980s and coming relatively soon after the national coal 
dispute, there was one year when would-be Solstice attendees clashed with police 
in the weeks preceding the summer equinox. The disorder that occurred led to 
hundreds of arrests and was widely reported in the media. 
This thesis does not explore the context around this particular incident of disorder 
(i.e. the possible political motivations of government and police at the time, the 
media coverage of the event) but it is important to highlight how this one incident 
impacted on subsequent Solstice events. Up until 2000, there was no officially 
sanctioned open access to the Solstice location for people to gather and celebrate. 
Instead, the authorities (including the police and other agencies) placed exclusion 
zones around the Solstice location at the time of the summer equinox. On the odd 
occasions when a very limited number of people were allowed on the site to 
celebrate, there would often be protracted and sometimes violent stand offs 
between large numbers of people attempting to access the site and police / private 
security personnel. 
During the 1990s there were movements to try and remedy this situation to the 
benefit of the authorities and those wishing to attend the Solstice by moving away 
from restricted access and exclusion zones to managed open access for all event 
attendees. This became a reality in 2000. The basis for this shift came from both 
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the druid and pagan communities and the authorities. Firstly, the druid and pagan 
communities created an open meeting forum with an aim of increasing dialogue 
between these communities and all those agencies, including the police, involved 
in and around the Solstice location. The aims and format of these meetings was 
inspired by the truth and reconciliation process that was occurring in South Africa 
at the same time. This forum is still active but it plays no part in the planning of 
Solstice events: its goal remains to promote dialogue and reconcile a historically 
difficult relationship between the druid and pagan community and the authorities. 
However, the key players in organising the Solstice event in 2003 from both the 
druid and pagan community and the authorities have had, and continue to have, 
some input in these meetings. 1 
In terms of the authorities, the mid to late 1990s marked the arrival of new 
personnel and a fresh perspective on how to manage the event. The druid and 
pagan communities had long wished for a form of open access but it was not 
contemplated by the authorities until the arrival of new personnel in positions of 
authority. Amidst the context of exclusion zones and the potential for disorder at 
the Solstice, the early dialogue between the communities and these new personnel 
in authority raised the possibility of moving away from misunderstanding between 
the two groups and towards a form of Solstice event (i.e. open access) that would 
be beneficial to all parties: 
"So we set up a series of meetings and some of them were really very 
good. However, it set me on a mission, we had to find a way forward 
and the one thing 1 distinctly remember coming out of these meetings 
was actually the ground we were talking about was very similar. 
There was common ground, it was just that we were coming at it from 
completely different angles and 1 felt that what 1 needed to do was take 
on board the fact that there was this commonality, there was common 
ground to work with and find a way forward and 1 actually ... to some 
1 The druid and pagan community had been meeting together on matters relating to Sols~ice for a 
number of years before these 'truth and reconciliation' meetings. The group from whIch these 
meetings originated is heavily involved in the planning process and will be explored in greater 
detail in the section on community organisers. 
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extent until that point J thought that the organiser [The Government 
Agency that maintains the Solstice location], were seen as the great 
'No' whereas that is not how J saw myself, leading the organisation ... 
J just saw it as a huge opportunity and what J find is that J got to know 
the key characters initially and there was this undeniable incredible 
passion that they had and it was very infectious." - SM (Organiser, 
Solstice 2003) 
The arrival of new senior personnel at the government agency that maintains the 
Solstice location also coincided with a fresh policing perspective with the arrival 
of a newly appointed Chief Superintendent in the late 1990s: 
"Superintendent {Anon] took over at [local police HQ] and he had 
come from policing {Inner City area with history of disorder], so he 
was used to dealing with heavy shit and couldn't believe how archaic 
and medieval {the local] police were so that was certainly a big step 
because he was able to see that we were talking some sense in that, 
yes the only way forward was public open access." - KM 
(Community Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
With a dialogue in place and a willingness on the part of the (new) organisers in 
authority towards 'moving on' from a period of tension towards an event that 
benefited all parties, the first Solstice with 'open managed access' (i.e. open 
access to the site for all who wanted to celebrate) was staged in 2000. At this 
event, people were allowed to gather for around twelve hours at the Solstice 
location to celebrate the summer equinox. In total between 6,000 and 8,000 people 
attended the event and there was no disorder or arrests. The access to the Solstice 
location was managed by the government agency charged with maintaining the 
Solstice location throughout the year and the planning had also involved the police 
and the druid and pagan community. The event was considered to be a success by 
all parties. If the mid 1980s marked a watershed for the event in terms of years of 
tension and frustration, 2000 set a precedent for subsequent trouble free Solstice 
events in the run up to 2003. 
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Post 2000, the event format for the celebration of Solstice has stayed consistent. 
Open access has been planned for, and granted by, the authorities in consultation 
with members of the druid and pagan community throughout the planning and 
staging processes. Rather than a 'festival' format (i.e. gathering for weeks at a 
time), this access has been limited to the hours preceding and following the 
sunrise. The Solstice events in 2001 and 2002 showed an increase in numbers 
(approximately 14,500 and 25,000 respectively) and these events also passed 
peacefully without any disorder. In summary, the post 2000 precedent is markedly 
different from what preceded it. The expectation, from both the authorities and the 
druid and pagan communities, was of a trouble free and enjoyable event, 
something that until recent shifts in dialogue and planning appeared unlikely: 
"When you compare the situation as it was in 1999, when the fence 
came down and people pushed in who were not supposed to be there 
according to the authorities, and the situation today where 30,000 
people are welcomed in by [The Government Agency that maintains 
the Solstice location] when we came in at 1230 ... it was supposed to 
be one o'clock, but we came in at 1230 or something like that, but we 
were welcomed in and facilities were provided. 1 mean everybody has 
to admit that is progress. " - WP (Community Organiser, Solstice 
2003) 
2.3. Solstice 2003: The Planning Process 
The planning for Solstice 2003 started in the September of the previous year and 
two groups were involved in the planning process. The first group predominantly 
consisted of community organisers from the druid and pagan community but also 
included representation from the police and a national charity that manages the 
land around the Solstice location. These meetings were chaired by SM, a senior 
member of the government agency that runs and maintains the Solstice location. 
These meetings were informal in nature (i.e. no formal agenda and no minutes) 
and were an opportunity for members to discuss issues around the planning of 
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Solstice. For ease of reference, this group will be referred to as the . Solstice 
Consultation Group' (SCG).2 
The second group had a more formal planning and decision-making remit and 
consisted of representatives from the county council, fire and ambulance service, 
private security, RSPCA and a representative from the SCG in addition to further 
representation from the police, the government agency that maintains the Solstice 
location and the national charity. The organiser SM chaired these meetings in 
addition to chairing the SCG. This group will be referred to as the 'Solstice 
Planning Group' (SPG). The two groups met on a monthly basis and both 
meetings were held on the same day. The SCG always preceded the SPG. 
2.4. Solstice 2003: The Police and the Planning 
A Chief Superintendent (RB) based in the force area where the Solstice takes 
place represented the police at both the SCG and SPG meetings. He attended all 
the meetings that I observed. This officer has been involved in the planning and 
policing of all Solstice events since the initial open access of 2000. On occasions, 
Chief Superintendent RB would be joined at the SCG by other police personnel, 
including a Superintendent to whom RB hoped to pass on the responsibility of 
planning for Solstice post 2003.3 Greater numbers of police personnel attended the 
SPG meetings relative to the SCG and these were officers who would hold 
command positions during the staging of the event. 
2.5. Solstice 2003: The Organisers and the Planning 
The maIn organiser with responsibility for facilitating the open access at the 
Solstice event was the government agency that maintains the Solstice location. 
The organiser SM, who chaired the SCG and SPG, was the main representative 
from this agency. As with Chief Superintendent RB, she was accompanied at both 
2 The reader is reminded that a glossary of acronyms can be located on page 277. 
3 Chief Superintendent RB had been a Chief Inspector in 2000 and subsequently promoted to 
Superintendent for 2001 and 2002. His reasons for passing on the police representation post 2003 
were due to a heavy workload brought on by being a Chief Superintendent and a divisional 
commander. 
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sets of meetings by a colleague who it was anticipated would take over her role in 
organising Solstice post 2003.4 As has been previously mentioned in the planning 
process section, other agencies involved in the SPG represented the county 
council, fire and ambulance service, private security, RSPCA and a representative 
from the SCG. 
2.6. Solstice 2003: The Community Organisers and the Planning 
The community organisers of Solstice 2003 were predominantly involved in the 
SCG meetings. As has been previously mentioned the only community organiser 
involved in the SPG acted as a liaison between the two groups. The majority of 
the community organisers were drawn from either the pagan or druid community 
but there were also individuals from neither of these communities who were 
involved in the planning. This included people who have been involved in the 
Solstice over a number of years and in a variety of ways. For example, KM has 
been involved in the Solstice since the mid 1970s and was influential in attaining 
open access through his elected position as a local mayor during the mid and late 
1990s. Although no longer in this position, he was an active participant -
described by one organiser as • a voice of reason' - during the SCG meetings. 
None of the community organisers were elected onto the SCG and most had been 
involved in the planning of previous Solstice events. 
2. 7. Solstice 2003: Event Context 
During the planning and staging process there were a couple of major issues that 
demanded the attention of all organisers, including the police. Although the 
historical expectation (post 2000) suggested that a "managed open access' Solstice 
would not lead to confrontation or disorder between the event attendees and the 
authorities, there were still potential threats to the event that would have possibly 
jeopardised a peaceful and successful outcome. 
4 Post 2003 SM had been promoted within the government agency that she represented to a senior 
national co-ordinating role that took her away from primarily focussing on the Solstice event and 
maintaining the Solstice location. 
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During the planning stages, the biggest dilemma facing all the organisers was the 
date on which to stage the Solstice. A standard aspect of celebrating the summer 
equinox is that the sunrise occurs on the dawn of the longest day of the year. 
However, for Solstice 2003 this proved problematic. As I noted in my field notes 
during an early SCG meeting: 
"The date of the Solstice is determined by when the sun reaches a 
certain point in a solar calendar. For this year (2003), this point on 
the solar calendar occurs on the evening of Saturday June 2Ft. As the 
Solstice is celebrated on the morning closest to this point, the Solstice 
technically falls on the morning of Sunday June 22nd. " (Fieldnote -
Solstice 2003) 
The 'solar calendar' basis for this date-related dilemma came from the druid and 
pagan community but the debate was not just along community organiser versus 
police / organiser lines. There was also significant debate occurring within these 
two sets of organisers (namely the police / government agency that maintain the 
Solstice location and the national charity; internal disagreements between 
community organisers). Resolving this dilemma of when to stage the Solstice 
would dominate the planning process. The pros and cons of each date were widely 
debated with each having its own potential complications. Again, from my field 
notes I summed up this dilemma as follows: 
"This problem is dictated thus (as presented by Government Agency 
that maintains the Solstice location and the police) - if the Solstice is 
held on the 2Ft, it will cater for the majority of attendees who do not 
know / appreciate the true meaning of Solstice (i. e. "stand on the 
stones and ring home with their mobiles at dawn!"). However, 
members of the SCG would want to celebrate on the 22nd (the correct 
date). The 22nd presents the problem that thousands will still turn up 
on the 2Ft and the [Solstice location] 'would not be open, although 
this would alleviate any potential overjlOlt' to {External Solstice 
Celebration]. " (Fieldnote - Solstice 2003) 
99 
The 'external Solstice celebration' IS another location with ceremonial 
significance where event attendees have historically gathered either before or after 
the summer equinox but is a few miles away from the Solstice location. This 
external Solstice celebration is managed by the national charity rather than the 
government agency that maintains the Solstice location, although the local police 
force is involved at both locations. 
A decision was finally reached that the event would go ahead on the 21 st. 
However, in addition to impacting on inter and intra organiser relationships, this 
decision prompted a new potential problem: protest. During the later stages of the 
planning process the police and organisers were concerned about the threat of a 
protest occurring at the Solstice location on the 22nd. This threat of organised 
protest came from individuals external to the SCG and SPG and was orchestrated 
on the internet. In terms of salient event context during the planning of Solstice 
2003, the date dilemma and threat of protest dominated this process. 
2.8. Solstice 2003: The Staging of the Event 
Solstice 2003 shared many of the characteristics of previous managed open access 
Solstice events. The focal point of the celebration was the sunrise, and event 
attendees were allowed into the Solstice location a number of hours before and 
after this event. There were no other ceremonial events during this time apart from 
a torch-lit procession before dawn. All the members from the planning process 
had a role to play during the staging of the event. 
In terms of the policing, Chief Superintendent RB acted as a silver commander 
based at a silver control post at the Solstice location.5 This was supplemented by 
gold and silver command posts that were based off site. There were three bronze 
command positions whose areas of responsibility encompassed the location which 
formed the focal point for the celebrations, the car park and a specialist traffic role 
for the roads on and around the Solstice location. In addition to an entourage of 
5 A review of the gold / silver / bronze conunand structure is presented in chapter two. 
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tactical advisors, over 100 officers were deployed at anyone time during the 
Solstice event and these were drawn from five separate forces under the mutual 
aid scheme. The police federation also had a representative from the local force 
liaising with the silver control post to address issues of officer welfare during the 
course of the event. 
The organisers ran a separate command post that was located next to the on-site 
silver control post. This organiser command post had no radio communication link 
with the police. As the main government agency for maintaining the Solstice 
location, this command post was headed by SM, who had chaired the meetings 
throughout the planning process. This organiser command post had a link with the 
private security personnel who patrolled the Solstice location during the event. 
Both the organiser and police command posts had press officers attached to them. 
The other agencies involved in the SPG had their own command structures and 
separate channels of communication. 
The community organisers from the SCG fell into two categories. Some of these 
people were loosely involved with the organiser command post in organising 
'peace stewards' who were on hand to advise event attendees on a number of 
issues. These 'peace stewards' did not have the same role as the security personnel 
or other stewards.6 Other community organisers simply immersed themselves in 
the event. This was either through organising and leading the torch-lit procession 
or being at the centre of the celebration at the time of sunrise. 
2.9. Solstice 2003: Event Outcome and Event Future 
Despite the potential threats to the event that were raised in the event context 
section, the Solstice event passed without any major incident. Approximately 
30,000 people attended the event and there was no protest. Only 16 people were 
arrested and these were predominantly on alcohol related charges. Out of these 
30,000 people, it was anticipated that 70% would not be present for any 
6 The complexities of the provision and roles of security and the different forms of stewarding are 
considered in chapter six. 
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ceremonial/religious purpose but were just • curious' members of the public7. 
Members from the druid and pagan community did seem to be in the minority but 
there was no official audit of the event attendee demographics. As has been the 
case with previous Solstice events, there were a number of media organisations 
covering the event for newspapers and television. 
From the field notes during the staging of the event and the interviews after it, 
members from the police, organisers and community organisers involved in the 
SeG and SPG declared that they were happy with the outcome, especially 
considering some of the complexities around the planning in terms of the date of 
the event and the threat of protest. 
However, an issue that did prove problematic during the staging of the event 
related to communication. It was highlighted that having two command posts (i.e. 
police and organisers) with separate communication channels was an issue that 
would require improvement at any future Solstice event. Some senior police 
personnel also questioned the worth of having two silver posts in the police 
command structure as it was perceived that this created confusion. In addition to 
these communication issues, there were also problems relating to vehicles being 
abandoned (195 cars had to be towed away) on the roads around the Solstice 
location leading to severe congestion - a problem that was not foreseen during the 
planning process. 
Future Solstice events are expected to be staged in its current form (i.e. managed 
open access). However, as was highlighted earlier, they will be planned without 
some of the senior, and influential, personnel from the main organiser agency and 
the police. It is anticipated that these Solstice events will be less difficult to 
manage as there will not be any confusion concerning the date on which the event 
will be held. 
7 A claim made at a SCG meeting (Fieldnote - Solstice 2003). 
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3. Pride 2003 Case Study 
3.1 Pride Event Purpose 
Pride is a celebration predominantly aimed at the lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
trans gender (LGBT) community in the south of England, although it attracts event 
attendees from all over the world. The main focus of Pride is a morning parade 
through the city where the event takes place involving a large number of floats 
and participants. The parade ends at a large park which then hosts a gathering that 
incorporates a number of dance tents, entertainment facilities, bars and a 
fairground. This event lasts until the late evening and is followed by a 'post Pride' 
party in a large nightclub in the city. 
3.2 Pride Event History 
The city in which Pride takes place has held an annual Pride event for over ten 
years. The format of a parade followed by a gathering has been at the centre of the 
event during these years, although the locations have changed as the event has 
grown in terms of numbers attending. The staging of an official 'post Pride' party, 
held in the evening of the event, has been a more recent development in the 
event's history. The driving force for organising all aspects of the event has come 
from the local LGBT community (through a specific Pride committee) with other 
agencies (e.g. the police, council) aiding the planning process. 
Relative to Solstice, Pride has not been subject to the same turbulent event history. 
There have been no outbreaks of disorder associated with the event or any threats 
to its continuation. However, there have been tensions between the police and the 
LGBT community arising from Pride 2002 and these dominated the planning and 
staging of Pride in 2003. 
As was highlighted in chapter three, I only had partial access to Pride 2002 but 
from the planning stages before Pride 2003 through to the interviews after the 
event it is clear from both the police and organiser (including community 
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organiser) perspectives that Pride 2002 had been policed insensitively. To briefly 
re-iterate, the problems around Pride 2002 followed a high profile event that 
occurred a month before where both the police and council were heavily criticised 
for mishandling a large crowd and narrowly avoiding a major incident resulting in 
multiple deaths. The officer who had acted as a liaison between the police and 
organisers during the planning of Pride 2002 had been involved in the planning 
and staging of this high profile event and was removed from an operational role -
he was due to be a bronze commander - prior to the staging of Pride. 
Post Pride 2002, the police were criticised by the LGBT community based in the 
city and the Pride organisers for policing the event insensitively. Although not 
involved in the policing operation at Pride 2002, the chief inspector charged with 
liaising with Pride in 2003 stated what, from a policing perspective, had gone 
wrong: 
"At the previous year's [2002J event we had treated it rather than a 
celebration, we treated it more as a public order operation and there 
was no intelligence to suggest that but nevertheless we had gone 
ahead and done it. We had also had external players coming from 
outside to manage the operation due to annual leave and it meant a 
recipe for failure in hindsight. We deployed evidence gathering teams 
in line with how public order units are deployed and that really hit at 
the sensitivity of the issue. In real terms we were filming people if you 
listen to the LGBT community who hadn't come out and they viewed it 
as a threat, quite rightly they viewed it as a threat, and it was a 
particular own goal... " - AC (Chief Inspector, Pride 2003) 
The consequence of this deployment along 'public order' lines led to 
dissatisfaction being expressed through a widely distributed and influential LGBT 
magazine and a local politician. A community organiser who has been involved in 
the planning and staging of Pride for a number of years recalled how this 'public 
order operation' had impacted on both the main event and those \vho attended the 
Pride 2002 post-event party: 
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"Everyone was just shaking like mad and they had so many police 
trained in repelling crowds, they had SWAT teams, there were so 
many police officers with video cameras that were being shoved in 
faces, they were going into first-aid posts and filming people right up 
close and intimidating people. Intimidating my own members, my own 
members complained about the attitude of the police and there was an 
event at the post pride party [Held in a club], and there was an 
evacuation because the DJ let off so much smoke it set off the smoke 
detectors and the door staff were too slow in responding to the alarm 
and it went through to the Fire Brigade so they had to evacuate the 
building... the police arrived in their vans, black uniforms, padded 
jackets, riot gear, cameras, you know filming everyone and there were 
arguments breaking out. I believe that someone from the crowd was 
actually taken down to the police station but I don 't think any charges 
were made. Two people were intimidated and upset by the police; one 
was the Lib Dem leader down here and also Dave [Local Gay 
Magazine Editor]. Dave upset the police by going up to them and 
taking a photograph of them photographing him. " - JM (Community 
Organiser, Pride 2003) 
In addition to the tactics employed during the policing of the event and the post 
Pride party, there were also complaints made stating that the police had been 
unnecessarily intrusive in relation to licensing issues at gay pubs and clubs in the 
area during the event. 
It is speculation to suggest whether this policing operation would have manifested 
itself in the same way if the original police liaison officer had been kept in post -
as an individual he was liked by community organisers who suggested that he 
could have been a scapegoat for the failings of the police and council in relation to 
the mishandling of the event preceding Pride 2002. However, the combination of 
breaking the continuity during the planning, the subsequent employment of 
officers external to the city that hosts Pride and the implementation of a policing 
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operation that lacked sensitivity sets the scenes for the relationship between the 
police and community organisers / LGBT community during Pride in 2003. 
3.3. Pride 2003: The Planning Process 
In relation to the planning of Pride 2003, four meetings were held consisting of 
the police, organisers and community organisers. The first of these meetings was 
held four months prior to the staging of the event. The aim of these meetings was 
to identify and plan for any issues relating to safety at the event. The community 
organisers involved in these meetings held separate meetings concerned with 
event logistics that were not connected to safety issues. 
The final meeting was followed by a 'tabletop' exerCIse involving all those 
involved in the planning process. The objective of the tabletop exercise was to run 
and respond to potential scenarios that could occur at the event. All four meetings 
were minuted and chaired by an organiser from the city council. The format of 
these meetings followed those advocated by ACPO (1999) in relation to Safety 
Advisory Groups although to maintain consistency these meetings will be referred 
to as the Pride Planning Group (PPG). 
3.4. The Police and the Planning 
The police representative at the PPG meetings was a Chief Inspector (AC) from 
the events planning department in the city where Pride takes place. This officer 
attended all four meetings. He was also accompanied at these meetings by an 
Inspector from the same department. There was additional police involvement in 
the tabletop exercise in the form of the gold and silver commanders for the event. 
3.5. The Organisers and the Planning 
The main organisers involved with the PPG were affiliated to the city council 
where Pride takes place. These included a senior member from the council's 
events planning department, a senior environmental health officer and a 
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representative from the highways department. A representative from a private 
security firm that would be involved in providing security personnel to the Pride 
event also attended these meetings. Finally, there was also representation from the 
ambulance and fire service. 
3.6. The Community Organisers and the Planning 
All the community organisers at the PPG were elected members of a committee 
drawn from the local LGBT community that organises Pride. This included the 
chair of this committee, a representative in charge of issues relating to financing 
and securing sponsorship for the event, a representative who organised the parade 
and a representative who was involved in organising and staging many of the 
events at the gathering at the park. 
3.7. Pride 2003: Event Context 
Not surprisingly given the tensions raised in relation to the Pride event history, the 
main issue during the planning and staging of Pride 2003 was how the police 
would approach the policing of the event. The need to improve on the policing at 
Pride was highlighted after the negative feedback arising from Pride 2002 at a 
debriefing involving community organisers: 
"It was a fall on the sword, profuse humble apologies and a statement 
that we must do better and we must get a close link with the organisers 
at a very early stage so that they can be heavily involved in the 
planning of the operation and any decision made by the police would 
be shared with them prior to the operation and in fact during the day 
so they felt that there was a high degree of openness and that was the 
intention of the way that we would plan this year [2003]. " - AC 
(Chief Inspector, Pride 2003) 
Following this debriefing, two senior police personnel attended an LGBT forum in 
the city and received heavy criticism relating to the policing of Pride 2002. This 
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was then followed by the local Chief Superintendent, and gold commander for 
Pride 2003, calling a meeting with the community organisers of Pride. As well as 
apologising again it was agreed that the police and community organisers would 
work together with the objective of running a successful Pride in 2003. Prior to 
the PPO meetings this involved liaison with licencees at the city~s gay venues, the 
involvement through consultation of the local police force~s gay police association 
during the planning and staging of the event and the publication of a set of joint 
statements of common purpose (e.g. preventing homophobic crime) that were 
signed by the police, council, licensees and community organisers which were 
published and promoted amongst the local LGBT community. The aim of these 
activities was to promote cohesion between all those involved in the planning and 
staging of the event, something which had been lacking the year before: 
"Everybody was singing from the same hymn sheet which hadn't been 
done on previous events. "- AC (Chief Inspector, Pride 2003) 
In relation to the policing of large events, the local force has experience of being 
involved in the planning and staging of a major pop concert, football matches and, 
given the backdrop to the planning and staging of Pride of the Iraq war, organised 
protest. 
3.8. Pride 2003: The Staging a/the Event 
Pride 2003 followed the format of previous Pride events with a parade, gathering 
and post event party. For the first time, there was also a ticketed event held on the 
park (in the form of an award ceremony) the night before the main celebrations. 
The parade and main gathering followed a specified theme. 
In relation to the policing, Chief Inspector AC acted as a bronze commander at the 
gathering on the park. The silver and gold commanders were based off-site at the 
local police station. There was also a bronze commander who held responsibility 
for policing the parade leading to the park. The policing operation incorporated a 
number of specialists such as traffic officers and tactical advisors to both the 
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bronze and silver commanders. A PSU consisting of public order trained officers 
was held in reserve at the local police station - they were not called upon during 
the operation. In total, 95 officers were involved in the operation and, in contrast 
to the previous year, all were drawn from the local city, a pledge that had been 
made during the planning stages of the event. In addition to the police operation, 
eight different forces held recruitment stalls at the main gathering. 
In contrast to the Solstice, the police were involved in a joint command and 
control centre on the park that incorporated all the organisers and community 
organisers from the PPG meetings. Everyone and a half hours, these personnel 
would meet and evaluate how the event was progressing and then act on any 
issues arising. A member of the local LGBT community was also involved with 
the policing operation at the silver command centre at the local police station. This 
individual acted as an advisor to the silver commander. 
In addition to the policing operation, a number of security personnel were 
operational at both the parade and gathering. These security personnel were 
supplemented by stewards drawn from the local LGBT community. 
3.9. Pride 2003: Event Outcome and Event Future 
No official crowd number was ascertained for the event, partly because the local 
police force helicopter was not used to photograph the event after the problems 
arising from the event in the previous year. The consensus between the police, 
organisers and community organisers was that between approximately 60,000 and 
90,000 thousand people had attended the event over its entirety. In addition to 
there being no outbreaks of disorder, no arrests were made during the event. 
All those involved in the PPG agreed that the event had been very successful. To 
date, it is the biggest Pride event in the city's history in terms of numbers 
attending. After the problems of the previous year, it was accepted that the police 
had made significant steps in rebuilding trust with the LGBT community through 
the way in which they approached the planning and staging of the event: 
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"The feedback we have had from various people, unsolicited feedback, 
is that the policing this year was brilliant ... certainly the statement of 
common purpose was a step forward, the pre-planning and publicity 
of it we both did before the event to sort of say we want to get things 
right this year and we don't want a repeat of last year and I think the 
police did take that opportunity. " - WP (Community Organiser, Pride 
2003) 
The police were also pleased with how the event had progressed after the 
problems arising from Pride 2002. One incident highlights in great clarity the 
difference between Pride 2002 and Pride 2003: following the criticism the police 
received from community organisers, the local LGBT community and the gay 
press from the previous year, Chief Inspector AC was presented with an award 
after Pride 2003 in appreciation of how he had worked towards regaining lost trust 
and his input in staging a successful event. 
"It is one of the proudest moments I have had in my 23 year career -
knowing that after last year's event, the LGBT community had such a 
downer on [the local] police that you had to go to the meetings to see 
how sad the situation had got, but with the strategies we had put in 
place, with my boss getting people to the meetings and the openness 
that developed to at the end of it have a presentation plaque and a 
heartfelt speech, from a personal point of view I don't think I can put a 
price on it. " - AC (Chief Inspector, Pride 2003) 
Following Pride in 2003, it was anticipated that future events would be held on an 
annual basis. It is planned that these will follow the same format as previous Pride 
events albeit with a different 'theme'. However, there is some concern from , 
community organisers that Chief Inspector AC has moved positions within the 
local police force and will not be involved in future planning - it is feared that all 
the progress made post Pride 2002 could be reversed if the wrong police personnel 
are involved in future events. 
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4. Mela 2002 Case Study 
4.1. Mela Event Purpose 
The translation for the word 'Mela' is 'fair', which encapsulates what the event 
entails. The town where the Mela took place is based in the north of England and 
is resident to a large Pakistani / Kashmiri population to whom the event was 
targeted. The observed Mela was one of many to be held in the county where the 
town is located. Relative to these other Mela events, it is a small affair that occurs 
over one day and was characterised as being a day for the family that involved 
stalls, music and a handful of fairground attractions. 
4.2. Mela Event History 
The observed Mela was held in the summer of 2002. Prior to this event, there had 
been other Mela events held at the same town in 1995, 2000 and 2001. The first of 
these Mela events in 1995 was facilitated by the local town council and a 
partnershi p group that had been formed to build links and understanding between 
the different faith groups that reside in the town. From the policing side, a 
Sergeant who was to playa key role in the planning of the Multicultural Festival 
was involved in this partnership group and helped liaise with the community and 
organIsers. 
Following a gap of five years, all Mela events were facilitated by a European 
funded arts charity that had a remit to tackle issues of regeneration and social 
inclusion through the arts. Mela formed part of its portfolio of events in order to 
meet this remit. In terms of salient event history, external factors created tension 
for the event in 2001 when the planning occurred against a backdrop of disorder 
between the police, members of far right political parties and members from Asian 
communities. Although the disorder did not occur in the town where the Mela 
took place, a few miles down the road it was making national headlines. This 
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inevitably meant that there was great concern as to whether the event would go 
ahead and this was only resolved very late in the planning process: 
"We couldn't be sure that they [the British National Party] were not 
going to use Mela as some kind of opportunity to express themselves 
because at the time they were shipping in people from all over the 
place on buses for protests, demonstrations, you know, victory to the 
BNP, so we also talked about whether the police felt or had any 
information on that Mela might be a good place for people to gather ... 
actually that year it went right up to the wire again in that they [the 
police] said they would let us know the week before whether they had 
any information and they came back and said they didn't have any 
particular information and there were no problems. JJ - FM 
(Organiser, Mela 2002) 
Despite this potential threat from the BNP in 2001, all the Mela events prior to 
2002 have been staged without any incidents of disorder breaking out around the 
event. 
4.3. Mela 2002: The Planning Process 
Two meetings were held that involved both the organisers and the police during 
the planning of Mela 2002. The first of these meetings was held five months 
before the event. The second meeting was held a few weeks before the event and 
involved a site visit to the park where the event took place in order to assess 
potential health and safety risks. The purpose of both these meetings was to plan 
for safety and security issues with a separate Mela committee meeting to consider 
issues of event funding and logistics. These two meetings involving the police and 
organisers will be referred to as the Mela Planning Group meetings (MPG). 
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4.4. The Police and the Planning 
There were two officers who liaised with the organisers at the MPG meetings. 
One was an Inspector who had just moved to the area and held responsibility for 
local policing issues and the other was a Sergeant who was also based at the local 
police station. 
4.5. The Organisers and the Planning 
The main organiser at the MPG meeting was a representative (FM) from the local 
arts charity who acted as the main facilitator for the event in terms of funding and 
organisation. Also present was an organiser who was involved in the planning of 
all Mela events occurring in the local county. 
4.6. The Community Organisers and the Planning 
There was only one community organiser involved in the MPG meetings. He was 
a local councillor who had been involved in the planning of previous Mela events. 
4.7. Mela 2002: Event Context 
During the planning stages of the event, there were local elections held around the 
country which resulted in a number of BNP members gaining council seats. A 
member of the BNP did stand in the town where the Mela is located. However, he 
was defeated by the councillor who acted as a community organiser and it was felt 
that the BNP were not as much of a threat to the event as they were during the 
planning for the previous year. 
However, there was another potential threat to the event that dominated the 
planning stages for Mela 2002. This concerned the possibility of 'gang related' 
violence breaking out between two (Asian) groups at the event. Both of these 
groups had a recent history in relation to violence in the to\\11 where Mela is 
staged: 
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"About six weeks before Mela there was a big event going on the 
college site which was an Asian event primarily for the Asian 
community, I think there was Kabbadi8 and stuff going on there and 
there had been a big crowd of people and there had obviously been 
some trouble and somebody got stabbed. One person from the other 
gang got stabbed. And I think it was in retaliation for something that 
had happened previously and that's what happens, you know, in [Mela 
Town]. It builds up, it builds up, tit-for-tat, tit-for-tat and something 
big happens and so there had been a stabbing and it had been in 
broad daylight in front of hundreds of people and the community had 
closed in and obviously gone quiet. I think there had been an arrest 
or they had brought somebody in but I think the police have found it 
incredibly difficult to find any witnesses and that kind of thing ... 
People started to say in the community and outside of the community, 
is it a good idea to be having another big public gathering that's 
primarily for the Asian community? JJ - FM (Organiser, Mela 2002) 
In relation to the local police, Mela is one of a number of different public events 
that they are involved in. These include other festivals, a fairground and a jazz and 
blues music event. 
4. 8. Mela 2002: The Staging of the Event 
Both the main organiser FM and the community organiser were present when the 
event was staged. The main organiser FM was responsible for the running of the 
event on the day and was aided by other organisers that were affiliated to agencies 
that worked with her charity and by other members of the Mela committee. There 
were also stewards and private security present. The community organiser 
attended the event but was not involved in the organisation on the day. As with 
8 Kabbadi is a game that is thought to have originated in India over .. +000 years ago but is no\\ 
played throughout Asia and other countries. It is described as a cross between wrestling and rugby 
and involves two teams. For more infonnation see www.kabaddi-games.com 
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previous Mela events, there were a number of activities during the day including 
stalls, live music, dancing and various food outlets. 
The Inspector who had been involved in the MPG was not present at the event as 
he was on leave. The policing for the event was organised by the Sergeant who 
had attended the MPG meetings. She was a bronze commander for the event, 
although she was not present on the site for its entirety. There was no specific 
silver or gold commander for the policing of the event although a locally based 
Detective Chief Inspector was on call to assume this role in the event of any major 
incident. 
Two PCs were initially deployed to police the event and they patrolled the site 
during the morning and afternoon. They were relieved by two officers in the early 
evening who in tum were joined by three additional officers to aid traffic dispersal 
and ease congestion as the event came to a close. The local police force had a 
recruitment stall present on the park for part of the day. 
4.9. Me/a 2002: Event Outcome and Event Future 
It was estimated that 5,000 people attended the Mela during the day it was held. 
There were no outbreaks of disorder and no arrests were made at the event. Both 
organisers and the police were happy with how the event had progressed, 
especially given the potential for violence. However, the main organiser FM was 
concerned that there would have to be some changes to the way that any future 
event would be planned in terms of increasing the number of organisers and 
resolving issues around the recruitment and role of community organisers. Rather 
then dwell on these issues here, it is appropriate to examine them in relation to the 
next observed event: the Multicultural Festival. 
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5. Multicultural Festival 2003 Case Study 
5.1. Multicultural Festival Event Purpose 
The aim of the Multicultural Festival, held at the same location as Mela 2002 and 
involving many of the same organisers, was to hold an event that would appeal to 
all communities that reside in the town and local borough where the Mela had 
been held. Although the event had changed its emphasis away from being 
specifically focussed towards the local Asian community and was aiming for a 
broader community appeal, the format of the day was essentially the same. There 
were various stalls, live music, fairground attractions and other attractions which 
were aimed at all communities. 
5.2. Multicultural Festival Event History 
The event had evolved from the previous years Mela and thus shares the same 
heritage with regards to past threats from the BNP, gang related violence and 
disorder arising from clashes between members from the Asian community and 
far right groups nearby. This evolutionary process from Mela to Multicultural 
Festival will therefore be considered in greater depth in the section examining 
salient event context. 
5.3. Multicultural Festival 2003: The Planning Process 
Compared to the planning for Mela 2002, the Multicultural Festival comprised of 
more meetings involving a larger number of people. The planning started five 
months before the event and meetings were held on a monthly basis. The purpose 
of these meetings was slightly different compared to the MPG. There was still a 
focus on safety and security issues but these were combined with more general 
logistical considerations (e.g. securing funding, appointing organiser positions) 
involving the Multicultural Festival committee which had evolved from the old 
Mela committee. The police were involved in these meetings but did not attend 
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everyone. These meetings will be referred to as the Multicultural Festival 
Planning Group (MFPG). 
5.4. The Police and the Planning 
As with Mela 2002, two officers attended the MFPG meetings. The Inspector who 
had been part of the MPG planning the previous year was present during the 
MFPG meetings. He was joined by a different Sergeant, who was locally based 
and had been instrumental in the planning of the Mela in 1995. 
5.5. The Organisers and the Planning 
The main organiser (FM) from the previous year was again heavily involved in 
the planning although an early part of the MFPG process was to delegate planning 
tasks to a larger number of organisers. Other representatives involved in the 
MFPG process included members of youth projects, the borough council, a local 
women's forum, organisers from other local events and a local government arts 
co-ordinator. 
5.6. The Community Organisers and the Planning 
The community organiser from the Mela was invited to participate in the MFPG 
process but chose not to. This led to community organisers being drawn from 
community networks and, in one case, an outreach worker from a local school. 
5.7. Multicultural Festival 2003: Event Context 
The reason why Mela 2002 evolved into Multicultural Festival 2003 is twofold. 
Firstly, there was a sense from the main organiser FM of Mela 2002 that the event 
had become 'stuck in a rut' and needed re-invigorating. Secondly, there were 
issues around the nature of community involvement in the planning process that 
had dominated previous events and these needed resolving. Both of these issues 
would dominate the planning process. 
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Starting with the community involvement issue, there was a feeling that party 
politics was unnecessarily dominating the planning process during previous Mela 
events and this would impact on the planning for the Multicultural Festival if left 
unchecked: 
"There were major, major problems and there are major problems in 
[Mela / Multicultural Festival Location] around the council and its 
power, the affiliations of Asian councillors to political parties and 
also to local groups that are set up in order to serve the Asian 
community and some of those gentlemen are extremely hard to work 
with because it really is about power and what they are involved in 
and not an awful lot of action and that is true for councillors across 
[the local borough council]. ] mean, if you look at how many 
councillors actually attended the festival, came and showed their 
faces, ] am not sure there were any there this last year, any, so that is 
not just about working in the Asian community that is about working 
with the council. " - FM (Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003) 
It was for this reason that additional agencies became involved with the MFPG 
process in order to try and encourage members from the local community to take a 
proactive role in the event planning that would not be dominated by party political 
interests. This required a break from the past: 
"The first step, ] thought, was that we had to finish off what was the 
old Mela committee and we had to look at the constitution and decide 
what changes we needed to make it a more sustainable event and more 
sustainable in the way of that organisational committee." - RP 
(Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003) 
The old committee from Mela 2002 was dissolved at the first MFPG meeting. A 
new committee was established and members attending this first meeting were 
elected to positions and roles (e.g. chair, secretary, finance officer) and the 
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constitution was amended to incorporate a change in direction towards a 
multicultural event. From this point on, the major issue was one of securing 
funding for the event. In comparison to previous years, there was no external 
threat to the event in terms of the BNP or possible gang related conflict occurring 
at the event. 
5.8. Multicultural Festival 2003: The Staging a/the Event 
The event was held at the same location as the Mela and followed a similar format 
in terms of the activities that were available (e.g. stalls, music, dancing). All 
organisers (including community organisers) from the MFPG were involved in 
running the event on the day. Some of these organisers had extensive experience 
of hosting large public events that was not the case at Mela 2002. A different 
security firm was employed and there were more stewards compared to the 
prevIOUS year. 
From the policing perspective, neither of the two officers involved at the MFPG 
meetings attended the event. Eight officers were involved in policing the event, 
with a maximum of two at anyone time patrolling the park where the event was 
held. As with the previous year, the local police force ran a recruitment stall. 
There was a gold / silver / bronze command structure in place on the day of the 
Multicultural Festival but it catered for three large events, of which the festival 
was perceived by the police to be at lowest risk in terms of disorder. The other 
two events occurring locally included a football 'friendly' match involving two 
sets of fans with a history of confrontation, and a BNP gathering. Neither of these 
events impacted on the Multicultural Festival during the planning or staging 
processes and those policing the event did not have to access the gold / silver / 
bronze command structure. According to the Sergeant involved at the MFPG, had 
the Multicultural Festival been staged in isolation such a command structure 
would not have been utilised. 
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5.9. Multicultural Festival 2003: Event Outcome and Future 
Despite the stresses of resolving intra-organiser relationships, fonning a new 
committee and apprehensions over receiving funding, the event took place without 
any problems. The evolution from a specifically Asian event to a Multicultural 
Festival was reflected in a much more diverse range of perfonners compared to 
Mela 2002 and more diversity in the crowd profile. The number attending the 
event was slightly higher than Mela 2002. There were no outbreaks of disorder or 
any arrests made at the event and both the police and the organisers declared that 
they thought that the event had been a success. 
In tenns of the event's future, the plan is for the festival to take place over two 
days in subsequent years with a continuing emphasis on making it relevant to all 
local communities and not just the local Asian community per se.9 The 'new' 
committee fonnat had certainly addressed and resolved problems from previous 
years in respect of placing community interests (through recruiting community 
members) above party political interests and delegating tasks away from one 
organiser. However, the organisers hope that in time the role of the agencies 
involved in planning the event will gradually shift from leading the planning 
process to facilitating local community members who will plan it themselves. 
6. Conclusion 
This first analysis chapter has outlined the structure and processes associated with 
each of the observed events. The first point to make is that the policing associated 
with these events broadly meets the characteristics of public order policing as 
outlined by P.A.J Waddington (1996). The policing was highly visible and 
conducted as corporate action (i.e. collective police operations under a defined 
command structure). In addition, there was an inclination against arrests which is 
another factor identified by P.A.J Waddington (1996). However, the events were 
not contestable relative to the policing of political protest / industrial disputes. 
9 As a postscript to the Multicultural Festival, events held in 2004 and (most recently) 2005 moved 
to a two day format. There have also been subsequent Pride and Solstice events held on an annual 
basis. 
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These events therefore represent a relatively under-researched set of event types in 
relation to public order policing. With regards to the typology presented in chapter 
two, these events do not constitute 'political protest / industrial disputes' or 
'community disorder' public order contexts which have generated the majority of 
research findings on public order policing (e.g. D. Waddington et ai, 1989; P.AJ 
Waddington, 1994a; King and Brearley, 1996). Instead, these events would appear 
to constitute a sub-group of the 'festival' category where some research has 
focussed on community / commercial events that do not culminate in disorder 
(e.g. Barton and James, 2003; Valverde and Cirak, 2003). This research can 
therefore contribute knowledge to this particular public order policing context. 
Whilst the observed events correspond to this 'festival' category, there is a great 
deal of diversity across them in relation to their histories, logistical concerns, the 
agencies involved in the planning and extent of police involvement. However, it is 
also possible to draw out common characteristics across the four case studies and 
it is important to present them here: 
• Each event has a history, rather than being staged for the first time: 
• The most salient characteristic of all four event histories is that order has 
been maintained, even in light of previous difficulties (e.g. BNP at Mela, 
the tensions around Solstice pre 2000, troubled police / community 
relations at Pride); 
• Moving to the observed events, there is interaction between police, 
organisers and community organisers through a planning process; 
• Despite the previous precedents of order being maintained at all four 
events, there are potential 'threats' that could compromise order / safety 
maintenance and / or the event future. These can be external to the 
planning process (e.g. gang violence at Mela), internal to the planning 
process (e.g. the police / PPG relationship arising from Pride 2002) or a 
121 
mixture of the two (e.g. protest at Solstice arising from decisions made 
during the SCG / SPG);10 
• Following the planning process, the events are staged and these potential 
'threats' are not reported to impact on order at the event. That is, these 
'threats' have in one form or another been reduced or eliminated; 
• Following the 'success' of each event, it is anticipated that they will re-
occur at a future date but there will be some form of evolution (e.g. new 
personnel involved - such as Pride and Solstice; new event formats such 
as the proposed two day Multicultural Festival). 
This commonality provides an analytic baseline from which to work. The next 
three chapters explore each of these entwined features through thematic analysis 
by considering in detail the 'planning process' (chapter five), the . staging process' 
(chapter six) and 'post event issues' (chapter seven). In addition to what has been 
presented in this chapter, this form of thematic analysis culminates in a grounded 
model presented in chapter eight that attempts to explain how and why these 
events are orderly and safe. This process will therefore contribute to meeting the 
aims of this thesis which are presented at the end of chapter two. 
10 It is important to acknowledge that the terrorist attacks in London 2005 could also lead to new 
forms of 'threats' to these types of events (especially Muslim oriented-festivals. but not 
exclusively) through, for example, resource issues or community tensions. 
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Chapter Five: The Planning Process 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted that the four observed events contained a set of 
common attributes which require further exploration to meet the aims of this 
thesis. This second analysis chapter therefore focuses on the interaction between 
the police, organisers and community organisers during a planning process that 
occurred at all the observed events. Firstly, consideration is given to the concept 
of 'event safety' as a potential key function for the various planning groups. This 
is followed by an exploration of the dynamics that were associated with each of 
the different planning groups in relation to an array of potential threats to either 
event safety, order or the future of the event. Finally, the chapter concludes by 
briefly comparing the findings from this exercise with partnership working in 
other policing contexts (i.e. crime reduction and community safety). However, 
before embarking on this, it is useful to offer a reminder of the basic structural 
characteristics of the observed planning meetings. These are summarised below: 
Figure 1. Summary of the Observed Planning Formats 
Event Name of Group Number of Meetings Number of 
pre Event Personnel Involved 
(average) 
Mela 2002 MPG 2 - Infrequent >5 
Solstice 2003 SeG 9 - Monthly 15 - 20 
SPG 9 - Monthly 15 - 20 
Pride 2003 PPG 4 - Approx. Every 10 
Six Weeks 
Multicultural MFPG 5 - Monthly 10 
Festival 
2. The Importance of Event Safety 
Chapter two highlighted that in respect to the planning of public events, ACPO 
(1999) recommend that Safety Advisory Groups (SAG) consisting of 
representation from the event organisers, the police and other agencies (especially 
the local authority and other emergency services) should meet, identify risks and 
plan contingencies to increase public safety at events. It was also highlighted that 
the SAG is a voluntary rather than statutory requirement (ACPO 1999; Sexton, 
2003). 
With regards to the observed planning meetings, each group (i.e. MPG, SPG, 
PPG, and MFPG) dealt with the aims of the SAG as outlined by ACPO, albeit to 
varying degrees. Although agencies other than the police, a national charity and 
the main organiser were absent, the Solstice Consultation Group (SCG) also 
discussed issues concerning risk and safety connected with the staging of the 
Solstice event. 
For each planning group (including the SCG) the majority of issues relating to 
public safety at the event were discussed and dealt with in an uncontroversial and 
efficient manner. As examples, these typically included discussing and arranging 
first aid cover, conducting risk assessments including ground plans and 
identifying emergency vehicle access routes. It is therefore reasonable to argue 
that, as a common thread underpinning the purpose of the different planning 
groups, planning for a safe event was the main concern of the police, organisers 
and community organisers. This represents a focus on maintaining general order 
rather than potentially contentious specific order (Marenin, 1982): the safety of 
those attending the observed events was more important than protecting vested 
interests. 
However, even though the majority of issues were unproblematic, the previous 
analysis chapter outlined a number of significant 'threats' associated with each 
event that potentially threatened order and / or the future of the four observed 
events to different extents. These included the threat of protest at Solstice: the 
threat of gang related violence at Mela; deteriorating police / LGBT community 
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relations arising from Pride 2002 and the potential for disruption to the planning 
of the Multicultural Festival through conflicts originating from the political 
interests of previous community organisers. The previous analysis chapter also 
highlighted that, despite these threats, the events ultimately had successful 
outcomes from the perspective of all parties. 
Therefore, the remainder of the chapter will delve beyond the overt 'public safety' 
remit that dominated the planning process and will attempt to locate and 
understand what factors were contributing prior to the staging of the event that 
aided in the reduction and ultimate non-impact of the highlighted threats. 
3. Experience and Expertise in Planning the Events 
The first factor to consider is the varying degrees of experience and expertise that 
the members comprising each of the planning (and in the case of Solstice, 
consultation) groups had in relation to a) planning previous Pride, Solstice and 
Mela / Multicultural events and b) planning other events. The purpose of such an 
exercise is twofold. Firstly, it will demonstrate the diversity of this experience and 
expertise across the planning processes associated with each of the events. 
Secondly, it provides a baseline from which to judge how prepared each group 
was in relation to dealing with the more "significant' threats mentioned in the 
previous section. 
3.1. Pride 
There is a considerable spectrum of experience and expertise In relation to 
planning on both the part of the police, organisers and community organisers 
across the four observed events. The most experienced and "expert' planning 
group was the PPG involved in Pride 2003. For example, this was the only group 
of all the four observed events that held a "table top' exercise as part of the 
planning process. Although termed the 'Pride Planning Group' for the sake of 
consistency, this group was actually an operational Safety Advisory Group and the 
format, instigated by the police. has been in place since 1999: 
"[City where Pride takes place] never ran SAGs at all and I arrived 
here pre the millennium, I arrived in September 1999, and they didn't 
have a safety advisory group as such so we hastily put one together 
with the intention of managing the millennium celebrations which 
proved to be a particularly good move ... We involved what 1 call 
statutory partners, we played ball in relation to the 'purple guide ,1 for 
policing pop concerts and similar events, we had somebody from the 
council and in September the police used to chair the meetings but my 
opinion was it is not a police event, why are we leading on it? 
Meetings were being held at the police station, why? We are a part 
player in relation to this and we needed to change the emphasis from 
the police chairing and driving this thing through to putting the 
ownership elsewhere. So at that early stage it was decided that LK 
[Organiser Pride 2003] from the events Department would chair, that 
I would represent the police, that there would be representatives from 
fire, ambulance at one stage we even had a health authority and I 
can't remember the other sort of partners... we would look at the 
safety aspects but I'm not particularly interested in how we get the 
fencing in to the venue, that is something that people working for me 
and for the other main players need to get their heads around and 
manage. " - AC (Chief Inspector, Pride 2003) 
As well as outlining the ongins of the format of the PPG, the above quote 
effectively notes the police role in the planning process - they are there to advise 
and don't mind forsaking what P.AJ Waddington (l994a) terms 'home 
advantage'. One could interpret this as the police losing 'control' of proceedings 
but counterbalancing this is the fact that ownership of the event is placed 
elsewhere and therefore potentially reduces the potential for 'on-the-job' and 'in-
the-job' trouble should anything go wrong. 
1 Health and Safety Executive (\999) - see section 5.3. in chapter two for an overview of this 
document. 
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In addition to a SAG format being in place for the planning of Pride 2003, it is 
also important to note that the police representatives, including Chief Inspector 
AC, belonged to a specialist event-planning department with a wide remit: 
"The only operation that this small unit here at [city where Pride 
takes place] doesn't get involved with or isn't responsible for is the 
planning of political party conferences... Probably the largest 
operations that we in this office plan are obviously Pride, a large 
commercial pop concert [that takes place in park where Pride is 
held] every year and certainly some of the larger, what we call the 
category C, football matches when there is intelligence to suggest that 
public order problems will be taking place, and all operations of that 
nature, they all have a SA G and obviously table top exercises. " - TN 
(Police Civilian / Special Constable, Pride 2003) 
The police representatives at the PPG had a great deal of experience and expertise 
in relation to the planning of public events. In addition, this experience and 
expertise was also shared by the organisers and community organisers involved in 
the PPG. As mentioned above, the chair of the PPG came from the events 
planning department of the city council and had held this role for three years. The 
traffic management representative, health and safety officer and private security 
representative had all been involved in planning events and planning Pride 
specifically for a number of years. There was also a great deal of consistency 
amongst the community organisers involved in the PPG - only one community 
organiser involved in the group was new to the process in 2003 and he had 
previously been a police officer for eighteen years! The community organisers had 
not just been involved in planning previous Pride events in the city but had 
experience of a) in one case being involved in the planning of other Pride events 
across the country and b) the parade director also inputted in safety advisory 
groups for other local events as a St. John Ambulance representative. 
To summarise, there was a great deal of experience and expertise available for the 
planning of Pride from the police, organisers and community organisers. The 
'structure' of the PPG was also tried and tested across both Pride and a number of 
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other events through the safety advisory group format. In terms of jUdging the 
PPG's 'structural' capabilities to deal with risks relating to event safety, this 
combined experience and expertise would suggest that these risks should be 
significantly reduced: 
"You put all those people in a room together and ask them to make a 
decision on a safety issue at an event that they know about; I wouldn 't 
think that you are going to make many mistakes. You could, but it is 
unlikely. " - CB (Community Organiser, Pride 2003) 
It transpired that there was no threat associated with event safety per se that 
threatened order / the event future at Pride 2003. However, the previous chapter 
highlighted that the policing of Pride 2002 was the source of the greatest 'risk' to 
order / event future because it created a great deal of resentment from the local 
LGBT community towards the police. How this risk was reduced through the PPG 
at Pride 2003 will be discussed in section four. 
3.2. Mela / Multicultural Festival 
Returning to the issue of experience and expertise, if the PPG represented the 
organised end of the spectrum, the MPG involved in Mela 2002 represented the 
unprepared end. The police representatives, organisers and community organisers 
simply did not share the same experience or expertise as their PPG counterparts. 
The MPG format was specific to Mela 2002 and did not follow a formal template 
such as the safety advisory group. From the police perspective, the involvement in 
the MPG consisted of an inspector and sergeant who were based at the local police 
station and held general 'geographic' policing responsibilities. Given this more 
general remit it is hardly surprising that they were only involved in the policing of 
a limited number of public events. However, notification of the intention to stage 
the event came directly from the main organiser rather than any other channel and 
the police were left feeling distinctly underwhelmed by the organisational 
capabilities of the organisers and community organisers: 
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Out of the blue to a large extent came a telephone call following a 
letter from people known as the [arts charity that organise Me/a]. .. so 
we got a fair bit of warning that they were considering having such an 
event and they invited myself and one of my sergeants along to a 
meeting to discuss the practicalities of organising such an event and 
to seek our input on the event to try and minimise the possibility of any 
difficulties... my first impression was that the organisers and the 
organising committee were a little bit naive with a small letter 'n' as 
to their responsibilities as organisers when they are basically going to 
invite a potentially very large number of people to come along to an 
event that they were organising, and they didn't seem to have much 
cognisance of the types of safety requirements which may befall upon 
them as members of the organising committee and they were looking 
for a good deal of guidance from us... I found that a little bit 
dispiriting and ideally I feel they should have had a better cognisance 
of guidance and best practice that people should adhere to when 
organising public events... I got the feeling, rightly or wrongly, that 
they were happy to make us aware of it and then, if you will, to leave 
us owning a good deal of the organisation and one thing and 
another ... Well, I'm afraid that circumstances have changed over time 
and as we move into an ever more litigation minded community or 
environment, the police as a body have tried to pull themselves away 
from being seen as the persons responsible for events or, for want of a 
better expression, the potential fall guys for other peoples' oversight. " 
- SD (Inspector, Mela 2002). 
As with the PPO, the police therefore considered themselves to be advisors rather 
than organisers although there was the additional perception of having to educate 
the Mela organisers as to their responsibilities. Again, the police did not hold 
'home advantage' - the meeting mentioned was held in a terraced house doubling 
as an outpost for the arts charity that organised Mela 2002. It is also interesting to 
note that this event poses potential 'in-the-job' trouble through the prospect of 
litigation that could be aimed at the police should anything go wrong. 
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However, the police involved in the MPG did not help themselves in this respect. 
During a meeting there was discussion over the number of stewards that would be 
required for the event. The inspector (SD) stated that he would have to consult a 
document that neither the organisers nor myself could access to determine how 
many stewards would be required at the event. The point to make is that such 
information exists in the public domain through the 'purple guide'. Failure to 
make such information clear to the organisers is either a) deliberate or b) 
demonstrates a lack of knowledge on the part of the police in the MPG. The latter 
explanation is most likely as there was no possible reason why such a relatively 
mundane issue as the number of stewards required at the event would need to be 
kept secret from the organisers and observer alike. 
This lack of experience and expertise in relation to event planning was also 
highlighted as problematic from the organiser perspective. Advice did come from 
the police and local council but the main organiser only had a limited amount of 
relevant event planning experience to inform her decision-making. This 
experience originated from past Mela events and involvement in staging another 
art based event. This allowed for a vague awareness of the 'purple guide' but: 
"] have never seen a copy of it ... it is some kind of guidance book that 
talks about health and safety relating to public performances or public 
events and it has guidelines on the things like how much space you 
have to keep between chairs and it is a very secret document and] am 
not sure who has got it but] think the police and the council have 
referred to it previously. " - FM (Organiser, Mela 2002) 
The organiser was therefore reliant on whatever information she could glean from 
the police, councilor other contacts rather than any official (and available) 
references for guidance. However, it is important to note this lack of guidance did 
not impact greatly on health and safety issues - the event passed without 
controversy in this respect. 
In contrast to Mela 2002, the Multicultural Festival in 2003 had greater experience 
and expertise in relation to event planning. This came in the form of new and 
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additional representative assistance to FM from other organisations and this led to 
a number of planning tasks being devolved. Two of these new organisers had a 
great deal of experience and expertise in the planning of other large public events 
(including a large outdoor music festival attracting 70,000 - 80,000 people over 
four days) and were knowledgeable about logistical event planning and safety 
issues. There were also more meetings compared to the MPG and increased 
discussion on both event logistics (e.g. whether there should be a large screen) and 
event safety matters (e.g. first aid provision). 
Dissolving the old Mela committee instigated this new planning format and led to 
the recruitment of new community organisers. The previous chapter highlighted 
that there was a perception that community organisers, and in particular one 
member, were using the event for party political purposes and not contributing to 
the planning side. There were some concerns that these individuals may have 
impacted negatively on the planning for the MFPG but this never transpired and 
the new group were more organised than the previous year: 
"We didn't seem to have any negative reaction, well not that 1 heard 
from old committee members, because we made it clear saying this 
will be your commitment, do you want to be in this year or not in this 
year? 1 think there were only one or two committee members that felt 
they could give time this year but they did turn up for the event and 
commented on it that they were really pleased with the scale of the 
event. The other thing in redoing those constitutions and rules is we 
made sure that when people made a commitment, that was the 
committee, and obviously people just couldn't turn up at meetings and 
try to reverse decisions but we made that clear at the start - if you 
want to stand the people who are elected will be the committee and 
they are the people that have to make the decisions rather than it 
being a more fluid committee as it has been in the past. .. - RP 
(Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003) 
From a policing perspective, the same inspector but a different sergeant attended 
some of the meetings and, again, the police's self-defined role was one of otfering 
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advice. An interesting point to note is that this sergeant had been involved in the 
planning and policing of a previous Mela (in 1995) in both an organiser and 
police capacity through his work in a local multi-faith based group. This 
experience therefore enabled additional relevant knowledge to be made available 
during the planning process compared to the previous year. 
In conclusion, the MPG held neither the collective expenence nor expertise 
compared to the PPG. However, the planning process for the MFPG - although 
nowhere near the level of the PPG - was, a) larger in terms of numbers, b) more 
organised and frequent in relation to the actual meetings and, c) had additional 
planning experience and expertise. Once again, the outcome of this planning 
process was a successful event with no reported health and safety issues impacting 
on it. 
3.3. Solstice 
The final planning groups to consider briefly are the SPG and SCG. In terms of 
the spectrum of experience and expertise in event planning, these planning groups 
fall between the MPG / MFPG and the PPG. In terms of expertise, the SPG and 
SCG contained no members that could match the specific safety planning abilities 
and experience of the PPG. From the police perspective, Solstice is the biggest 
public order operation in the county and the officers involved in the planning 
process were drawn from the local division rather than a specialist-planning unit. 
Likewise, the organisers and community organisers are not involved in event 
planning other than for the Solstice. The SPG was a fully-fledged multi-agency 
planning group and its purpose was analogous to a safety advisory group (i.e. a 
focus on public event safety) without actually being termed one. The SCG was 
also predominantly concerned with these aims but there was more emphasis on 
consultation and debate rather than determining policy. 
However, a critical factor was experience and consistency. The majority of the 
personnel in both sets of meetings had known and worked with each other for a 
number of (consecutive) years in relation to Solstice, especially since the first 
managed access to the Solstice location in 2000. Comparatively. these personnel 
(i.e. police, organIsers and community organisers) had been involved in the 
planning process relating to this specific event for a greater period of time 
compared to their counterparts at Pride and the Mela / Multicultural Festival. As 
with the planning groups in the other events, the process appeared to be successful 
from a safety perspective as there was no report of such issues impacting during 
the staging of the event. As will be argued in a later section, this experience and 
consistency was probably influential in successfully negating protest at the 
observed Solstice event. 
To conclude this section on experience and expertise in relation to safety, it has 
been demonstrated that each of the planning groups employed different methods 
in order to reduce general health and safety risks. The PPG is an example of a 
tried and tested formula that is based on the ACPO (1999) guidance for public 
event safety. It also had as a resource a great deal of expertise in event planning 
from the police, organisers and community organisers involved in the group. This 
was in comparison to the MPG where such expertise and experience was lacking, 
although it had increased by the time the MFPG convened. The SPG and SCG did 
not meet the levels of expertise in event planning compared to the PPG but they 
had more experience (and continuity) in terms of being involved in the planning 
of the Solstice event for a number of years. 
Despite these differences in planning levels and formats, safety issues did not 
impact on the staging of the events and the vast majority of safety related 'risks' 
were easily identified and dealt with in an uncontroversial manner. However, in 
order to understand how the' significant' threats were reduced during the planning 
stages it is important to examine the factors concerned with the planning process 
rather than the structural composition of the planning groups. This will therefore 
be the focus of the following sections. 
4. The Planning Processes: A Police Success Story? 
P.A.J Waddington (1994a) argues that the police form . spurious' friendships in 
order to 'win over' event / protest organisers and therefore maintain as much 
control over the planning process as possible. An example of a . spurious' 
friendship offered by P.AJ Waddington (1994a) concerns the interaction between 
the police and the organisers of a Gay Pride event. In this instance the police 
involved in the planning meetings were friendly and accommodating towards the 
organisers but behind closed doors were openly homophobic (P .AJ Waddington 
1994a). 
This example is cited because it is relevant to the planning for Pride 2003. It is 
worth re-iterating that the police were viewed by the local LGBT community to 
have 'over policed' the previous years event by deploying aggressive tactics 
during the staging of the event (i.e. the use of EGTs, aggressive licensing 
enforcement over the weekend). In relation to Pride 2003, this was the most 
'significant' threat to order / the event future because it a) created potential 'in-
the-job' trouble and b) was perceived to impact negatively on more general police 
/ local LGBT community relations. This was a situation that the police were keen 
to rectify: 
"A lot of that may have been caused through a breakdown of 
relationships between the police and obviously the organisers because 
if you don 't get that right you can make life very difficult for yourself. 
As you saw last year we attracted a lot of adverse publicity, some of it 
understandably so, so it was [in 2003J a) the skill of being able to do 
the job and b) patching up partnership working relationships, 
understanding if you like the sensitivities. " - CS (Superintendent, 
Pride 2003) 
Away from the PPG, there were additional meetings with the local LGBT 
community and the community organisers prior to the start of the official planning 
for Pride 2003. From the police planning perspective, this led to a meeting 
between the designated 'silver' (Superintendent CS), 'bronze' (Chief Inspector 
AC) and • gold' (a locally based Chief Superintendent). The result of this meeting 
was to present and execute a policing style reflecting three key aims: public 
safety, public reassurance and preventing hate crime. 
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The issue of 'public safety' was explored in the previous section and the PPG had 
the relevant experience and expertise to address these needs. Consideration to the 
prevention of hate crime at the event will be presented in the next chapter on the 
staging of the events. However, the issue of communicating the 'public 
reassurance' message is pertinent as the PPG offered the opportunity for the 
police, through Chief Inspector AC, to rectify the errors of the previous year 
through the planning and policing of Pride 2003. 
In relation to rectifying the previous year's mistakes and thus avoid 'in-the-job' 
trouble, the PPG offered the opportunity for the police to demonstrate that they 
could' get it right' in relation to Pride 2003 by: 
• Agreeing, signing and helping to promote a joint statement of common 
intent with the community organisers, organisers and licensees; 
• Chief Inspector AC pledging in the first PPG meeting that he would 
stay with the event for its duration; 
• Communicating a set of (low key) police tactics for the event. For 
example, no evidence gathering teams would be deployed and a police 
car driven by members of the local Gay Police Association and 
displaying a Pride flag would lead the parade, rather than a generic 
police van that had been used at previous events. 
Therefore, in addition to the public safety remit, the PPG also allowed the 
opportunity, through the input of Chief Inspector AC, to build trust that had been 
lacking the year before. When combined with the other meetings held between the 
police and the community organisers / LGBT community, it is important to note 
that this effort to build trust was not perceived as • spurious' and Chief Inspector 
AC received credit from the perspective of the organisers and the community 
organisers for his input in this process. For example: 
"There were problems with communication last year and other people 
are in a better position to talk about that because I only ... 11ritnessed 
some of it myself but Ifelt that their response to what had happened, 
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And: 
certainly [Chief Inspector AC'sj response, to sit down with 
representatives and let them have their say directly to them was very 
sincere and it was not just a tactic. " - BW (Organiser, Pride 2003) 
"He [Chief Inspector ACj just seems to understand everything around 
him, he seemed to, appeared to, understand the different needs of all 
the different communities. If there was something shocking going on 
around him he never let on that he thought it was shocking. He is an 
excellent chap and 1 should imagine he is too good to be promoted 
very far. " - JM (Community Organiser, Pride 2003). 
In addition, the 'table top exercise' - unique to the PPG process in comparison to 
the other planning groups - acted as a method of increasing trust by introducing 
the community organisers to the police officers who would be policing the event 
(i.e. the gold and silver commanders in addition to Chief Inspector AC) who in 
turn could reinforce the changes in relation to the way the event would be 
policed.2 This function was arguably more important than the resolution of the 
hypothetical dilemmas that were presented during the exercise. 
By communicating through the planning process their intentions and strategy, the 
police were effectively minimizing the most 'significanf potential threat to Pride 
2003 before the event took place. How these strategies and intentions unfolded 
during the staging of the event will be considered in the next chapter. Returning to 
P.AJ Waddington (l994a) and 'spurious' friendships, one would argue that the 
police involvement in the planning process demonstrated not just professionalism 
(and the avoidance of potential 'in-the-job' trouble) but was also genuine. 
~ One of the officers - the designated 'bronze' commander for the parade - was not in attendance 
and this did cause a problem for the parade director during the staging of the event. The 
implications of this are explored in chapter seven. 
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5. The Planning Process: Tension at Mela 2002 
In contrast to the gradual reduction of police / community organiser tensions 
through the PPO, the main threat to Mela 2002 was external to the police and 
organisers. The nature of this threat produced tensions in terms of the relatively 
undeveloped working relationship during the planning process for this event. As 
was highlighted in the previous chapter, there were tensions arising from 'gang 
related violence' that was associated with two local Asian groups and there was 
concern whether it would impact on the Mela. In comparison to the Pride 2003 
planning process, the organisers of Mela found it difficult to obtain support and 
advice from the council and police in relation to this threat and consequently the 
event was nearly cancelled: 
"We went for some discussions with the police and the police's line to 
me originally was we are on high alert as far as this situation is 
concerned because there is great tension. 1 know that they were 
extremely worried and there were a few false alarms about people 
gathering here, people gathering there and, you know, we are not sure 
if Mela is a good idea ... It was a really difficult situation because we 
started to say to the police well are you advising us that the event 
shouldn't go ahead? You know, what's your information because if you 
have information that the guys are going to use Mela then obviously 
we'll cancel it. And of course, the police's line then became we can't 
tell you to do anything and we got the same reaction from the council 
and we had this ridiculous 24 hours of sitting here, [other organiser] 
and 1, saying to each other well are we meant to be cancelling this or 
not? And it became clear that either we got a phone call from the 
council that said if you decide to cancel it, we've just had a meeting 
with the police and we would be very happy if, you know, you could 
maybe find a reason for cancelling it like [Organising Arts Based 
Charity] didn't secure the funding or some of the artists have 
cancelled and 1 said well no way, if 1 cancel it 1 won't say that It'e Ire 
cancelled it on the advice of the police but Ilt'ill say that this has been 
a multi-agency decision ... because the police's point and the council's 
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point was that they didn't want. .. their relationship with the Asian 
community particularly in [Mela town] is very delicate anyway and 
obviously they didn't want it to come out that they had cancelled Mela. 
That's not good for the community, and 1 understand that but equally 
so it's not good for us because that is what 1 do, 1 work with those 
communities week in, week out ... 1 didn't want that responsibility 
either of having to say to people well you know it might kick off It 
was a very, very confusing 24 hours." - FM (Organiser, Mela 2002) 
There are a number of interesting factors highlighted by this quote that 
demonstrate the problems of the MPG process compared to the PPG. Firstly, the 
decision-making in relation to this risk was occurring outside of the MPG via 
extraneous meetings and phone calls. Although this type of external threat did not 
occur during the run up to Pride 2003, if it had there would have been a structure 
via the PPG process to discuss the issues with all agencies present in an 
environment that was conducive to shared decision-making. In contrast, the MPG 
was abandoned as an option to work through these issues and, in the absence of 
the community organisers, there was certainly pressure exerted on the organisers 
to cancel the event. This would suggest that the police (and council) were facing a 
dilemma in relation to potential 'in-the-job' and 'on-the-job' trouble arising from 
the event being staged. On one hand, advising that the event could go ahead 
represented the possibility of 'on-the-job' trouble with the police having to 
potentially deal with the consequences of an outbreak of gang related violence by 
making arrests / dealing with injuries. The potential for 'in-the-job' trouble could 
be even worse: as was highlighted earlier, the police were concerned about 
perceptions that they 'owned' responsibility for the event. Had there been disorder 
they would have potentially been the 'fall-guys' in the eyes of the community and 
any subsequent media attention would potentially focus on their (and the 
council's) actions. Given that there had been serious outbreaks of disorder the 
year before occurring near to the town, official judgment post any outbreak of 
disorder at Mela could have represented 'bad news' for these two organisations 
and the associated personnel involved in the planning process. 
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The chair of the PPG suggested during an interview that. prior to the SAG format 
being established, the police attitude to public event safety was '"A safe event is 
the one that doesn't happen" (GF, Organiser, Pride 2003). This attitude would 
appear to have been aired via the recommendation that Mela 2002 should be 
cancelled. However, taking such action highlights another dilemma and more 
prospects for 'in-the-job' and "on-the-job' trouble. By asking the organisers to lie, 
the prospect of the word getting out that they (i.e. the police and council) had in 
fact been instrumental in the decision-making process would have potentially 
caused terrible damage to the already fragile police / council - community 
relations. This would obviously have potential repercussions beyond the issue of 
whether the Mela should go ahead. 
The compromise that occurred involved the organisers hiring in extra stewarding 
through their event funding. How these additional stewards would have fared had 
there been an outbreak of disorder is a moot point but this 'answer' satisfied the 
police and council to the extent that they retracted from urging the cancellation of 
the event. On the day itself, there was no disorder and no 'gang related' trouble -
other factors played a role in this and they will be discussed in the next chapter -
but it is interesting to note that from a police perspective post event this incident 
was not related and the impact of potential "gang related' trouble was 
downplayed: 
"I don't want to suggest there is a gang mentality or anything of that 
nature because quite genuinely I don't believe we have white gangs 
hell bent on having confrontation with Asian gangs or vice versa for 
that matter. " - SD (Inspector, Mela 2002) 
However, this incident does highlight working relations that make the PPG appear 
a beacon of cohesion in comparison. The MPG, and thus community organisers. 
was not consulted and decision-making was occurring via "backstage' channels 
with a number of pressures being placed on the organisers. Although an outbreak 
of disorder at the event did not materialise, the planning process for Mela 2002 
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would suggest that the MPG was a relatively ineffective forum for dealing with 
issues beyond straightforward event logistics. 
6. The Planning Process: Dealing With Dissent 
The case of Solstice 2003 presents an interesting exception to the other planning 
processes as there were effectively two planning groups: the SPG and the SCG. 
The SPG followed the norms of the other planning groups with the majority of 
decisions proving uncontroversial. However, two potential "threats' to the event 
did expose tensions, especially in the SCG and to a lesser extent the SPG. This 
section will focus on how these tensions and by implication, the potential threats 
were resolved. 
To briefly re-cap, there was a dilemma associated with the date that the Solstice 
should be celebrated. It is normally the 21 st June, the calendar date for 
midsummer, but technically, in 2003, it should be the 22nd as this is the dawn 
closest to when the sun is at its most northern point (8pm on the 21 st). The 
dilemma, therefore, was whether the event should be staged on the 21 st (the date it 
is normally associated with and most potential event attendees would regard as the 
'proper' date) or the 22nd (the correct date from a solar calendar perspective). 
At the first observed meeting there was a great deal of debate concerning this 
issue in both the SeG and the SPG. In relation to the SCG, the police, organisers 
and community organisers all agreed that the event could not be held over two 
days. From the police / organiser perspective it would be impossible logistically to 
plan for two days whilst the community organisers were keen that the Solstice 
should not recess back to a festival format which had been the case in previous 
years (pre managed open access). There were elements of dissent from a couple of 
community organisers - one argued that he could not continue in the planning 
stage if the 21 st was chosen whilst the other accused the government agency that 
maintains the location of exploiting the solstice location's historical and spiritual 
importance if it went ahead on the 21 st. The group collectively (i.e. police, 
organisers and community organisers) persuaded the former to stay on as part of 
the planning process and, with regards to the historical and spiritual importance, 
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there was a collective argument that if the process went wrong in 2003 future 
Solstice events would be potentially threatened and thus also undermine the 
historical and spiritual importance of the location. A vote was held at the end of 
the meeting by the community organisers and the result revealed that the 22nd was 
the preferred option but a second vote stated that the community organisers would 
support whichever date was finally selected. This demonstrates a level of 
pragmatism and consistency on the part of the community organisers that was to 
prove important as the planning progressed. 
The SPG were also split on the issue. The main concern for the organisers was 
with another location external to the Solstice location. The police and main 
organiser (who chaired SPG and SCG and was a representative from the 
government agency that maintained the site) were keen to hold the event on the 
21 5\ as this would avoid having to manage the site for two days. Other organisers 
made a case for the 22nd as it was perceived that the 21 5t could lead to a 
decampment from the Solstice location to this external site, which they had 
responsibility for. 
However, a decision was made to stage the event on the 21 st and this created two 
sets of planning tensions that could have been the basis for both 'on-the-job' and 
'in-the-job' trouble relating to the organisers and the police. The first and 
ultimately less serious planning problem revealed tensions between the different 
organisers. The community organiser from the SCG who had threatened to leave 
the group at the previous meeting decided that he would hold a separate 
celebration on the 22nd at an alternative, but still local, site rather than attend the 
Solstice celebration. This created a dilemma for the organisers who valued the 
contributions from previous Solstice events that this community member had 
made to the SCG but were not keen on a potentially large gathering occurring on 
the 22nd. This particular community member also made it clear that he had no 
intention of disrupting the main planning and wished both the SCG and SPG well 
in relation to the planning and staging of Solstice 2003. He also stated that he 
would return to the SCG to aid in the planning of future Solstice events. 
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Nobody questioned the sincerity of this community member but there were 
worries over how many people would arrive at this alternative celebration. These 
concerns were exacerbated by the fact that organisers from the national charity 
who had requested the 22nd as a date were attending separate truth and 
reconciliation meetings3 and, as land owners of the site where the celebration 
would take place, were viewed to be implicitly endorsing it: 
"As time went on some of the people we thought who would be total 
allies turned out to be difficult. I am talking about the [national 
charity] and that sort of thing and some of the issues that emerged 
latterly in the process with opening the [alternative celebration site] 
and that sort of thing for [Solstice Community Organiserj. Some of 
those discussions that went on do make me wonder sometime as to 
which side they were on, not that there should be sides, but never the 
less we ought to say that there are the organisers and there are the 
revellers who want to come along and actually celebrate solstice and 
really the organisers have got to be corporate in the way they deal 
with things. " - RB (Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003) 
The other organisers (especially the police) developed a contingency plan for this 
alternative celebration but they turned to the SCG at later meetings to ask for their 
assistance in trying to discourage people from attending. This tactic appeared to 
work as only twelve people participated at this alternative celebration. 
The second and, potentially more serious, threat concerned a potential gathering 
that planned to protest at the chosen date of the official Solstice celebration. This 
protest was orchestrated over the Internet and it was planned to take place on the 
morning of the 22nd . It is important to note that the main organiser of this protest 
was not part of the SCG. 
The community organisers in the SCG downplayed this threat during meetings by 
stating the individual concerned was a 'cyber-anarchisf and that the protest would 
3 As mentioned in the previous chapter, this forum pre-dates the SPG and SCG although it was still 
runnino during the planning process. Its membership consists of people who were involved in both 
the SPG and SCG although it had no formal planning responsibility. 
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never materialise. Whilst presenting this message at the SCG group, a number of 
the community organisers were also involved in dialogue on internet message 
boards with members of the druid and pagan community who were unhappy with 
the chosen date. These community organisers argued a consistent 'party line' by 
stating that the future of open managed access would potentially be under threat if 
the protest occurred and this could herald the return of exclusion zones around the 
site and closed access. There were online counter accusations that these 
community members were no more than 'mouth pieces' for the police and the 
mmn organIsers. 
It ultimately transpired that there was no protest at the Solstice. It is impossible to 
say what impact the online dialogue had on reducing this threat - the 'organisers' 
of the potential protest could have been simply espousing threats and never 
actually held the intention of carrying it out. However, from the community 
organiser perspective, engagement was a better tactic then either ignorance or a 
heavy-handed intervention from the authorities: 
"1 was incredibly encouraged by the fact that it seemed that we are 
getting to people, we are communicating and also we are representing 
people, people who are willing to work with a formula because so 
many people came on the right day and so few people came on the day 
that it wasn't open. It was a major vindication of all the work we did 
in the lead up 1 think. 1 think it surprised all of us, 1 think we were all 
biting our fingernails like mad that it was going to be a problem but it 
wasn't and it was because we were so aware and anticipated ... 1 think 
we have to realise that we did do an incredible amount of work ... if 
you are looking at it from a control and public order point of view it is 
an example of what happens when you allow people to talk to each 
other and encourage people to cooperate with each other and listen to 
each other. It shows that you can have good order, even in the most 
trying and difficult circumstances whereas the idea that a few behind 
closed doors should make rules and then you have a strong rod of iron 
to enforce those rules, this is what leads to the problems. " - WP 
(Community Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
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From the police and organiser perspective, the outcome of this response to 
potential protest could hold important implications for the future of the event as it 
suggests that, beyond the safety and planning remit, increasing trust was an 
inevitable outcome of the continuity and consistency displayed by the community 
organisers in the run-up to Solstice 2003: 
"There were a number of individuals 1 think [Community Organiser) 
was one, [Community Organiser) was the other one, who were 
basically saying that they were armchair anarchists they wouldn't 
cause any problems, they didn't have a following and that sort of thing 
and what was interesting is that they were absolutely proven right but 
what we were doing is saying oh are they right in terms of the risk to 
the whole event, we had to have contingencies in case they did turn 
up. Now 1 think that what we will have to do is in future years if the 
likes of [Community Organiser) come through and say we wouldn't 
worry about those 1 think we can put a little more credence to what 
they are saying whereas in the past, suspicious police officer saying 1 
don't know if 1 like that sort of thing, 1 think what we have got to do is 
say yeah they probably are right and perhaps not worry quite so much 
about it ... If you had listened to the e-mails earlier on in the process 
we would have had thousands grouping at the fence line, that they 
would have got in there and celebrated what they considered to be the 
true Solstice but that didn't materialise. So 1 think that is part of the 
point we were discussing earlier of trust - that is building. " - RB 
(Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003) 
The two main threats of alternative celebrations and protest did not impact on the 
event. However, in dealing with these risks during the planning stages there was 
an assortment of possible 'in-the-job' and 'on-the-job' trouble tensions for all the 
parties involved. All the parties were interested in maintaining some sort of 
'control' of proceedings. For example, the consequences of protest and alternative 
celebrations could lead to having to a) deal with it as it happens and b) face the 
potential consequences should anything serious occur (as the chair of the SCG 
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pointed out, she would be the one appearing in court should the worst happen). 
From the community organiser perspective, by not engaging with other 
community members over the internet there was the possibility that the event 
would be marred by trouble and the previous three years worth of work related to 
managed open access would be undone. By engaging, they could at least attempt 
to keep control of the future of the event and increase their credence with the other 
organIsers. 
It is interesting that, of all the four events, the threats faced by Solstice were 
potentially the most serious. It is also important to note that the two planning 
groups (SPG and SCG) had an internal consistency in terms of personnel 
stretching over a number of years. This provided a basis for a collective, and 
successful, approach to minimising these threats. Beyond the visible function of 
safety and logistical planning, this process also presented the opportunity to build 
trust - a factor that will no doubt stand the police, organisers and community 
organisers in good stead for the future. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted that the process associated with the planning of the 
observed events. At a functional level, the purpose of the various planning groups 
is to ensure that the prospects of event safety are maximised prior to the staging of 
the events. This demonstrates that the concern for all the parties involved in 
planning is analogous to the maintenance of general order (Marenin, 1982). 
Whilst much of the decision-making was not contentious, a number of threats 
existed that could have potentially impacted on order / event safety. However, 
these were to an extent negated by the planning process, especially with regards to 
Pride and Solstice. The key factor behind this relates to the dynamic associated 
with the planning groups. This dynamic is characterised by good working 
relationships between the police, organisers and community organisers at these 
events. Further, these relationships had been built up over time (in the case of 
Solstice) and were interacting in environments that could facilitate effective 
decision-making (in the case of Pride and the Multicultural Festival). The 
exception to this concerned the planning process for Mela where the \\'orking 
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relationship between the organisers and police was not as developed compared to 
the other observed events. The reasons for why the threat associated with this 
event (i.e. gang-related violence) was negated are explored in the next chapter. 
To an extent these planning meetings demonstrated characteristics that are 
analogous to partnership working that occurs in other contexts. For example, 
Crawford (1998) argues that the development of trust is an important factor in 
partnerships that focus on crime reduction and community safety and this was 
certainly evident during the planning process for the observed events (e.g. the 
police rectifying previous mistakes at Pride, community organisers dissuading 
protest at Solstice). Crawford (1998) also argues that conflict avoidance strategies 
in the context of crime reduction and community safety represent a . quest for 
unity' which potentially undermines the effectiveness of their work. This is not as 
evident in the context of the observed planning process. For example, the Solstice 
planning process required difficult decisions to be made that culminated in heated 
debate and ultimately people leaving the planning process. The need to 
demonstrate superficial unity came second to avoiding an unworkable situation in 
this case (i.e. an event that lasted two days and took a festival format). 
There are two possible reasons for this. The first relates to the nature of organising 
and then staging an event. As the following chapter will demonstrate, the 
personnel involved in the planning process were also involved in staging the 
event. The failure to address an issue during the planning could have serious 
implications on the staging process which in tum would reflect on these 
personnel. As one respondent put it "failing to plan is planning to fail" (GF, 
Organiser, Pride 2003) and this is an adage that all the planning groups wished to 
avoid. The second reason relates to consequences and it is necessary to draw on 
P.A.1 Waddington's (1994a) concept of 'trouble'. Whilst P.AJ Waddington 
(1994a) argues that avoiding 'in-the-job' and . on-the-job . trouble motivates the 
police to work closely with organisers, this chapter has demonstrated that these 
concepts are equally applicable to organisers and community organisers. To 
jeopardise event safety is to invite these forms of trouble for all the parties 
involved in the planning process (e.g. the main organiser of Solstice would 
potentially be taken to court should anything go wrong at the event). Therefore, to 
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facilitate safety and order and by default avoid these forms of trouble requires the 
police, organisers and community organisers to work together effectively. 
One final point is worth highlighting from the literature on partnerships occurring 
in the crime reduction and community safety context. Heddermen and Williams 
(2001) argue that an important factor in effective partnership working concerns 
the skills of key individuals: 
"In many cases, (project) implementation seemed to have been 
achieved largely because of his or her imagination, stamina, 
networking and management skills, and dogged determination." 
(Heddermen and Williams, 2001, p2) 
It is evident that these types of skills contributed to the planning process outlined 
in this chapter (e.g. the role of Chief Inspector AC at Pride). The recognition that 
individuals have an important role in facilitating successful planning and staging 
was also alluded to in the previous chapter (i.e. the recognition of Chief Inspector 
AC's role from the local LGBT community). The combination of these factors 
(planning function, group dynamics, and individuals) are important for 
understanding the role of the planning process in relation to answering why order 
and safety was ultimately maintained at the events. These issues will be returned 
to in chapter eight when considering a holistic perspective on the public order 
policing of community-based events. However, the next chapter will shift the 
focus from this planning process and outline in greater detail how it impacted on 
the staging of the observed events. 
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Chapter Six: The Staging Process 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline and explore the inputs of police and other 
agencies during the staging process. Although each event was different in terms of 
format, levels of police resources and approaches to general event management, it 
is possible to draw out some interesting common characteristics as well as 
highlight aspects that were unique. This is best achieved by considering a number 
of factors associated with the staging process. Firstly, it is important to outline the 
police strategy at each of the events and the factors that influenced how these 
manifested themselves 'on the ground'. Secondly, the previous two chapters 
identified potential threats to order and public safety that emerged during the 
planning stages. Even though these threats did not manifest themselves it is worth 
outlining what capacity the police had available if the worst happened. This 
exercise is followed by revisiting some of the themes arising from the previous 
chapter in relation to general approaches (i.e. the integration, or otherwise, and 
collaboration between police, organisers and community organisers) to the 
management of each of the events. This will demonstrate a consistency with some 
of the practices that were evident during the planning stages at each event. Finally, 
there is consideration of the private security and stewarding that were a feature at 
all four events and in particular the types of tasks that these personnel conducted. 
As a reminder, and an opportunity to provide some background context, the 
chapter will start by briefly outlining some basic characteristics associated with 
the police input at each event. 
2. The Police Input into the Staging Process 
The previous chapter highlighted that, to varying degrees, representatives from the 
police had an input into the planning groups associated with each of the four 
events. This part of the chapter is an exploration of hov.; this input can be 
translated into a set of policing strategies that were implemented at each of the 
four events. As a benchmark for the discussion that follows, it is useful to briefly 
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summarise the police resources and command structure in addition to the format 
and numbers present at the observed events: 
Figure 2. Summary of the Police Resources at each of the Observed Events 
Event: Number of Focus of Event: Police Resources / 
Event Command Structure at 
Attendees: Event: 
Parade followed by 95 Officers 
Pride 60,000 - 90,000 public gathering 1 x Gold Commander 
(events / stalls / dance 1 x Silver Commander 
tents / live music) on 2 x Bronze Commanders 
local park 
Public gathering / 100+ Officers 
Solstice 30,000 celebration at Solstice 1 x Gold Commander 
location 2 x Silver Commanders 
3 x Bronze Commanders 
Public gathering 7 Officers 
Mela 5,000 (stalls / live music) 1 x Bronze Commander 
on local park No Gold or Silver 
Commanders present for 
event 
Public gathering 8 Officers 
Multicultural 5,000 (stalls / live music) No command structure 
Festival on local park present for event 
The previous chapter highlighted different approaches to the planning of each 
event and the table above demonstrates that, from a logistical perspective (i.e. 
event numbers and police resources), there is also diversity relating to the format / 
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resource allocation at the staging of the four events. Howeyer, it is possible to 
draw out common characteristics relating to the police input at each of the events 
and determine the impact these had on the eventual safe, orderly and successful 
outcomes reported in chapter four. 
3. The 'Policing Style' 
The policing strategies implemented at the four events can be conceptualised as a 
set of policing styles. In essence, these policing styles encapsulated the methods 
and tactics that were employed at each event and they were devised by those 
officers who had liased with the organisers and community organisers during the 
planning process and / or held command positions during the police input into the 
staging process. The common thread across all four events was that each policing 
style was characterised by a 'low ket but not necessarily "low profile' police 
involvement. The term 'low key' was either explicitly mentioned or implied when 
the officers involved in the planning process and / or command outlined their 
overall strategy to the events. The largest police presence was associated with 
Solstice and the silver commander on site (who was also the main police 
representative at the SPG and SCG) surmised that this "low key' strategy a) was 
appreciated by the public and b) resulted in a low number of arrests: 
.. That's been a deliberate stance right from 2000 in that what we 
employ is basically two sets of officers, those who are what I would 
say are straightforward police officers without training and that sort 
of thing, so they would go along and police that event wearing 
conventional uniform, you know a high visibility vest, helmets that sort 
of thing, and then in addition to that we have got trained officers who 
are in full protective equipment or lets say they have got the capability 
of getting into that protective equipment ... the general way that It'e 
police would be community policing if we could and I knOl-\' what I've 
said in the past at several briefings I're done is treat this as a big 
village and go in and fry and police that accordingly and cerfainly I 
didn't mingle with the cro·wd velY much in 2003 because my 
responsibilities 1t'ere different but It'hat J ha· .... e seen in the past is a lot 
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of the crowd have been quite appreciatil'e of the style of policing that 
we have adopted which has been low-key, you knoYr. if we look at this 
year, 30 odd thousand people there, 16 arrests." - RB (Chief 
Superintendent, Solstice 2003) 
There are a number of points worth noting from the above statement. This low key 
policing style attracts both the backing of those who attend the event and it results 
in a low number of arrests. To contextualise these figures, it is worth comparing 
the number of arrests made at the observed Solstice with numbers from a "bio-o 
village' over a similar period (i.e. over a weekend). The Surrey town of 
Camberley has a population of 30,105 (2001 Census) and averages 2.35 arrests 
over a weekend evening / early morning (Surrey Police, personal communication). 
It is also important to note that the chosen policing sty Ie has been consistent since 
2000. As chapter four highlighted, prior to the Solstice in 2000 the event had been 
characterised by over a decade of exclusion zones that were heavily policed (along 
with the Solstice location) and the occasional outbreak of (heavily publicised) 
disorder. The next section will examine how these strategies manifested 
themselves 'on the ground' but the points that are important include the notion of 
"community policing' (communicated in this instance through the metaphor of 
policing a "big village') and the fact the strategy at the observed Solstice had been 
utilised on previous occasions. 
The previous two chapters have highlighted that in relation to the police input into 
Pride, the topic of the policing style had not only dominated the planning process 
but it potentially presented the greatest threat to the event given the tensions that 
had arisen between the local LGBT community and the police during the previous 
year's event. The consensual opinion from all parties, including the police 
involved in the PPG, was that the previous Pride had been insensitively policed 
with an emphasis on traditional public order methods (e.g. the use of Evidence 
Gathering Teams) rather than liaison with the organisers and community 
organisers who could have potentially informed a more appropriate operation. In 
contrast, the policing style for the observed Pride placed an emphasis on a strategy 
incorporating reassurance, public safety and the prevention of hate crime that had 
been planned and communicated well in advance of the actual e\'ent: 
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"It was never perceived that there was going to be any great problem. 
All events are risk assessed and this was well planned and I'm talking 
about it from the partners, from Pride, it is something that we had 
known before, it was well planned, there was high levels of 
organization. So basically the event itself was always going to be low 
risk because this wasn't something that was going to be an illegal 
march where the motives were one of civil disorder or protest, this 
was lawful, well-organised, rehearsed. The biggest issues were crowd 
safety because we have got large numbers of people on a hot day 
coming into [Pride City] in a congested city and possibly throwing 
into it the usual sort of alcohol factor ... people can get hurt. The other 
side of it of course was the crime because there were a lot of obviously 
homosexual people coming into the city, it could attract hate crime 
which of course is something that we have to police very sensitively. 
There have been incidents leading up to it, indeed there had been 
incidents in previous years, and we need to make sure that we 
maintain the confidence of the gay community in being able to 
respond and deal quickly and prevent it and hence the operation 
started on the Friday night were of course around the gay venues most 
of the people were gathering and of course it was this having high 
visibility reassurance but not being oppressive or intrusive as far as 
the gay community is concerned. It reassured them, it wasn't sort of 
hang on you are looking and checking up on what we are doing, which 
would be issues that came out the year before where it was all 
enforcing licensing rather than actually saying hang on are you okay 
with support and reassurance and visibility. " - CS (Superintendent, 
Pride 2003) 
In addition to a policing sty Ie that was designed to regain lost confidence from the 
community organisers and the wider LGBT community, there was an expectation 
of an orderly event based on the inputs of the planning process and knowledge 
about what the event constituted. The policing style was low key in that the 
intrusive tactics of the year before \yere replaced with high visibility reassurance 
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but also an emphasis and awareness that the large numbers and weather conditions 
posed a threat to public safety. Another feature of the policing style at Pride was 
the integration of the organisers and community organisers from the PPG into the 
management of public safety at the event. This also occurred at Solstice but to a 
lesser extent. These factors will be considered in more depth as the chapter 
progresses. 
The smallest of the observed events in terms of the police presence and the 
numbers of event attendees was the Mela and the Multicultural Festival that 
followed it. From the policing perspective, the Mela was not perceived as 
particularly difficult to police and the main objective was public safety: 
"Given the size of event that the Mela was, it was something that eight 
times out of ten we deal with in our stride ... the success criteria for me 
would be first and foremost did anybody come to any harm, were there 
any difficulties from a traffic flow situation and any knock-on effects 
from road traffic accidents or anything of that nature and did the 
majority of people go away from the event feeling that they enjoyed 
themselves and hadn't seen an overt police presence. When all things 
are considered reflecting on the Mela that occurred, I would suggest 
that it was a success within those criteria. " - SD (Inspector, Mela 
2002) 
As with Solstice and Pride, the Mela was not occurring for the first time. During 
the MPG, the Inspector - who was new to the area and had not policed the event 
previously - outlined that he had been informed that the policing at the preceding 
Mela had relied on a small police presence and there had been no significant 
problems. The organiser and community organisers in the MPG had endorsed this 
policing strategy and were particularly pleased that the event had passed 
peacefully given that it had been staged shortly after a nearby outbreak of disorder 
related to clashes between the police, members of far right political parties and a 
small number of the local Asian community. 
Therefore, the policing at the observed Mela was based on a previous template 
and, because of the relatively small numbers involved, an expectation that a small 
police presence would be sufficient to ensure public safety without creating an 
impression of an overt or intrusive police presence. However, there was still a 
potential threat to order at the event arising from possible gang related conflict. 
The reasons why this did not materialise will be examined shortly. along with the 
procedures and resources available to the police to potentially counter this threat. 
Before outlining the policing style at the subsequent Multicultural Festival, it is 
important to note that no threat to order and / or public safety had been identified 
prior to the staging of the event. It was in this sense the most straightforward event 
in terms of policing compared to Pride, Solstice and Mela. Given that the policing 
style had been based on previous events, it is no surprise that this in turn informed 
the policing style at the Multicultural Festival: 
.. What we decided to do was put together a sergeant and seven pes, 
which is a minimum PSu, and they would be allocated the task of 
policing the event on the day on the understanding that it is very low-
key in the sense of we didn't want all seven there in a riot van. We 
wanted a maximum of two at a time, hats and coats, walking through 
the area, community involvement, and then alternate staff obviously 
because it is a long day. That was the plan up to the day itself, we 
never got any intelligence, or reports, or comments from anywhere to 
say that they expected trouble so It'e didn't increase the policing and 
on the day itself that is how It'e policed it. So you had one sergeant 
making contact with the organisers and at anyone time generally 
there were a maximum of two officers walking through. We then 
policed the extremities, because 1,t'ith any event you get people 
travelling to and from which makes it a good area for anyone who 
wants to steal anything or mug anyone, so we policed the extremities 
with the extra. So ~f there It'ere two in the event, there It'ould be jh'e 
lj'alking around outside and that is how we policed it." - :v1Y 
(Sergeant, Multicultural Festival 2003) 
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In terms of consistency, the numbers were consistent with the Mela and again 
there was an emphasis on low key policing through a small police presence 
patrolling the Multicultural Festival location and engagement, or community 
involvement, with participants at the event. Compared to Solstice and Pride, the 
policing of the Mela and the Multicultural Festival was characterised by a 
relatively loose command structure. The metallic hierarchy existed in principle but 
it was not as rigid or as comprehensive in contrast to Solstice or Pride. The 
concerns were related to finding cover and the logistics of allocating a small 
number of officers to the event. The task of preparing and running an operation 
involving approximately 100 officers under a more rigid command structure, 
which was the case at Pride and Solstice, naturally creates more complexity and 
potential difficulties. The various command structures are explored in greater 
detail in section five whilst a number of problems that were identified by the 
police and organisers in relation to these receive consideration in the following 
chapter. 
Returning to consideration of the policing style, there are elements of consistency 
across the four events despite the differences in format, size and levels of police 
resources. Overt and intrusive public order tactics were eschewed in favour of the 
'low key', reassurance and community involvement, combined with a concern for 
public safety rather than explicit order maintenance and crowd control. These 
formed the basis of policing styles that, rather than being reactive, were devised 
by police representatives and / or police commanders involved in the planning 
process. They were also informed by previous experience of policing the events in 
the past. The next section will reflect on how these policing styles operated during 
the staging of the events. This exercise will also offer the opportunity to consider 
why the potential for gang related conflict at Mela did not materialise. 
4. The Policing Styles in Action 
One common characteristic of police involvement during the staging of each eyent 
is that police officers generally had very little to do. This is not surprising giyen 
that each event ran in an orderly and safe fashion. Howeyer, it is interesting to 
retlect on how the policing styles mentioned translated into the actions that \\ere 
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taken by police officers by drawing out common characteristics across the four 
events. 
It was noted in the previous section that there were only 16 arrests out of a cro\\d 
of 30,000 at the observed Solstice. There was undoubtedly much more 
opportunity for the police to be proactive in making arrests if they had so desired. 
At the height of the event, it was impossible to circulate around the crowd without 
witnessing the smoking of cannabis. Quite often there were police officers close to 
this open drug taking but they did not intervene. This was a deliberate tactic 
embodied within the policing style at Solstice: 
.. We could have probably been far more rigorous in our arrests if we 
had decided to nick everybody who was smoking a bit of dope and 
everyone who swore and everyone who was drunk and disorderly and 
that sort of thing but 1 think you've got to be realistic in terms of if you 
are not careful and you start going and you start arresting people in 
large numbers, for a start you run out of resources, because 
immediately if you take an arrest that is officers moved away from 
there and also you end up inflaming the crowd and is that really what 
we want? 1 think that there was a quote from Scarman from the 
Brixton riots in 81 where by he basically said that, and what he was 
referring to at that time was the whole issue of intervening in terms of 
drugs and it was the particular cafe that they hit and that sort of thing 
on that occasion and he did put forward a view to say that if taking a 
certain course of action by the police that then adversely affects the 
Queen's peace, the question is should you be taking that course of 
action even though there is a degree of criminality and that is 
something 1 have always kept in mind as far as Solstice is concerned. 
Whilst there may be misdemeanors, some would argue that it is avtful 
that there are people smoking dope and that sort of thing, but (f that is 
going on is it right as a consequence of dealing with that few that you 
could really cause an incident of major proportions as 'vt'e have seen in 
the past and that is 11'hy we have said try to keep it 10'vt'-key. U there 
are people dealing there they should be taken out because l'm sure 
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everyone would applaud if that happens, and those people that are 
really drunk and disorderly and committing antisocial behaviour yes 
as far as possible get those out but in general terms low-key. " - RB 
(Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003) 
The policing strategy for Solstice therefore had a 'bigger picture' approach at its 
heart. This was based on weighing up outcomes - the police could chose between 
non-intervention and therefore underenforcement in relation to drugs / minor 
public order offences or they could take a proactive arrest strategy that could 
potentially have antagonized the crowd and created disorder. The choice of the 
former strategy was taken in the light of previous experience (Chief 
Superintendent RB had been instrumental in the planning and policing of Solstice 
since 2000) and an awareness that, if order (and therefore public safety) was the 
priority, overt criminality was not a pressing concern relative to achieving this 
overall aim that had been a precedent at the event since the inception of managed 
open access. At a logistical level, a proactive arrest strategy could also have 
exacerbated the potential for disorder and there would not have been the resources 
to cope. 
The low arrest figures reflect that this approach was adopted by the police officers 
at the event even though the strategy of underenforcement in relation to drugs was 
possibly not the policing norm - despite changing attitudes - away from Solstice: 
"Attitudes change, I don't know if on the night you were aware but the 
consensus was we would not be actively policing people using 
prohibited drugs. We had been proactive in policing the distribution 
and sale and dealing of such things but if somebody walked past you 
smoking a splifJ, it wasn't that you turned a blind eye but you didn't 
actively police it. If that happens on a Saturday night on a high street 
I think nine times out of ten that person would be arrested for the 
possession of a controlled drug but I think attitudes are changing to 
the recreational use of certain drugs and I think you don't get conflict 
and without conflict you don't get hot spots, YOli don't get a problem 
for policing. It is l'ery much if I'm going to stand on the road and 
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stand in front of you and prevent you from going somewhere you are 
going to be upset. If I wave at you when you go past you are going to 
think what a lovely policeman and that is the situation I think. " - DC 
(PC, Solstice 2003) 
Once again, the implication is that underenforcement and the application of the 
general low key policing style minimises the potential to create crowd antagonism 
towards the police and this was desirable in relation to avoiding 'a problem for 
policing' . 
There were no reported arrests arising from the staging of Pride but in comparison 
to Solstice where the policing style was similar to that utilised at previous events, 
the policing of the observed Pride event rejected an overt and enforcement 
oriented policing style (that had been used the previous year) and opted for a 
discretionary approach that placed an emphasis on proportionality: 
"I don't have police officers walking like guards along the side of this 
procession with evidence gathering teams filming and that is one of 
the issues that was picked up... you know in riot gear, that is the 
proportionality side of it and is it necessary? If I saw someone on the 
float or officers saw someone on the float who was carrying out a 
sexual act on another male, quite clearly an offence, a public decency 
offence, quite clearly there could be members of the public who think 
it's horrendous, there are lots of complaints, is it necessary at that 
stage to stop the procession and form cordons, go up to that float in 
front of the community and actually arrest or take details to summons 
these people? I don't think so, that is the discretionary power of 
saying no. " - CS (Superintendent, Pride 2003) 
As with Solstice, there was drug taking at Pride but this was not actively policed. 
Overt drug taking was not as prevalent compared to Solstice. However. it was 
occurring and an impact of the policing style was that the police opted for non-
intervention and therefore underenforcement: 
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"If anyone was seen drug dealing at Pride, as they H'ere, nothing was 
done about it. They were just observed because if the police had gone 
in and arrested anyone the crowd would not have known -what they 
were being arrested for. They would have seen it as a hostile attack on 
a gay person so they very wisely - ] suppose in a way it is wise - just 
let it carryon which] 'm not for. ] 'm not just saying it because you are 
doing something for the police, ] know that you are not a copper, but] 
don't approve of people taking drugs. ] like poppers for sex, amyl 
nitrate but that's all. That is very much a gay thing." - JM 
(Community Organiser, Pride 2003) 
This quote raises an interesting contradiction: JM states that he is against people 
taking drugs and that by implication something should have been done even 
though he admits to his own drug-taking. However, it is worth reiterating that, in 
direct contrast to the previous year, potentially intrusive methods such as the use 
of evidence gathering teams and even the use of the police helicopter (who in 
previous years had photographed the crowd) were not present during the policing 
of Pride 2003. From the first PPG meeting, there was a commitment to a 'low 
key' and sensitive policing style and this included new tactics such as officers 
from the local Gay Police Association leading the parade rather than the 
traditional tactic of using a police van. In addition, the officers who policed the 
event were drawn from the city that hosts Pride, the logic being that they would be 
more sensitive in their approach to the event as they were used to policing a large 
resident gay population compared to officers drawn from other locations. These 
were tactics specific to the police input at the event that were implemented in light 
of the tensions arising from the previous year. However, to fully appreciate the 
implementation of the policing style one needs to consider the levels of integration 
between the police, organisers and community organisers during the staging of the 
event and this will be considered in due course. 
Returning to the specific police input at the observed events, it is interesting to 
relate that whilst there was underenforcement in relation to drugs and (minor) 
public order offences, arrests that were made mirrored the intention of the chosen 
policing styles. This represents a subtle but important distinction bet\n~en general 
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underenforcement and limited, yet punitive, selective enforcement. For example, 
prior to the parade and subsequent gathering at Pride, the bronze commander on 
the park (who was also main police representative at the PPG) was informed that a 
man had been arrested for robbery that was known to be homophobic. After 
liaison with the silver command room and the custody suite. it was decided that 
this individual would be detained for the entire weekend to ensure that he could 
not potentially commit any hate crime. This reflected the stated intention of the 
police to prevent hate crime at the event. At the Solstice event, the silver 
commander on site (Chief Superintendent RB) was informed during the staging of 
the event that two people who had been arrested for trying to gain access to the 
Solstice location with wire cutters had been cautioned and released. This 
prompted the silver commander to contact the custody location, which was based 
off site, and insist that anyone arrested must be detained overnight to prevent 
possible reoccurrences and / or further problems. 
It is evident that discretion was therefore a key element imposed by the police 
commanders during the staging of Solstice and Pride. This discretion was directed 
towards maintaining the overall aims of the policing styles at each event (i.e. 
reassurance / low key and public safety). In order to achieve the successful 
outcomes and maintain order, discretion led to selective law enforcement. Some 
criminal acts were tolerated (e.g. drug taking) because it was perceived that 
intervention might increase the potential for disorder. Those persons arrested were 
subject to full enforcement - there was a desire to keep them away from the 
events by detainment rather than caution and again this was because it was 
perceived that they could undermine the aims of the policing styles and disrupt 
order. 
The implementation of the policing style at Mela and the Multicultural Festival 
highlights different priorities compared to Solstice and Pride. Firstly, the police 
did not have to make the same choices in relation to whether they would under or 
over enforce certain acts and behaviours. Both events were characterised as being 
pitched at a family audience and overt criminality / minor disorder (e.g. drug 
taking, alcohol related public order offences) was largely absent. As was hinted 
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earlier, this made these events relatively easy to police, hence the small police 
presence and the emphasis on public safety / community involvement. 
Returning to main threat associated with the observed Mela, the planning process 
revealed that there was a fear that the two gangs might have confronted each other 
at the event. Incorporated within the policing style was an expectation that this 
would not occur because of the family nature of the event. During the briefing the 
designated bronze commander (who was a sergeant who had been involved in the 
MPG) told the two officers who would police the majority of the event that there 
was a) no intelligence to suggest that disorder would occur - it had been absent 
from a fair the previous week which was viewed as potentially much more 
conducive to disorder - and b) the families of the gangs would be present at the 
event thus decreasing the possibility of disorder. The main organiser at Mela, who 
was content with the policing style incorporated at the event, echoed this view: 
"They [the police] were very helpful on the day, always available, 
always had officers available so there has been a police presence 
because you know it is not an easy situation and 1 don't know why 
nothing kicked off last year really. It could easily just have done. 
Apart from the fact that their mums and dads might have been there, 
which is quite often the reason really. " - FM (Organiser, Mela 2002) 
The policing style was therefore implemented with two officers initially being 
deployed to patrol the event during the morning and afternoon. Two additional 
officers replaced them in the early evening and they were joined by three more to 
aid with traffic dispersal at the close of the event. None of these officers were 
involved in the planning process and the bronze commander only made one visit 
during the staging of the event. These officers were deployed with an expectation 
that disorder was unlikely and throughout the duration of the event, they had very 
little to do. Their role encompassed patrolling the park and interacting with 
members of the public and those involved in the event (e.g. vendors). The two 
initial officers managed to score an unplanned public relations coup when they 
could not find a parking space for their police vehicle. Following from the 
example set by a nearby fire engine. these two police officers allowed children 
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(and even the local mayor!) the opportunity to clamber around their vehicle and 
answer any questions they might have. Once these officers were relieved, the next 
set of officers continued with patrolling and general traffic related duties (e.g. 
stopping traffic to let cars out of the car park). Overall, from the perspective of the 
officers policing the event, it was perceived as an opportunity to earn relatively 
easy overtime at double the normal rate. 
I observed the staging of the Multicultural Festival from the perspective of the 
organisers but the implementation of the policing strategy appeared similar. There 
was only minimal contact between the organisers and the police officers present 
and with only two officers at anyone time, policing an event with over 5000 
people there certainly was not a sense that the police were imposing themselves 
on the event. As with the previous year, the implementation of the policing style 
was well received: 
"I was only aware of the police patrolling now and again. Obviously 
they said that they didn't want to be a heavy presence there, they 
didn't see it is a high risk and they just wanted to keep an eye on 
things and not feel like they were imposing on the event. They didn't 
want to be seen as spoiling people's fun, which 1 think that they were 
aware of" - RP (Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003) 
There were no arrests arising from either the Mela or Multicultural Festival so, in 
addition to the policing at Pride and Solstice, it must be concluded that the 
policing styles were implemented successfully and a) avoided antagonizing the 
crowd which therefore reduced the potential for disorder and b) contributed in 
varying degrees to public safety. 
5. What If ... Police Preparations for the Unexpected 
Each of the four events was deemed to be ultimately successful and they were 
characterised by being both orderly and safe. However, it is important to note that, 
despite policing styles that emphasised low key approaches to each of the events, 
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there were systems in place to deal with any potential threats to order and or / 
event safety. 
In relation to the Mela, resources would have been drawn to the event from the 
surrounding area if they had been required: 
"Although it is assessed as being a fairly low risk event, we never 
close our minds to the possibility that the unforeseen might occur but 
on that weekend we didn't have a particular group of officers 
identified and ready to act in a public order type role but there would 
have been a number of officers scattered about the division who if the 
on-call inspector had felt a need to send into that area, he or she 
could have called on that fairly shortly and we could have had 
something there fairly quickly. " - SD (Inspector, Mela 2002) 
Although not implemented, this provision was built into the command structure at 
the event. The bronze commander was the only part of this structure involved, 
albeit in a limited role, during the staging of the event. However, a DCI and two 
inspectors were nominated in the operational order and subsequent briefing as on-
call gold and silver commanders respectively. 
Circumstances were slightly different in relation to the subsequent Multicultural 
Festival. In addition to this event, local police resources were allocated to a large 
balloon festival, a football match and a BNP rally. This led to an alternative 
command structure relative to the previous years Mela that could have potentially 
been called upon: 
"There were four events surrounding the area, some very high profile 
with the possibility of large-scale disorder so gold / silver / bronze 
was in the area but had nothing whatsoever to do 'with this one event. 
Had something gone wrong at the event, because they were there, they 
would have been utilised. Had it been a one-off on that day there 
would not have been a gold / silver / bronze set up, just the 
operational order outlining 'what the event was, 1-t'here it was, the time 
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it is running, what is expected and then what we expected from the 
officers on the day i. e. two at anyone time at the event walking 
through. It was very short - it only took two sides of A4. " - MY 
(Sergeant, Multicultural Festival 2003) 
The command structures at Pride and Solstice did incorporate specific gold, silver 
and bronze commanders into the policing strategy. Public order trained officers 
were also present within the police resources allocated to each of these events. In 
relation to Solstice, approximately 20% of the officers present had some level of 
public order training although they were not required in this capacity. The on site 
silver commander also had an officer acting as a public order tactical advisor, 
although this was in anticipation of the unexpected rather than as a core function 
of the policing operation: 
"We have a public order tactical adviser there should there be an 
incident in the crowd for example we've either got to go in and arrest 
somebody quickly or rescue an officer, God forbid, or rescue a 
security guard or deal with a medical emergency and the crowd are 
not being compliant then there are tactics that we could use with the 
appropriately trained officers going to do it. As it was we didn't need 
to use those. " - RB (Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003) 
The silver and two bronze commanders at Pride also had public order tactical 
advisors but their expertise was not called upon. Indeed, the tactical advisor 
assigned to the bronze commander in charge of policing the parade stayed on in 
this capacity at the park to earn extra overtime. There was also a public order 
trained PSU available for deployment in the event of disorder or an emergency but 
this was not deployed and it spent the entire event located at the local police 
station. Keeping the PSU away from the event was a deliberate tactic after the 
problems associated with the overt public order strategy taken during the previous 
year. To conclude this section, the capacity to deal with the 'unexpected' in 
relation to disorder or public safety was present at each of the four events - it 
would probably have been utilised had there been a protest at Solstice - but they 
were not required to perform these public order functions. 
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6. Integrated Approaches to Management at the Observed Events 
The chapter thus far has focussed on the police inputs into the four observed 
events. This section revisits what was explored in the previous chapter on 
planning and will examine the levels of integration between the police, organisers 
and community organisers in relation to the management of each of the events. By 
considering this, it is possible to outline three distinctive approaches to managing 
Pride, Solstice, Mela and the Multicultural Festival that demonstrate different 
levels of integration. As with the planning stages, there is a spectrum relating to 
the capacity for combined and cohesive decision-making that occurred at these 
integrated levels. It is interesting to note that this spectrum mirrors the levels of 
integration and cohesion present during the planning stages. 
6.1. Fragmented Approaches to Event Management 
The Mela and Multicultural Festival were characterised by a fragmented approach 
to event management. The role of the organisers and community organisers 
involved in the MPG and MFPG during the staging of the event was essentially 
logistically based (e.g. setting the park up, meeting and greeting the bands) and 
these tasks were conducted in isolation from the police. Likewise, the police did 
not set out to consult with others on the day of the event in relation to their chosen 
tactics and decisions (e.g. the use of the police vehicle as an opportunity for good 
PR was purely the decision of the two officers initially deployed). The only 
contact that the main organiser had with the police at Mela was to be present at a 
briefing of stewards and security that occurred on the park where the event took 
place. During the Multicultural Festival, there was not even this contact between 
police and organisers - they simply introduced themselves to each other and then 
continued with their respective roles. 
There was no obvious requirement for the police, organIsers and community 
organisers to engage in joint management and this had been the norm in terms of 
approaching the event. As was highlighted in the section on policing styles, the 
police and organisers were happy with the low key and non-intrusive way in 
which the event had been policed. An emergency, whether relating to disorder and 
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/ or public safety, might have necessitated liaison between these parties but this 
never arose so it is impossible to speculate how they would have worked together. 
6.2. Joint Control Approaches to Event Management 
At the opposite end of the spectrum to fragmented control is the joint control 
approach to management that was present during the staging of Pride. This joint 
control approach was essentially a continuation of the collaborative planning that 
had occurred at the PPG. All the representatives involved in the PPG had some 
role to play in relation to event safety during the event so this approach 
demonstrated a high level of integration between the police, organisers and 
community organisers. 
This joint control strategy manifested itself in a number of ways. During the 
gathering on the park, most of the personnel involved in the PPG held regular 
meetings (approximately every ninety minutes) to discuss any health and safety 
concerns. The bronze commander allocated the responsibility for policing the 
parade worked in tandem with the parade director, a key member of both St John 
Ambulance and the PPG as a community organiser. Another community 
organiser, who had been involved in the tabletop exercise, worked as an observer / 
advisor with the silver commanders (from the police and ambulance service) at the 
silver command post located at a local police station. However, the most visible 
demonstration of this strategy occurred when stewards from Pride were briefed 
and paired with police officers to visit gay venues and report any concerns that 
licensees held. This information was fed back into the joint control strategy that 
was, in the words of Chief Inspector AC, 'tweaked' to accommodate these views 
in order to maintain a sensitively driven policing operation. 
This integrated approach was in direct contrast to the previous year where there 
was inconsistency in the police personnel present during the planning stages and a 
lack of liaison / consultation with the community organisers during the staging of 
the event and insensitivity in relation to licensing issues and the use of an overt 
public order policing strategy. In contrast to the previous year the joint control 
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approach, that was essentially a continuation from the PPG, gained praise from the 
participants at Pride and the community organisers: 
They got the safety function there in terms of road closure and 
everything, that all went according to plan so there weren't any issues 
there. We had no arrests which for an event where you get upwards of 
90, 000 plus people attending. .. I mean Reading [an annual music 
festival} had 50, 000 and 90 arrests or something. We had double and 
no arrests so I think that says a lot for the planning work that went on 
in the first place and it also goes a long way to the police exercising 
sensitivity and listening to what was asked of them and they had their 
views obviously but I think the policing of it went very, very well. " -
KT (Community Organiser, Pride 2003) 
KT, who was a senior member of the Pride committee and a member of the PPG, 
was new to the event in 2003 but other community organisers that had been 
involved in both 2002 and 2003 echoed similar sentiments that demonstrate an 
extremity in opinion between the two years: 
"There was certainly praise all around for the police. The public, and 
I listen to the public on show day [i.e. the gathering on the park], 
were very pleased, they were very happy, unlike last year when they 
were very unhappy. The after parties, also I have not heard any 
complaints about the policing of it and the council again were very 
supportive over licensing on their premises and all sorts of issues 
where councils can be difficult, police can be difficult, fire authorities, 
ambulances, all those people if they want to can dig their heels and 
cause a problem and this year none of them did. - WP (Community 
Organiser, Pride 2003) 
Given the positive feedback, the final point to make concerning the joint control 
approach to management was that it served a wider purpose for the police than 
simply fusing decision making. It was highlighted in the previous chapter that the 
police input into the PPG had reduced the main threat to the event (i.e. that the 
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police would damage local police / LGBT community relations through any 
insensitive policing of Pride) by promoting trust, cohesion and communication 
between all the agencies in the months leading up to the event. The subsequent 
implementation of these efforts into a successful and well-received event therefore 
provided the opportunity to demonstrate the increase in trust and send a positive 
message to the wider LGBT community: 
"There is an LGBT community of 40,000 in the city which is 1/6 of the 
population and over that weekend there are more, there must be 80 to 
100,000 in the city and quite rightly those people deserve a service 
from us but a lot of police service is about perception and we are 
never always going to get it right be it with the LGBT community or 
the general public. We will from time to time drop the ball but if 
you're successful managing Pride through they will tolerate, the 
opinion formers in the LGBT community will tolerate, you dropping 
the ball occasionally in relation to general policing arrangements if 
you build that degree of trust. If we haven't got it there that will be 
viewed as just yet another discriminatory act done by the police and J 
can totally understand where they are coming from with that. So J 
wouldn't say it's the biggest thing as far as trust and confidence but it 
is not far off as far as that community is concerned. " - AC (Chief 
Inspector, Pride 2003) 
6.3. Partial Joint Control Approaches to Event Management 
The management of Solstice shared many similarities with the joint control 
approach that was evident at Pride. The centre of operations for the staging of the 
event was a car park slightly off site from the main Solstice location. This car park 
was host to the police silver command post, the organiser command post and other 
services (e.g. the RSPCA, the fire service, a St John Ambulance post). The key 
police and organiser representatives involved in the planning of Solstice were 
present at these command posts (thus there was consistency between the planning 
and staging processes) and there was interaction and consultation but it was not as 
systematic compared to Pride (i.e. consultation was on an ad-hoc basis rather than 
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the regular pre-planned meetings that occurred at the gathering on the park during 
Pride). Consultation between the police and organisers focussed on logistical 
decisions such as when to open the Solstice location to the public and when to 
tum off the lights preceding the focal point of the Solstice celebrations that occur 
when the sun rises. Away from these decisions, the police and organisers 
predominately worked in isolation from each other and there was no integration 
between the agencies in the form of a police representative incorporated within the 
organiser command post or vice-versa. In addition, the community organisers 
were rarely present or in contact with either the police or organiser command 
posts which was in stark contrast to the community organiser input into the joint 
control strategy evident at Pride. Given these differences, I would suggest that the 
management of Solstice was therefore characterised by a partial joint control 
strategy. The police and organisers were located closely to one another and, even 
if not physically present, were only a mobile phone call away should an issue have 
arisen. The majority of police and organisers had also worked with each other 
during the planning of Solstice. However, they did not fuse or integrate their 
decision making in relation to the staging of the event to the same extent as the 
joint control approach evident at Pride. 
The main intention behind this partial joint control approach was a focus on event 
safety: 
"Basically you have responsibilities and you have responsibility for 
people's safety and you have to think about everything you do 
irrespective of what you may have planned and what you think is 
right, you have to have that flexibility to say, okay we are not opening 
at lOwe are opening at 9 because the crowd dynamics are changing 
and if we don 't do it now we could have a crush and we could have 
this that and the other and it is that whole process - safety is number 
one. " - IL (Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
In relation to the major decisions where there was consultation between the police 
and organisers (i.e. when to open the Solstice site to the public. the timings for 
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switching off lights), the actions taken were relatively cohesive because of the 
general consensus that safety was of prime concern. Therefore, the Solstice 
location was opened earlier than planned in an attempt to ease external traffic 
congestion and to reduce the chances of potentially antagonising a crowd that was 
patiently waiting and to avoid crushing outside the Solstice location. The lights 
were only switched off when it was considered light enough (the timings change 
because of factors such as the cloud base) and this reduced the potential for 
injuries resulting from event attendees not being able to see what they were doing. 
The flexibility inherent in this approach reflects both the consistency and trust that 
has built up since the inception of open managed access and the good working 
relationships evident during the planning process. When this is combined with the 
low key policing style, it is not surprising that the event has been typified by order 
that is in complete contrast to the tensions prevalent during the 1980s and 1990s. 
This section has outlined three approaches to event management that incorporate 
varying levels of integration between the police, organisers and community 
organisers. These approaches were informed by what had happened at previous 
events and mirrored the levels of collaboration occurring during the various 
planning processes. In addition to the policing styles, it would appear that each 
approach was suitable to manage the requirements presented by each event. 
However, and although not impacting adversely on order or event safety, the 
feedback process from each event highlighted that improvements could be made 
in relation to certain aspects of the staging process and these will be addressed in 
the next chapter. Returning to the staging process, the final common characteristic 
that needs to be addressed concerns the use of stewards and private security that 
played some part at all four events. 
7. The Role of Private Security and Stewards 
The terms steward and security were often used interchangeably during the 
planning and staging of the four events. It is therefore important to outline the 
input of stewards / security (as defined by the organisers) involved in each eyent 
through and this is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Summary of the Security / Steward Input into the Observed Events 
Event: Security / Steward Input During Numbers and type of security / 
Planning? stewards at event: 
Mela No 6 - 8 Professional Security 
10 Voluntary Stewards 
Multicultural No 5 Professional Security 
Festival 15 - 20 Professional Stewards 
Solstice Yes 160+ Professional Security 
40+ Professional Stewards 
Small Fire Marshall Presence 
Small 'Peace Steward' 
Presence 
Pride Yes 150 Professional Security / 
Professional Stewards 
Some voluntary stewards 
recruited from local LGBT 
community worked with police 
in relation to licensing at gay 
venues 
The role for the vast majority of stewards / security at each of the events is best 
encapsulated by a Freudian slip during an interview relating to the Multicultural 
Festival: 
"They [the organisers] paid for a private security firm to do the 
policing. .. 1 mean the stewarding ... .. - MY (Sergeant, Multicultural 
Festival 2003) 
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In relation to the role of professional stewards / security at Solstice, these 
personnel were explicitly tasked with dealing with minor criminal offences or 
disorder that potentially falls within the domain of the public police: 
"It is the security guards who are there to police the event. We are 
there to back the security people up. It is [the main organiser'sJ event 
and they supply their own security and we are there purely to back 
them up and that is why you are going to get quite a low key policing 
style. "- RR (Chief Inspector, Solstice 2003) 
It is possibly naIve of this officer to make the assertion that the police / security 
relationship automatically culminates in a low key policing style. Historically, this 
relationship of the police 'backing up' security existed at previous Solstice events 
when there was a high profile police presence, disorder and disruption (i.e. the 
antithesis of 'low key policing'). Returning to the observed Solstice, the remit for 
the professional stewards / security at Solstice was agreed upon with other 
organisers and the police prior to the staging of the event and culminated in a 
'statement of intent'. The professional stewards / security were therefore 
performing order maintenance and minor crime management roles in the 
knowledge that the police would only intervene if their assistance was required. 
The person in charge of security for the event remarked that police assistance was 
only called upon on one occasion to deal with disorderly individuals. It is a 
reflection of the event as a whole that this situation did not result in any arrests. 
Whilst dealing with minor disorder / criminality, the main objective of the 
professional stewards / security was consistent with the overall aim of the police 
and other organisers: 
"1 think there is one thing that ultimately we focus on and that is the 
safety of the crowd. Obviously in that sentence the crowd encompasses 
the contractors working there, the security and the police, but it is the 
safety all the way down the line. It is always safety and everything 
else is secondary to it, even the stones [the focal point of fhe Solstice 
location]. Ultimately they are a bunch of stones, a bunch o.lrocks and 
?f they fall over or are damaged but it stops someone getting hurt or 
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killed, you can 't defend that and I think all the way from the very start 
of the planning to when we finish safety is all we are thinking about. " 
- HJ (Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
Solstice was unique amongst the four events in that a small number of 'peace 
stewards' were present during the staging of the event. These peace stewards 
(interchangeably referred to as magic or green stewards) were drawn from the 
druid / pagan community via the community organiser input at the SCG and they 
had been a feature of the event for a number of years. They did not have the same 
overt order maintenance / crime management remit associated with the 
professional stewards / security - their self defined remit was to act as sources of 
information - but they were a potentially useful resource for their professional 
colleagues: 
"For minor incidents they are great and they will ... say someone has 
put a tent up and you have got some security guards saying can you 
take it down and someone like good old [Community Organiserj will 
come over and he is prepared to sit and talk for 10 minutes whereas 
the security staff won 't ... They are good at defusing situations and it is 
probably better coming from someone from their own community then 
some officious security guard. " - HJ (Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
The approach taken to professional stewards / security at Pride shared many 
similarities with Solstice. However, one important difference was that one specific 
security firm at Pride provided the key personnel in addition to all stewards and 
security. In contrast, the key security personnel at Solstice had to sub-contract in 
workers from a host of companies that created a discrepancy in experience and 
ability that although not ultimately impinging on event order or safety was not as 
straightforward to manage. Returning to Pride, the staging of the event was 
essentially incident free for the stewards / security with these personnel mainly 
involved in monitoring and feeding back information concerning crowd 
management systems (i.e. keeping people flowing at 'pinch points'). However, 
they did occasionally participate in actions relating to minor order maintenance 
and crime management: 
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"There was one incident on the day this year whereby there were 
reports of dealing in one of the dance tents. A discussion was held, 
and [security firm at Pride] were asked to ask their response team to 
assist in removing an individual from the dance tent if they were seen 
dealing. That person in the dance tent was spoken to by the response 
team, searched by the response team because it was deemed to be an 
action which could be taken reasonably because ultimately the 
security and stewarding firm will if necessary act under the direction 
of the senior police officer on the site." - BW (Organiser, 2003) 
This insight is interesting as it reflects that, in contrast to the assertion made at 
Solstice, the security were willing to -back up' the police rather than vice versa. 
This demonstrates that the relationship between police and security is potentially 
complex and will be dictated by events rather than a pre-determined strategy. 
With regards to working relationships, the discussion that culminated in the 
actions mentioned above demonstrates the joint control approach that was 
associated with Pride (i.e. meetings, discussion and action based on collaborative 
decision making between the police, organisers and community organisers). In 
comparison, at Solstice the main security personnel were in direct communication 
with the main organiser rather than an integrated system with the police and other 
organisers. It must also be noted that at both events the key security personnel 
were involved in the planning process. Indeed, they had been involved for 17 
years and 4 years at Solstice and Pride respectively. They therefore were 
consistent members of the planning groups and the security operations at the 
observed events were essentially based on templates from previous events. Given 
the commercial competition associated with the private security industry and the 
fact business rivals would take their position if the operations were unsatisfactory 
it is not surprising to report that the other organisers / community organisers were 
content with their input over this time: 
"1 wouldn't think of changing them {security firm at Pride] based on 
the results, you know. They confiscate beer and they are pretty good 
on the drugs front, they keep an eye on 1rhat is going on and they are 
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responsive so for what we paid and what we get is a good deal with 
them. " - WP (Community Organiser, Pride 2003) 
The final point that needs making in relation to the use of stewards and security at 
Solstice and Pride was a perception that event attendees might initially prefer to 
approach these personnel with any issues compared to the police. This could be 
the result of wider police / community relations or related to the more turbulent 
times in these events histories (i.e. the previous year's policing at Pride and pre-
managed open access at Solstice): 
"Some people definitely have predisposed ideas that they can talk to 
security and stewards, and definitely stewards more than security. 
That is what they are there for; they are there for public information 
and crowd management at the end of the day. ] think there are a lot of 
people who would rather... because they are nervous of police 
reaction or they have had a bad experience or their friends have had a 
bad experience, that does leave people with an imprint so ] think you 
work to your strengths. ] think that the positive aspects of how people 
can approach stewards and we can have those links in with the police 
and we have that line of communication in, that works really well. " -
TS (Organiser, Pride 2003) 
Once again, the joint control approach to management is emphasised as working 
well in the context of the Pride event. In the context of Solstice, the preference for 
dealing with stewards / security provides another factor that reduces the potential 
for antagonism and potential disorder arising from previous tensions: 
"] think in a way, it takes away ... some of the public are much happier 
to be dealt with by security than they are by police so automatically 
you are taking out that element of potential antagonism between 
certain sections of the community that don't believe in or are against 
the police. We all know who these people are and it is the sort of e\'ent 
that }I'ill attract them so by taking the police out of that equation and 
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just dealing with security 1 think works a lot better" - RR (Chief 
Inspector, Solstice 2003) 
The involvement of stewards and security in the Mela was slightly different. 
Firstly, they did not have to engage in the same levels of crime management and 
order maintenance simply because of the nature of the event. However, they were 
still occasionally involved in minor order maintenance (e.g. dealing with drunks). 
The intention again was that the police would only become involved if they were 
called upon and this situation rarely occurred. When it did, the steward / security 
personnel had to locate the police officers in person as they were not linked in via 
communications, thus once again demonstrating the fragmented approach to event 
management at the Mela. 
It was highlighted in the previous chapter that the main organiser of Mela had to 
arrange a certain number of stewards / security personnel at the last minute as a 
response to the potential for gang related disorder. Therefore, there was also no 
representation or input from these personnel during the planning stages at Mela. 
This provided some tension because, whilst the organisers were relatively happy 
with their performance, the police at Mela were not impressed by some of the 
personnel that had been employed to perform the stewarding / security role: 
"They [the police presence] found that some of the stewards that they 
acquired via a variety of means were not the type of people that 1 
would have been too keen on taking a position of public safety and 
responsibility and in fact some of the police officers who did attend in 
passing checks found themselves more intent on looking at the 
stewards because they knew their backgrounds so they were possibly 
more of a threat in some cases than the actual event itself." - SD 
(Inspector, Mela 2002) 
Although there was no identified threat the organIsers at the Multicultural 
Festival were persuaded by the police during the planning process to employ 
purely professional staff. The organisers took this action and although it cost mor~ 
money, there was not a repeat of these concerns from the police. Consistent with 
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the prevIOUS year was the fact that the firm employed were not part of the 
planning process and they performed their duties within the fragmented event 
management approach. However, as there was a bigger stage and more musicians 
at the Multicultural Festival a lot more of their time appeared to be concerned with 
guarding property and checking stage passes rather than patrolling the park. 
This section has attempted to outline the role of security and stewarding at the 
four observed events. As with the planning and event management strategies, 
there was diversity across all the events in the type, numbers, experience and prior 
involvement in the planning associated with security and stewarding. However, 
and to varying degrees, these personnel were tasked with minor order maintenance 
and / or minor crime management in addition to more general public safety roles 
(e.g. the avoidance of crowd congestion). This resulted in the police being able to 
implement the low key policing styles successfully because they were removed 
from these tasks and would therefore not appear overt or intrusive. However, at 
each event, the police were prepared to 'back up' the stewards / security if 
necessary but reflecting the general orderly nature of all four events, this 
assistance was rarely called upon. 
8. Conclusion 
This chapter has focussed on the staging process and has demonstrated that the 
inputs (and implementation) of certain policing styles that were low key and non-
intrusive were complimented by security and stewarding that conducted minor 
order maintenance and crime management tasks. This approach was informed by 
both expectations of order and historical precedent relating to each of the events 
and it allowed for a primary focus on public safety at Solstice and the Mela / 
Multicultural Festival and the re-gaining of lost trust at Pride. In addition, the 
various integrated approaches to event management reflected both these historical 
precedents to each of the observed events and the nature and form of the 
collaborative planning efforts outlined in the previous chapter. Despite the 
differences in approaches and the logistical diversity across the eYents, it would 
appear that the chosen strategies (both police and integrated) worked. 
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With reference to the academic literature, this chapter demonstrates the work of 
police / security in a non-confrontational public order context (cf. Button, 2002: 
Button and John, 2002). More generally, the multi-agency approaches taken to 
maintaining safety and order during the staging of the observed events reflect the 
trend of 'pluralisation' in relation to policing (Loader, 2000). These are themes 
which will be returned to in chapter eight. With regards to the empirical analysis, 
the next chapter will examine the implications of the findings raised in this and the 
previous two chapters. The events were deemed successful but by reflecting on 
post-event feedback from the police, organisers and community organisers and 
their expectations for future events it will be possible to evaluate whether the 
approaches taken at each event can be improved even further. The next chapter 
will also examine the elements from the planning and staging process that could 
be applied to other policing contexts from the perspective of those involved in 
each of the events. 
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Chapter Seven: Post-Event Analysis 
1. Introduction 
The previous analysis chapters have focussed on the history / context, planning 
and staging of each of the observed events. The aim of this analysis chapter is to 
reflect on post event issues. This is pertinent to the empirical analysis for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, a key characteristic of the observed events is that all 
three are repeated on an annual basis. At the time of conducting and completing 
the interviews following the observational fieldwork, the indications were that 
each event would run in the following year. The previous analysis chapters have 
examined how this process of repetition and past experience has impacted on the 
planning and staging phases. Just as these planning and staging experiences 
impacted on the events themselves, it is logical to suggest that the planning and 
staging will impact on any future Multicultural Festival, Pride or Solstice events 
from debriefing and the dissemination of experience. An example of this 
evolutionary process in action comes from the transition of the Mela to the 
Multicultural Festival that has been traced in previous chapters. Therefore, it is 
important to emphasise that the events are not occurring in an isolated vacuum 
and that there are factors that will inevitably impact upon and shape the future of 
each event. Focussing on issues post event allows the opportunity to a) identify 
the factors and their origins that may impact on the maintenance of order and 
safety at future events and b) highlight how . good practice' might be applied in 
the policing of public order and in other policing contexts. Undertaking this 
exercise will also highlight the key variables in determining what makes the 
events 'successful'. The results of these findings present further analytic and 
policy opportunities that will be explored in greater detail in the subsequent two 
chapters. 
2. The 'Debrier Process and the Event Future 
Before identifying the most salient features of each event that may impact on the 
futures of Pride, Solstice and the Multicultural Festival, it is important to state that 
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a common characteristic of each event was a process of "debriefing'. The purpose 
of the debrief for each of the events was to allow the police, event and community 
organisers the opportunity to reflect and evaluate on how each event had 
progressed and what might need to be altered before embarking on planning for 
the following year. From a methodological perspective, the majority of interviews 
were conducted as this process was either being prepared for or had just occurred. 
This presented an opportunity to explore the issues in advance of a formal debrief 
or as they had been presented after the debrief. In terms of structure, at Solstice 
there were formal debriefs for the police and SPG whilst at Pride this was 
conducted by the PPG. The MPG / MFPG also conducted this exercise although it 
was more comprehensive for the Multicultural Festival as there were agencies 
involved. What follows in the remainder of this chapter is an analysis of these 
issues that might impact in some form on the future of each event, whether or not 
they relate specifically to the formal debrief process. 
A key conclusion from the empirical analysis is that each event was characterised 
as being safe and orderly (i.e. threats to health and safety and / or public disorder 
did not materialise, despite a small number of arrests surrounding Solstice and 
Pride). When asking for general feedback on the outcomes from each event, 
participants from the police, event and community organisers would stress this 
point and often claim that the event had been a "success'. In fact, given the 
'success' associated with each event a pertinent question arising could be why 
hold a formal debrief at all? A community organiser from Pride offered an 
insightful rationale behind the debrief process that partially answers this question: 
.. We need to look at what went well, what didn't go well, getting 
peoples' perspectives. We need to look at that and we need to 
basically learn from what went well so that if we can hand on heart 
say everything went perfectly at the weekend - and we have already 
said that it wasn't perfect - but on the day if we can do that then that 
would be the day really when you don't need a debrief You just say 
right, we will do exactly the same next year and to a large extent it 
yt'ill be the same next year but there 'trill be different personalities next 
year and then the human factor starts coming in so yes there is a plan 
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for a debrief, we have got various key players who are not available 
until next month or whatever. In the ideal world, the debrief would 
happen within a week or two weeks but such was the fatigue ... I think 
the key issues are going to still be fresh in peoples' minds. " KT 
(Community Organiser, Pride 2003) 
This quote neatly highlights that there is an anticipation of factors (e.g. "different 
personalities ') that in some form will impact on the planning and staging of any 
future Pride event despite the fact that the maj ority of the feedback from the 
organisers and community related to a successful event. There could be a 
temptation to just 'leave things as they are' (and in a number of cases things will 
be done in the same way) but the debrief allows an opportunity for any issues 
raised to be discussed. Any decisions taken and agreed during this process may 
potentially culminate in shaping the planning stage for the following year which 
could impact on the staging phase and so on. It is therefore worth briefly 
summarising the main issues that arose either in anticipation of, or following, a 
formal debrief that could impact on the planning and staging of future events. 
2.1. Multicultural Festival 
The maIn logistical improvements identified for a future event included the 
provision of more food stalls, the production of a map that would contain 
information on the location of stalls / running order of events and finally the 
greater use of publicity to advertise the event prior to it being staged. Of relevance 
to the planning process, the event and community organisers were also thinking 
about the possibility of turning the event into a two day festival, which was a 
format that had occurred as a 'one-off in the mid 1990s. All subsequent Mela / 
Multicultural Festival events have lasted for one day only. Importantly. this 
possibility had been communicated to the police who were willing to support it: 
"It will have our support again next year as long as they .... vant to do it. 
Of course next year it might go back to tyro days and that 'will increase 
the police requirement and lre have no problems because, touch wood, 
here in [Town where the Multicultural Festival is located] }t'(' haven't 
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had any issues with it... it is something that we can actually support 
and 1 think society wouldn't expect anything less of us." MY 
(Sergeant, Multicultural Festival 2003) 
Two important factors were identified that could make this a reality. Firstly, the 
problems associated with the planning of Mela during the previous year (i.e. the 
'political' motivations of some committee members) had not materialised with the 
emergence of the larger MFPG. Secondly, this group would have more time to 
plan for a future event. The planning for the Multicultural Festival could only start 
after the MPG had been formally dissolved and new event and community 
organisers had been recruited. This was a time consuming process that will be 
avoided in the future as there was no perceived need to re-ratify the planning 
group. In addition to more time, the perceived success of the Multicultural 
Festival during the planning lay in the foundation of a new constitution that it was 
hoped would make the event sustainable. Clarifying the aims / roles involved in 
the planning of any future events - which had been built into the constitution for 
the MFPG - allows for 'sustainability' as it promotes a structure that 
accommodates the fact that key personnel might move on. For example, the main 
event organiser for the Mela and a participant in the MFPG (FM, Event Organiser) 
was due to move to a new position in London and thus would not be taking part in 
future planning. However, her role could be accommodated by somebody else due 
to the comparatively larger but more structured MFPG compared to its Mela 
counterpart the previous year. The luxury of more time also opened new 
opportunities for the MFPG in terms of a potential greater emphasis on 
community consultation and participation in any future events: 
.. We will be six months ahead of where we normally are so from that 
point of view, that [the MFPG] has worked and community 
consultation is something that 1 would be keen to build in, whether it 
be public sessions or whatever, some sort of community consultation 
sessions so we get ideas from the community and they are engaged 
with it in the planning process in some Y1'oy." RP (Organiser, 
Multicultural Festival 2003) 
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The rationale behind such an approach is that the greater the participation of the 
local community, the more representative the event will be of that community. 
However, what is of relevance to this chapter are the opportunities that greater 
consultation with the local community through the MFPG might offer the police 
and other agencies. This will be explored in greater detail in section three. 
2.2. Pride 
The feedback following Pride was generally positive from the police, event and 
community organisers. In contrast to what had occurred the year before, there was 
praise for the low key policing strategy adopted for the event and all organisers 
thought that the joint control strategy was the best way of planning and staging the 
event. In terms of the event's future, it was anticipated that the event would grow 
in popularity leading to an increase in numbers as had been the case over previous 
years. This might hold implications for where the parade is staged (namely if more 
people want to see it, the route might have to change) and for making additional 
arrangements with public transport providers to move event attendees into and out 
of the city where the celebration is held. The community organisers also 
anticipated that the theme for a future Pride event would probably change but 
essentially many of the aspects that made the event a success would stay 
consistent whatever the levels of attendance (e.g. holding a parade followed by a 
celebration on the park). 
As has been explored in previous chapters, one of the main successes associated 
with the observed Pride event was the attitude of the police in addressing the 
concerns of the gay community in relation to the strategies they adopted during 
the previous year. One officer in particular was identified as representing this 
change in attitude but post the staging of the event had moved to another location 
and new duties and would thus not be directly involved in the future planning of 
Pride events. However, this officer identified continuity as an important factor in 
building on the success achieved during Pride 2004: 
"It would be nice in the perfect world to have the same person 
managing it year in year out but that lrill nel'er happen but ll'hat can 
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happen, particularly where you have got the trust and confidence 
issues, is there must be an appropriate handover by the person who is 
going out to the person coming in and that is not just handover with 
them, it has got to be a handover with the people who you have got 
trust and confidence issues with so it is as seamless as possible 
because it would be, from pride's point of view, it would be a high 
degree of scepticism that the event has been so successful this year, it 
goes back to where it was in the previous year because of an 
individual not being present so there has to be a very heavy handover 
which we had this year because I have left it but I am having a 
meeting shortly with Pride organisers for the forthcoming event, the 
2004 event, with the person who I'm handing over to despite the fact 
that I have been away now for eight to ten weeks so that they can see ... 
they will express their concerns to that meeting and I will manage it 
with the new incumbent which should always happen but sometimes it 
doesn't, it depends on how much of a priority you see that being but if 
the colleague taking over from me can get off on a good footing with 
them then it will mean there will be added bonuses throughout the city 
for the LGBT community throughout the year. Of that there is no 
doubt. " AC (Chief Inspector, Pride 2003) 
The importance of this handover cannot be underestimated. One community 
organiser stated after an interview that whether the new police personnel were 
'dickheads' or not would impact on the planning of future events, especially in 
terms of forming effective working relationships. This demonstrates that, despite 
the success associated with the event, an underlining scepticism could be forced to 
the surface should the wrong police personnel take over the liaison role. In fact 
the issue of changes in personnel is also pertinent to other representatives involved 
in the PPO. As one event organiser stated, an effective handover through the 
passing of relevant information to any new personnel is crucial to establishing a 
planning base from which any unforeseen variables can be tackled during the 
planning and staging of future Pride events: 
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"1 think it will be interesting to see what happens now that [Chief 
Inspector AC] has moved to another area of command... it comes 
back to the point that we touched on earlier about the personalities 
and the consistency. It is hoped that [ ... J who is one of the inspectors 
in the project section with regard to events who has knowledge on this 
and attended the debrief this year, will be present hopefully ... where 
we can keep that knowledge going, [Chief Inspector AC] can brief the 
next officer or he can come with that officer. 1 think they have 
identified that as important, different senior officers have different 
views on the same subject and 1 think it is necessary to keep that 
consistency. For example, if 1 move on or go onto other duties 
elsewhere then someone would come in and also continue. It's not a 
'we know it, we're familiar with it, don't worry about it' because 
every year is slightly different. It is either slightly different because of 
the nature of the event, the physical positioning of the attractions, the 
personalities ... No two events are identical but it is important that no 
sits down and says 'right 1 don't know anything about this, tell me all 
about it. ' It tears everything apart. 1 think year on year we can say 
'okay we have established that and that needs fine tuning' or 'we've 
worked on that section really hard lets focus on this a little bit more' 
and issues that were identified for this year will be addressed for next 
year. " BW (Organiser, Pride 2003) 
Whoever may be ultimately involved, the clear concern for all organIsers IS 
building on the success of Pride 2003 for future events. In order to achieve this, it 
is acknowledged that the methods employed (e.g. the joint approach to both 
planning and staging; consultation with the local gay community) need to be 
communicated to new members and that any issues that require 'fine tuning' are 
addressed. Again, section three will address an example that is pertinent to the 
staging of the event that would benefit from 'fine tuning'. If these communicatiye 
and reflective strategies are successfully incorporated in future planning then the 
future of Pride is likely to be secure, safe and orderly, at least in the types of 
threats encountered. 
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2.3. Solstice 
As with Pride, an issue facing future planners of Solstice concerned changes in 
personnel. For the chair of the SCG and SPG (SM, Organiser), the observed 
Solstice was to be the last that she would be directly involved in due to a 
promotion to a new position. Similarly, the Chief Superintendent RB who acted as 
the main police liaison during the planning and as a silver commander during the 
staging of the event was making this Solstice his last due to commitments as a 
divisional commander. This meant that he would no longer be directly involved 
in the process. Both of these personnel had been involved with the event since the 
planning and inception of open-managed access to the Solstice location. In 
contrast to Pride, their 'successors' from the police and the main organisation that 
maintains the Solstice location shadowed them throughout the planning and 
staging process. This enabled these new personnel to familiarise themselves with 
the members of the SCG and SPG, understand how the planning process operated 
and gain experience of staging the event. Although planning for the following 
Solstice was at an embryonic stage at the time the interviews were conducted, this 
change in personnel was already starting to introduce new methods for planning 
the event: 
"With the change of management in [Organisation that maintains the 
Solstice location], [ ... ] is doing things slightly differently ... we now 
have specific subgroup meetings where the people who need to be 
talking to each other are talking to each other as opposed to having 
20 people sat around the table, three of which needs to talk to each 
other and the other 17 are bored. " IL (Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
This example relates to the SPG but it is not unreasonable to suggest that a new 
influx of ideas / methods in this group could filter through to the SCG and 
eventually the staging of a future Solstice event. Again. this event - as with Pride 
and the Multicultural Festival - will inevitably evolve and culminate in different 
decisions / directions being taken relative to previous events. 
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With regards to the debrief process and feedback received after the observed 
Solstice, the police, event and community organisers were content with the 
outcome, especially considering some of the logistical problems that emerged 
during the planning stages (e.g. the debates over when to hold the event and the 
potential for protest). There were two examples of problems occurring during the 
staging of the event that will impact on future events. These shall be explored in 
greater detail in section three. With regards to general logistical issues, all 
organisers suggested that the following year would be easier to plan because there 
would be no debate over the date on which the event should be held. This would 
eliminate the potential for large numbers of people turning up on two different 
days. However, the main event organiser for the observed Solstice felt that the 
total of 30,000 people who attended the event represented a maximum number 
that the site could accommodate: 
"The limit has to be 30, 000 people. The infrastructure and by that I 
mean everything, it would be overloaded beyond that because we 
already have a field hospital, we already have police support ... 
Whilst it would be wonderful to allow access for more, if we do so the 
costs are enormous. Actually, it is not about finances it is about how 
many more medical staff do we need there, how many more welfare 
staff do we need there, how many more police officers or security? I 
do know that police leave is cancelled and it is unfair on everything 
else that goes on in this county to expect that sort of level because 
there is no money involved in this, no one is asked to pay for parking, 
nobody is asked to make a contribution but there is a huge financial 
implication. My view is that we have to be very mindful of the fact that 
ultimately if there was a major road accident, what we don't want is 
medical staff in a field hospital when they should be somewhere else 
because of the numbers increasing. At the moment it is manageable 
and that is what we have to keep it to. " SM (Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
The issue of cost that is raised in this extract is releyant across all the observed 
events. The cost of running the events ranged from £ 1 0,000 for the \1ela to 
£ 150,000 for Pride. In terms of policing, the operations at the Solstice and Pride 
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cost £175,000 and approximately £50,000 respectively. Despite being similar 
sized operations in terms of police numbers, this discrepancy reflects the 
additional cost of mutual aid that was required for the Solstice. The police did not 
charge for their services at the observed events although there was recognition that 
this may change in the future. Indeed, AepO (2005) have published a . charging 
methodology' which aims to provide guidance on when the police should charge 
at events and the percentage of costs that they should seek to recover. This issue 
will be further explored when considering policy recommendations in chapter 
nIne. 
Returning to the issue of numbers, it is difficult to predict whether they will 
increase at the Solstice. The observed Solstice was held over a weekend and this, 
combined with good weather, might have inflated the attendance compared to 
future events which will, for the coming years, be held on weekdays. However, 
attendance has increased since open managed access 1 and there is potential for 
disagreement in future years depending on how the event evolves. For example, 
the community organisers might want to change the format of the event: 
"From the [organisation that maintains the Solstice location] point 
of view, they were talking before the event of 30,000 being about the 
absolute maximum that could be held... It is difficult to know how it 
will develop because of the changing circumstances of (the Solstice 
location). One would have thought that the more the event includes the 
sort of things I am talking about [lectures, talks and acoustic music 
sessions were raised as possibilities earlier in the interview] the more 
people will be kind of curious and want to come and then the issue of 
car parking and that comes back again so if it is going to get any 
bigger, there will be quite a lot of discussion but on the other hand in 
India they manage to have amazing Kamala2 type gatherings and 
although we are not specifically trying to organise anything like that, 
if the people want it then there should be a way of enabling it." H'P 
(Community Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
1 Solstice Year (-4ttendance) - 2000 (8000); 2001 (1-1,500); 2002 (25,000); 2003 (30,000) 
2 This refers to an annual festival that is held at Kamala 
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It is not within the remit of this thesis to speculate on the form of future events. 
However, it is important to note that there could be the potential for conflict 
between the community organisers and the event / police organisers if they 
disagree over the format that the event should take. Although speculative, it could 
be the case that the community organisers who compromised on certain issues 
(e. g. the dates, opening hours) during the planning stages of the observed Solstice 
might expect greater accommodation of their ideas in the future. There could be 
consequences for the maintenance of order and safety at any future events if any 
potential disagreements were unresolved during the planning process. However, it 
is also important to note that since the development of open-managed access a 
function of the SCG and SPG has been to allow such debate to occur with all the 
key players (i.e. the police, event and community organisers) present. This 
collaborative planning process has been successful in the past so there is no reason 
to expect that it will be unsuccessful in the future if these key players continue to 
plan together, even if disagreements arise: 
.. This is an organic process, it is not what the authorities feel they can 
handle against what the people want ... I don't want people to think 
I'm coming from the perspective of the alternative community 
although I talk about it occasionally ... My job is to let the information 
go through so that I can ... I feel with my ability to make contact with 
as many sides as possible, that it will work, that we are not going to 
have people so angry or so dogmatic that there is going to be a 
problem. It is trying to smooth up all the rough edges so that the 
process can flow and can continue. I have just happened to find myself 
in a position being able to do this a bit and as long as it is useful I will 
keep doing it. That's where I'm coming from." WP (Community 
Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
Of course, an unforeseen scenario might occur that j eopardises the entire event but 
given the strides made and the comparison between the event in the 1980s / 1990s 
(occasional violence, protest and exclusion) and open managed access, the 
framework of collaborative planning and its recent history of success would 
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suggest that most eventualities would be resolved during the planning process and 
not adversely impact on order and safety at future Solstice events. 
3. Post-Event Feedback: Enhancing the Potential for Future Success 
The previous section briefly reflected on general feedback arising from the three 
observed events. As each event was considered a 'success', it is likely that many 
aspects of the planning and staging will be undertaken in a similar fashion for 
future events. However, it was noted that certain factors (e.g. the success of the 
events attracting larger audiences, changes in personnel) could impact on future 
planning and staging and this will inevitably lead to a process of evolution 
although it would be pure speculation to predict with accuracy how these might 
impact. 
The aim of this section is to identify feedback from the debrief process and / or 
interviews that relate to improvements that could potentially enhance the' success' 
of future events. In the cases of Solstice and Pride, this relates to logistical issues 
arising from the staging of these events. The Multicultural Festival was not as 
logistically challenging to stage due to it being smaller than either Solstice or 
Pride but post event it was identified (by event and community organisers) that it 
presented potential opportunities for the police to enhance their reputation with 
the local community. 
3.1. Solstice 
There were two main logistical issues arising from the staging of Solstice 2003. 
The first of these concerned the unplanned consequences of a large volume of 
traffic on the roads around the Solstice location and the second related to 
communication between the different agencies involved in the partial joint control 
staging of the event. This approach was explored in the previous chapter but it is 
useful for the reader to be reminded that this incorporated the different agencies 
working together during the staging of the event and making some joint decisions 
(e.g. lighting times) but at the same time residing in different command posts and 
using different communication protocols. 
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Taking the first of the above issues, it is useful to briefly outline how the large 
volume of traffic descending on the Solstice location impacted on the staging of 
the event. During the SPG and SCG meetings, traffic issues were raised, albeit 
briefly, and approval had been sought and gained by the police representatives 
from the local council regarding a set of road closures around the Solstice 
location. In addition to these set road closures, Chief Superintendent RB also 
stated at a SCG meeting that the police would monitor road traffic levels and close 
roads accordingly in order to ease potential congestion. The responsibility for 
managing this aspect of Solstice fell with the police and was incorporated into the 
police command structure for the staging of the event via a specialist traffic 
bronze commander (a sergeant). 
During the briefing of senior officers on the eve of Solstice, Chief Superintendent 
RB stated that he had been over the Solstice location in a helicopter and that the 
road closures mentioned during the planning process had been implemented. 
However, Chief Superintendent RB also mentioned that there was sufficient build 
up of traffic on the main road around the Solstice location to warrant early 
opening of the car park. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the nature of 
the partial joint control approach to the staging of the event allowed for 
consultation between the police and main organiser to occur, culminating in a 
collective decision to open the car park earlier then was initially planned. 
Unfortunately, a combination of factors meant that the sheer volume of traffic that 
had already accumulated posed unexpected problems for those involved In 
managing the staging of the event, even after this decision had been made: 
"I think what you have got is anybody who doesn't know the [Solstice 
location] area is at a disadvantage, but certainly a Friday night in the 
summer on that section of the [main road] it is always very, very busy 
in any case because what you have got is people travelling down to 
the South West and the [main road] is quite a useful route. The 
problem that you find is that if you come from London. the first set of 
single carriageway you come to is [Solstice location] and it is 
extremely busy. Compound that with an operation at [Solstice 
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location} where you are encouraging people to come and go to a 
specified location to park, combine that with the fact that the car park 
is opening quite late and yet people, I would say wantonly, are 
ignoring the fact of the opening times, you get a stage where the sheer 
concentration of traffic is such that as it was the gates of the car park 
when they were opened were just flowing freely. The sheer number of 
cars coming in there added with the congestion which would be there 
in any case meant that people just decided that as dawn was 
approaching they didn't stand any chance, looking at a long line of 
traffic, of getting into the car park and then walking from the car park 
to the [Solstice location} in time for dawn, that they felt the most 
appropriate thing to do was park their car on the [main road} and it 
virtually, as you will know as you were going back at 7 0 'clock [the 
morning after Solstice}, it became like a car park - they then felt it 
was the most appropriate thing to jump over the fence. Now that was 
an absolute and utter disaster from that point of view, we were left 
with a situation where we couldn't get our units through because of 
course the road is blocked, we ended up towing 195 cars away at the 
end, we had to close the [main road} and redirect it in different places 
and so the impact further a field from [Solstice location} was great 
because you were channelling quite a lot of traffic through roads 
which are not suitable for those quantities so it did cause a lot of 
aggravation hence why deliberations for 2004 have to be such that the 
car park opens at a realistic time but I will still come back and say 
that 2003 was unique because it was a weekend and we anticipated 
that we would get those sorts of problems but I don't think we thought 
the [main road} would end up being a car park." RB (Chief 
Superintendent, Solstice 2003) 
In relation to the staging of all the observed events, the traffic problems at Solstice 
presented the greatest logistical difficulty for the police and event organisers. In 
response to this unexpected volume of traffic, a number of decisions were made in 
'real time' by the police's silver command post. This included impromptu traffic 
management tactics such as closing the main road in one direction for a short 
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period of time to try and increase traffic flow. There were also problems with 
traffic post-event. In addition to vehicles leaving the Solstice location after the 
event, there was a fatal accident (this was not due to traffic management schemes) 
involving Solstice participants that compounded the problems of facilitating the 
flow of traffic away from the Solstice location. 
Although the traffic problems did not impinge too greatly on the safe and orderly 
management of the Solstice location and celebrations, it did highlight the benefits 
of partial joint event management strategy. The main organisers had been 
unwilling during the planning stages to build in overt flexibility to opening times 
as it was perceived that this might signal to event participants that they were not 
fully in control of the event. However, these concerns were overruled by sheer 
logistical necessity as the event unfolded and it was a joint decision to open early 
which allowed the police to focus on managing the problem as effectively as they 
possibly could. In this respect, the cohesiveness of decision making demonstrated 
during this episode further highlights that underpinning the partial joint control 
strategy was the core issue, and prominence, of safety over other factors: 
"1 think we made a mistake when we didn't open the car park early 
enough. Alright we opened it early and it is great to keep it shut 
because it makes it better from our point of view because obviously we 
don 't have to start running our operations... but the havoc it caused 
and the potential for an accident on the road just for the sake of 
opening a car park early, in hindsight we should have opened it 
earlier. " HJ (Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
All parties involved in the planning and staging of Solstice agreed that, despite the 
possibility of Solstice 2003 being a . one-off' in terms of circumstances, the issue 
of opening times and parking would be an issue that future planning would have 
to address in greater detail. 
The second logistical "difficulty' that manifested itself during the staging of 
Solstice concerned problems with communication between different agencies at a 
tactical, rather than strategic level: 
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"The communications are not good is the short answer. 1 can usually 
get hold of IlL] and IRB] obviously, 1 can get his control, so 1 suppose 
for major incidents it works well, the decision-making for turning the 
lights out and stuff like that but for the day-to-day running it is not 
good. " HJ (Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
Essentially, the partial joint control approach enabled strategic decisions to be 
made whether they were planned (e.g. turning off the lights at dawn) or 
unexpected (e.g. attempting to manage traffic flow through opening the site early). 
This decision making involved the 'key' players from different agencies who had 
been involved in the planning process and can be characterised as consultative and 
cohesive. However, away from this strategic level much of the operational 
running of Solstice was conducted by personnel from different agencies who were 
not part of the immediate partial joint control approach and had not been directly 
involved in the planning. The greatest problem that this presented during the 
staging of the event was ambiguity. Although problems at this tactical level did 
not impact significantly on the successful outcome of the event, they are aspects 
of event planning / staging that were raised post event and potentially can be 
overcome in the future and thus shift an overall partial joint control approach to 
something analogous to the joint control approach that was present at Pride. 
From the police perspective, communication at this tactical level was hampered by 
the fact that radios did not work on the site leading the majority of communication 
to occur via the use of mobile phones: 
"The radio system in this county is not very good and a lot of people 
were using mobile phones which is all very well and good but ~r you 
are monitoring a radio you are obviously monitoring other peoples' 
conversations and it gives you an idea on what's going on. If all the 
conversation is done by mobile phones, you're cutting out a gap in the 
communications loop ... for myself as a commander, I1t'asn 't aware of 
what was going on outside of the Uocal point of Solstice 
celebrations], 1 wasn " really aware of what was going on. 1 also fed 
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vulnerable, you know, 1 didn't feel as though .,. it was a necessity for 
me to keep on going back to silver control to keep on getting updates 
on what was happening." RR (Chief Inspector, Solstice 2003) 
It is anticipated that a new radio system was due to be implemented by the police 
that would overcome this difficulty for future Solstice events3. In addition to not 
being able to communicate with each other, the police could not communicate 
directly with other agencies which led to ambiguity. An example of this ambiguity 
came from the bronze commander with geographical responsibility for the focal 
point of the celebrations (Chief Inspector RR) and concerned the deployment of 
ambulances onto the site. With no means of radioing in - either to the Silver 
command or ambulance check point - he did not know whether ambulances were 
being deployed to deal with minor issues (e.g. drink or drug related minor 
injuries) or something potentially much more serious (e.g. a stabbing resulting 
from confrontation). It was not just the police who experienced these problems. 
They were also noted by other agencies involved in the staging of the event. An 
example of this 'communication ambiguity' comes from the personnel providing 
the private security for the event: 
.. There was an incident and 1 was in the control room and the 
ambulance people ... 1 don't know what happened to their 
communications either, they could communicate with us quite easily 
but they obviously were not communicating with the police because 
they had a problem, 1 went over and 1 had to get one of the tactical 
guys, the sergeant, he was the only policemen around so we have to go 
and deal with it because we hadn't got communications. Somewhere 
along the line 1 couldn't talk to their [police] control room and the 
ambulance needed someone then and there because they had someone 
in the ambulance kicking off and he obviously couldn't get back to his 
comms so we ended up doing it off our own... So it is a definite 
problem that will have to be looked at, even if we have a tin can with a 
3 The new system referred to is called' Airwave' and is a digital, as opposed to analogue, based 
radio communications system. It's 'roll ouf is being overseen nationally by the Police Information 
Technology Organisation (PITa). 
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piece of string! It is crazy we are literally this far apart (hand 
gesture) but we have no comms to each other ... I think this year (i.e. 
Solstice 2004) we have got to make sure we have got better comms 
between all the emergency services because certainly half the time I'm 
not sure if the Fire Brigade have gone to sleep but we were not 
communicating terribly well with the ambulance because there were 
too many ambulances going in to people who had stubbed their toes 
and stuff like that." 1L (Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
To further compound communication-related ambiguities, the police command 
structure also presented potential tactical problems for police decision making. 
The traditional approach to the 'metallic hierarchy' of command during a police 
operation incorporates a gold commander, a silver commander and any number of 
bronze commanders depending on the scope of a particular event or incident (e.g. 
Waddington 1991, 1994a; AepO 2001). However at Solstice there were two silver 
based positions (silver control on site, silver command off-site). The problem, 
especially for supervising officers and bronze commanders, concerned which 
silver they should be communicating with during the staging of the event: 
"If you are referring to silver, who are you referring to? Silver 
command or silver control? Now that was raised at the debrief and 
that was a cause of confusion. As far as I am concerned the silver 
commander I don't think should really have been there [on site] and 
should really have been in control so combine the two. If there is a 
control and people call him silver I think really control is wondering if 
they are after control or the silver commander, so as the observer this 
might have given you the impression that there were a number of 
silvers ... You should have the one control and silver. But whether or 
not they will change it for next year I don't know but what you've got 
to look at is if officers are used to doing certain things and if they have 
done that over a number of years they are velY reluctant to change 
just to incorporate a system so they obviously think it ·works quite well. 
I )t'osn 't at the debrief though but I raised ... a lot of points I raised but 
I don't know ·whether they will take them on board ... they certainly 
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weren't raised when the minutes came. " RR (Chief Inspector, Solstice 
2003) 
This officer had moved from the Metropolitan Police during the previous year and 
had experience of policing similar types of events (e.g. the Notting Hill Festival). 
As a single silver is prescribed by ACPO (2001) and it is certainly interesting that 
Solstice deviated with this approach. It is therefore pertinent to highlight the 
'silver control' response (i.e. Chief Superintendent RB) to the potential logistical 
issues presented by communication and command related ambiguity: 
"It is never perfect by any means and certainly what we found this 
year was better than we had in previous years, I think the fact that we 
had a silver commander on the site with what would be the equivalent 
{Main organisation that maintains the Solstice location] silver 
commander if you were to use that same sort of model, was more 
appropriate. I'm sure if you were to speak to some of our officers they 
would say that the communication was still difficult but it certainly 
was better. I suppose the only way that you are realistically going to 
have that senior decision-making etc is to have a joint control facility 
and a joint command facility. Really the roles are in many ways not 
compatible to be able to do that and so it maybe that what we have in 
2003 with one or two refinements is perhaps the best we are going to 
get." RB (Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003) 
This statement further distinguishes between the partial joint control approach 
taken at Solstice and the joint control strategy adopted by the organisers of Pride. 
It also demonstrates the evolving nature of the Solstice event as the management 
of the event has changed dramatically, especially when comparing pre and post 
managed open access, and the format will undoubtedly evolve in the future even it 
is only through 'one or two refinements'. The point to make here is that Solstice -
as with the other observed events - is not occurring in an isolated vacuum but that 
factors arising during the planning and staging of future events will demand 
responsive management on the part of the organisers in order to preseryc the 
successful outcomes associated with it since 2000. It is tempting to suggest that 
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the reason why a joint control strategy has not been adopted at Solstice is because 
factors have not arisen that have facilitated the need for it. Although Chief 
Superintendent RB suggests that roles between different organisers may not be 
compatible in terms of a joint control approach to staging the event, some 
unforeseen scenario or indeed the change in key personnel might challenge this 
idea. The experience of the PPG would suggest that roles between different 
agencies can be made compatible in terms of control and command issues during 
the staging of the event. This aspect of Solstice therefore raises important issues 
with regards to 'good practice' in relation to potential guidance and / or legislation 
in the planning and staging of events that might be drafted in response to the 
current void identified in the literature chapter (ACPO, 1999; Sexton, 2003). 
These issues will be considered in the final chapter of the thesis that will explore 
the policy implications of this research. 
3.2. Pride 
As has been highlighted in the previous section and previous chapters, the staging 
of the Pride event was characterised by a joint control approach. Unlike Solstice 
this approach incorporated all the agencies involved in the planning process (i.e. 
the PPG) into one command and communication strategy. Further, the 
communication problems associated with Solstice were not evident at Pride. The 
police, council, event organisers and private security were not only located in the 
same vicinity throughout the staging process (in the park which provided the focal 
point for the celebrations) but were also consulting with each other regularly to 
review the staging of the event. It has been noted in previous chapters that the 
major issue for the organisers of the event - namely avoiding the problems 
associated with the policing in the previous year - were addressed during the 
planning stages (i.e. the police apologising, consulting and working with the local 
gay community / organisers throughout the planning process). 
It is therefore interesting to note that the only logistical difficulty associated with 
the staging of Pride had its root in the planning stages. After the last PPG meeting, 
a table top exercise commenced involving both members of the PPG and 
representatives of agencies that would be involved in the staging of the event. 
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However, there was one bronze commander missing from the table top exercise 
who would hold responsibility for the policing of the parade. Although this was 
not identified to be a problem at the time, it meant that the community organiser in 
charge of this aspect of Pride did not have the opportunity to meet the bronze 
commander until the event itself. 
During the staging of the Pride event, the only problem occurred during the 
parade. A public announcer (PA) van was due to be at the head of the parade so 
that the mayor could read a short speech, cut a ribbon and officially start the 
parade. Unfortunately the PA van was missing vital equipment which meant that 
this could not happen. The chair of Pride tried to amend this situation by arranging 
for another float (a bus) which had PA capabilities to make its way to the front of 
the parade. This created a certain amount of chaos as the parade had been lining 
up in a pre-determined order for two hours and there was not the space on the road 
to manoeuvre a large bus. In order for the bus to achieve its aim and get to the 
front of the parade it also had to pass two police vehicles. Unfortunately for the 
community organiser in charge of the parade, the bronze commander did not 
initially allow the vehicles to be moved. With a mayor waiting to make a speech, 
the community organiser relied on some last minute improvisation and the parade 
was officially started via a megaphone and the first floats, complete with 
surrounding dancers, progressed forward. As the parade started, the bus was still 
stuck and prevented the floats behind from moving on. It is at this stage that the 
police vehicles were moved and the rest of the parade progressed, albeit behind 
the frontrunners. From my fieldnotes, I noted that this part of the event was 
particularly chaotic as the police and community organisers rushed around to try 
and reinstate equilibrium in the parade. The heat was a factor (the dancers moved 
forward quickly but then slowed down) and with officers / organisers proactively 
slowing the front of the procession it was not long before the majority of the 
parade had caught up with the floats at the front. Although there was a lot of 
chaotic and improvised parade management, the crowd did not seem to either 
notice or care about this initial gap between floats during the early part of the 
parade. 
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From the perspective of the community organiser in charge of the parade, this 
hitch represented a problem with communication that could have potentially been 
avoided had the bronze commander been at the table top exercise or there had 
been another form of meeting prior to the staging of the event: 
"] have written a debrief report and in it ] have put that the 
relationship on the parade with the police was not good at all. There 
wasn't a relationship. ] think it was probably because] didn't meet the 
guy [the bronze commander for the parade] beforehand, we hadn't 
had a chance to meet we were just thrown together at the last minute. 
He was supposed to be with me all-day, ] didn't see him at all, ] don 't 
know what he did, ] don 't really care what he did, but it is important 
that we do actually meet and have some sort of bonding before the 
event. " JM (Community Organiser, Pride 2003) 
This further emphasises the importance of communication to both the planning 
and staging phases of the observed events. As with Solstice, this incident did not 
impact on either the overall safety or the perceived success of the event but it 
highlights that even with a cohesive joint control strategy there are still 
opportunities for improvement in the working relationship between different 
agencies in future events (e.g. through ensuring that all key police personnel meet 
their community organiser counterparts prior to the event). If this example is 
successfully addressed through the debrief it is likely that the joint control strategy 
at the staging of a future Pride event could be even more cohesive and therefore 
limit even further the potential for disruption to order and safety at the event. 
3.3. Multicultural Festival 
The staging of the Multicultural Festival (and the preceding Mela) did not prove 
as logistically or tactically demanding for the police or organisers compared to 
Solstice or Pride. This was due in part to the size of the event - it was much 
smaller in terms of attendance compared to Solstice and Pride - and, from the 
police perspective, there were less significant operational demands and a looser 
command structure. These factors contributed to a fragmented approach to staging 
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the event (i.e. the police and organisers isolated any decision making away from 
each other). Although there were no complaints about the policing of the 
Multicultural Festival, it is interesting to note that the event and community 
organisers suggested that there were positive opportunities offered by the event 
that the police could take advantage of. In short, the police could use the event to 
promote themselves to the local community. 
The first of these potential opportunities concerns recruitment. For example, the 
main police representative involved in the MFPG did not realise that the force had 
sent a recruitment stall until I raised it in the interview: 
"You are the first person to tell me that. 1 know the Fire Brigade was 
sending someone. Now, headquarters at no stage told me that they 
were going to do that and until you mention it 1 didn't know they had 
been there on the day. 1 personally couldn't go because 1 had a 
personal commitment that day so 1 couldn't get down there, but no 1 
wasn't aware they had one. So that is the left and right hand isn't it? 
We are trying to police an event and even the officers on the day didn't 
mention it." MY (Sergeant, Multicultural Festival 2003) 
Although a successful recruitment exerCIse does not rely on informing those 
officers involved in planning the event, it could have been potentially more 
productive had some liaison occurred so that the recruitment team could have 
been aware of local dynamics. In contrast, and in addition to the fire service and 
the police, the army also used the event (and the previous year's Mela) as a 
recruitment / information dissemination opportunity. From my observations of the 
event over the day, the fire service (complete with fire engine) and army had a 
more productive time compared to the police - they appeared to be drawing larger 
interest and had more to offer in terms of things for young people to do compared 
with the police who seemed happy to talk but were simply handing out 
recruitment brochures. Given that the MFPG occurred soon after the second Gulf 
War had 'ended', the attitude of the army was perceived positively given the 
demographic composition attending the event: 
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"The army were quite good in sending a couple of Asian squaddies to 
talk so Asian young people could ask if there were any clashes with 
religious and ethnic issues in being a member of the army and talking 
to a real soldier, a Sikh or a Muslim soldier or whatever, about their 
experience was I think quite valuable. I don't know how many people 
they spoke to but I would think if young people have an opportunity to 
speak to someone who is actually doing it from a similar background 
to them would be quite valuable so it would have been quite nice if the 
police had had something similar really. They [local community] 
might not be able to get that information anywhere else, talking to 
someone in an informal way about their own experiences... it would 
have been quite nice. " RP (Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003) 
The point to make here is that the army had recognised the nature of the event and 
sent people with whom younger people, especially from the local Muslim 
community, might identify. This recruitment / information dissemination exercise 
was geared towards the event. The police could have followed this example and, 
in addition to recruitment, used the event to disseminate information. However, 
for such a strategy to succeed, the police might need to acknowledge and 
understand some of the underlying tensions between themselves generally and the 
local (especially youth) community: 
"In this area if you speak to half the Asian young guys, or even the 
girls for example, their perceptions about the police are negative so if 
the perception is negative are they going to work for them? Nope. If 
they do work for them they are not going to work in this area for them. 
They won't be able to work in this area for them so you can't go 
around and have two officers in recruitment to try and recruit other 
people and pay them a salary when you don't even understand some of 
the issues about why people won't join the police in this area. " AM 
(Community Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003) 
In terms of context, the area where the Multicultural Festival takes place is close 
to, both geographically and temporally, the source of violent disorder bet'vveen the 
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police, far right groups and sections from the local Asian community. As the aim 
of the Multicultural Festival was to promote community cohesion, it therefore 
provided an ideal environment for the police to promote themselves as an 
organisation and build better links with the local community. One community 
organiser gave an example of how this could occur: 
"I think one of the hardest things about ringing the police is, if you 
have never rung the police and you have never had any dealings with 
the police, you don't know how the police work so you feel a bit thick 
and the police need to understand that is how people sometimes feel. 
So when you ring the police, who are you speaking to? What happens 
to that incident you reported? Who do you speak to if you want more 
information? I think the police could be taking steps to talk to the 
community about that, you know when you ring us this is what 
happens, this is your local community bobby, this is how you can get 
access to them, this is who you need to be ringing, these are local 
events going on - we can be helping you in your area set up a 
neighbourhood system for example, actively getting out there and 
empowering the community to take some sort of responsibility for 
themselves but with overall responsibility obviously lying with the 
police but that isn't done in this area. It is not done in the area so 
people don't take responsibility, people who try and take the 
responsibility, the police don't come forward so you are always in a 
catching up situation." AM (Community Organiser, Multicultural 
Festival 2003) 
Of course, such information is of potential relevance to any member of the local 
community regardless of their cultural reference points of how the police operate. 
What is important, and a possible failing of the fragmented planning and staging, 
is that the police need to know about this information if they are to think about 
disseminating it. Greater consultation could lead to such information being passed 
from community organisers to the police but then the police would have to further 
disseminate it to the relevant department that deals with recruitment and public 
relations. If, as hinted by those involved in the MFPG, there is a greater attempt at 
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consultation and collaboration between organisers and the local community for 
future events, there is the potential for the police to tap into this process and 
develop their relationship with the local community beyond the event. 
As has been highlighted in previous chapters, the contrast to the approach taken 
by the police at the Multicultural Festival comes from Pride. Within the joint 
control approach to planning and staging, recruitment and information 
dissemination was incorporated into the event after consultation with the 
community organisers and the local gay community. These actions, coupled with 
the way the event had been policed, were perceived to have benefits beyond the 
event itself, especially with regards to more general police / gay community 
relations in attempting to build trust between the two. This is not to say that the 
policing of Pride had solved every police / gay community problem but there were 
perceptions, as explored in previous chapters, that this process had been aided. 
In summary, this section has examined aspects of all three observed events that 
could be improved upon in the future and further contribute to the success 
associated with the outcomes of each event. In all three cases, greater 
collaboration between the different police, event and community organisers would 
suggest itself as the best method for addressing these. Whatever action is taken in 
future, when it is combined with the factors raised in section two and potential 
unforeseen scenarios it is inevitable that the approaches and mechanisms utilised 
in planning and staging future events will be different (whether subtly or 
significantly) from those taken during the observed events. 
4. Understanding and Applying Good Practice from the Events to Other 
Contexts 
The previous section hinted at the potential benefits that the Multicultural Festival 
might hold for the police beyond the event. The aim of this final section is to 
explore in what ways, if any, the police might usefully take their experiences of 
being involved in the three observed events and apply them to other policing 
contexts. This obviously has 'good practice' potential that will be explored in 
relation to possible policy implications in the final chapter of the thesis. With 
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regards to this section, it is worth briefly outlining these benefits from the 
perspective of participants as they demonstrate that the planning and staging of 
each event has potential implications in other contexts. 
From a policing perspective, the experience built up by Chief Superintendent RB 
as a key member involved in open managed access at Solstice has potential spin 
offs in his role as a divisional commander with the local traveller community: 
"What we are absolutely abysmal at is liaising with what is another 
minority group which is that of the travellers and when I say travellers 
I am talking about the Romany gypsies etc. We have quite a large 
community here and at the moment there is a great deal of mistrust 
from that community over the intentions of the police and what we 
have got to do is try to get to a stage where there is a mutual 
understanding because there is still this view that, quote, they are just 
a bunch of thieving gypos and that is not the case and certainly some 
of the tactics we have employed in the past have been discriminatory 
and we have got to try and address the needs of that community 
because there is no doubt at all if we can make inroads and build the 
trust of that community they too will want to assist us in making sure 
the unruly elements of their community, like the unruly elements of 
every community, are brought to justice but at the moment because 
there is a total lack of trust they are reluctant to come forward and do 
that so certainly what we are in the process of doing is our race and 
community relations officer is involved in various groups to try and 
build the trust with elements of that community and that is working 
with outside agencies. It is not us ourselves going along and doing it 
because if we said hello, Mr [local] Constabulary, here come along 
for a meeting I don 't think there would be many people sat on chairs 
whereas if we use... There is an actual group involved in the churches 
and there is a very active reverend in the city here who is sort of a link 
in with the gypsy and traveller community but it is through those 
avenues that we can replicate what we have done as far as Solsticf! is 
concerned. The only thing I would say 'rl'hich is probably the negatil'f! 
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of it is that we have been dealing with a history and culture from 
Solstice which is let us say 18 years where the trust really broke down 
- It has taken us until 2000 and arguably those relationships are still 
building. What we have got as far as the traveller community is 
mistrust which has been built over many, many years and so therefore 
to turn that round in perhaps two or three years may be unrealistic 
and may take a lot longer but there is no doubt at all that that is work 
that we have got to do. " RB (Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003) 
What is evident from the above quote is recognition that there is a) a problem 
between the police and the local traveller community and that b) a multi -agency 
approach might be the best way of building up trust between the two. The 
experiences of Chief Superintendent RB in the SPG and SCG over a number of 
years would suggest that the lessons learned during this process offer the best way 
forward for making positive inroads between the police force involved in Solstice 
and this local community. In terms of understanding the factors that potentially 
increase trust, a prominent dynamic would appear to be building good working 
relationships. This is viewed as a key factor in the success of Solstice: 
"Isn't it a fundamental basis of everything which is you know what 
your outcome is and then you build the team to manage the outcome. 
The process in the middle is just how it happens but so often people 
look at the process and try to manage the process as opposed to... if 
you manage process, you're so process driven you don't build your 
team. This is about people, this is about the interpersonal 
relationships between all these different people and the agencies but 
at the end of the day you are not dealing with the agencies you are 
dealing with the people so if you build a good relationship with the 
people you represent those agencies, you end up getting support. " SM 
(Organiser, Solstice 2003) 
As has been explored in previous chapters, the 'personalities' involved in the 
planning groups are important to success. Even amongst apparently diverse 
groups such as the police, local councils, druids and pagans the focussed 
206 
'outcome' of facilitating a successful event has, coupled with time and reflectil'e 
personnel from the community and authorities, allowed these working 
relationships to flourish. This approach could be beneficial for a number of 
policing contexts, such as crime and disorder partnership working. It is not 
surprising to report that similar sentiments were also expressed about the planning 
and staging processes associated with Pride: 
"A successful event will only come around through effective and 
constructive communication between all parties involved... You can 
sum the whole thing up by communication and certainly, with regards 
to the police involvement, a reflection on personalities, but also 
culture I think as well is generally changing, reflecting the way things 
are done and breaking down those stereotypes, you work for local 
government you are a loser... Members of the group, whatever the 
group is called should be hand-picked with the following things in 
mind: they should not be just who is in the office, right you can go 
because a whole manner of things can go wrong and I have read post 
event reports, post incident reports from elsewhere from all around 
the world as part of my research which have heavily criticised the 
representatives from the agencies for being unable to carry out the 
functions which they were required to do because they were chosen by 
senior ranks and didn't understand what was being asked of their 
organisation, as simple as that, a lack of understanding, a lack of 
communication and too many people think of rules and regulations 
and tick boxes. What I try and do is say well they are all over there, 
they are there if you want them but this is the principle, this is the 
spirit, I can use those if I'm forced to but I don't want to, I'll explain, 1 
will refer, I will enforce but developing and communicating is the key. 
BW (Organiser, Pride 2003) 
Once again there is an emphasis on personality and open communication - the 
agencies will ensure that the event goes ahead but the success or otherwise will 
rely on these factors combining to form good working relationships. In one sense. 
the planning arrangements and the partial joint control/joint control approaches 
to staging Solstice and Pride provide the forum for these positive factors to 
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flourish. With regards to good practice, it would appear that this type of approach 
would be beneficial at other types of events as one community organiser from 
Pride - who has experienc~ of being involved in the planning of other events _ 
points out: 
"All events in general, they should all follow something similar. It 
would be very useful and just safer for the public... There should be 
SAGS and joint event controls. You can't always do that with private 
promoters, once a promoter has hired a field, Mean Fiddler or 
whoever, they don't want all these services, they want to take 
responsibility themselves therefore they take responsibility but they 
also take the rap if things go wrong. If something goes wrong at 
Reading [Music Festival] next week it will all fall to the Mean Fiddler 
and how they have operated or reacted accordingly. I wouldn't want 
to take that risk and wherever possible any event that I am involved in 
I would certainly want consultation and joint event control provided it 
doesn't interfere with the event and the SAG does not because it is on 
safety issues only so any promoter that doesn't want an expertise of 
people in the room for free, trouble is they are not normally going to 
be for free are they, it's got to be a good thing. It is got to be a good 
thing for the safety of outdoor events." CB (Community Organiser, 
Pride 2003) 
The idea of safety advisory groups (SAGs) and joint control would appear to hold 
benefits across a number of event contexts although the potential cost as 
mentioned by the above community organiser, could be a factor at commercially 
based events as opposed to community-based events. This issue was raised earlier 
in the chapter and will be further discussed in chapter nine. 
It would appear that the methods adopted by the police. event organisers and 
community organisers at Solstice and Pride promote trust through open 
communication and this in turn leads to successful outcomes (i.e. the maintenance 
of safety and order). Turning away from community-based events, one community 
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organiser involved with Solstice suggests that this • spirit' may hold implications 
for the policing of political protest: 
"The police should be seen not as an agent of enforcing the authority 
of the government or another authority but as servants of the people 
including the government and the authorities. I am not suggesting the 
police should start acting against the government... I think the police 
are beginning to realise, certainly the way I've been dealing with the 
police over the Solstice issues, I get the feeling they realise that there 
is much there to make protest possible, if it is a protest we are talking 
about and I'm not talking about Solstice now, if we were talking about 
a more difficult protest situation there is much to make the protest 
possible and the protesters able to express their view as they are to 
ensure that the agencies of government and control are enforced ... 
Local people [near to Solstice] go about their business if they don't 
want to be there so similarly in any policing situation is up to the 
police to protect the interests of people who are not involved in the 
protest but also that the protesters are not the problem. It is just like 
the people who come to Solstice are not the problem and as soon as 
they are treated as the problem we get problems and therefore if any 
strategy, any kind of protest is planned, really it would be good if the 
people who are organising the process could develop a spirit of trust 
with the police so that the police could be organised so that people 
who do organise protests realise that the police are not there to 
undermine or prevent their protest or stop what they want to be, or be 
heard, they are there to help the facilitation as far as is reasonable in 
the context of everybody else who is concerned with what is going on. 
It's all words this but I think there is something very important in It'hat 
we are saying here, that the whole idea of protest is not. .. we want 
change, we want understanding, there is a reason why people do 
things, we want what people do to be ejJectil'e and police involvement 
in a co-operative way will help the two sides to understand each other 
better, it will prevent bad feeling and pre'rent horrible things 
happening and therefore lead to more peaceful resolutions ql 
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problems which is what it is all about." WP (Community Organiser. 
Solstice 2003) 
To some commentators and practitioners, the views presented above may appear 
naIve and it could be the case that some protest participants may be unwilling to 
co-operate with the police during any potential planning stage. However, the point 
being made is that the police should not dismiss protestors as 'the problem' and 
there must be an effort on the part of the authorities to try and engage with 
protestors who in tum must also be willing to engage in order to achieve the 
difficult mix of facilitating 'effective' protest but avoiding disorder. To an extent 
this is exactly what happened, albeit over a number of years, as the Solstice 
transformed from a difficult, occasionally violent annual public order incident to a 
safe and orderly community celebration. 
To conclude this section, the successful outcomes associated with each of the 
observed events offer potential good practice that could be applied to other 
contexts. It would appear that key factors are trust through open communication 
and the formation over time of good working relationships. The SCG / SPG and 
PPG coupled with the respective partial joint control/joint control offer the 
mechanisms for these to flourish. With regards to the Multicultural Festival, the 
personnel involved may be at the embryonic phase of developing both these 
approaches and the suitable mechanisms. They may manifest themselves in the 
future as there are signs that the planning process may be more consultative and 
cohesive compared to previous events (e.g. the Mela). The links between 
organisers and the police may also develop - for example one of the event 
organisers fully intended to use the main police representative involved in the 
MFPG to assist in the planning of another event - and this can, in association with 
closer planning, only be beneficial to all the organisers and their respectiYe 
agencies / communities in staging future community-based eyents. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored post el'ent findings from the three obseryed eYents. By 
reflecting on the outcome of each event and information concerning the debrief 
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and / or reflections on the event future, it has been possible to identify that key 
variables associated with the successful outcomes would appear to be the building 
of trust through open communication leading to effective working relationships. 
As has been explored in previous chapters, consistency and personality would also 
appear to be important in addition to trust. In order for these • factors ~ to manifest 
themselves, the utilisation of a partial joint / joint control approach to planning 
and staging would appear to offer the best mechanisms for them to flourish. This 
has potential implications for policy, especially when considering other policing 
contexts in addition to the observed events. These will be explored in the final 
chapter of the thesis. 
To conclude the empirical analysis section, it is important to note that each event 
has a history, a present (i.e. the observed events) and a future. These have now all 
been explored through the last four chapters and combine to shape the planning 
and staging of the events. These factors also demonstrate that the events are not 
occurring in an isolated vacuum. Accordingly, the task of the next chapter will be 
to take the empirical findings of the last four chapters and develop an analytic 
framework to account for this shaping process. This also offers the opportunity to 
compare and critically evaluate existing theory concerning public order policing. 
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Chapter Eight: Theorising the Public Order Policing of 
Community-Based Events 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the empirical findings of this thesis 
within a theoretical context. To achieve this, there will be a focus on three areas of 
investigation. Firstly, a five stage model is developed which represents the 
empirical and grounded research findings. This allows for a holistic overview of 
the processes associated with the public order policing of community-based events 
that have been explored in the previous four chapters. Following this is an 
evaluation of these findings in respect of existing analytic accounts on public 
order policing. This section will draw on the accounts highlighted and discussed 
in chapter two. A product of this evaluation is the identification of opportunities 
and limitations associated with these existing accounts. These in tum suggest that 
there is the scope for a new analytic framework to account for the practice of 
public order in the context of this thesis. Drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, 
this new analytic framework is presented in light of the empirical research 
findings. 
This chapter will therefore aid significantly in meeting the research aims outlined 
at the end of chapter two. It offers answers to exploratory (i.e. what is happening) 
and explanatory questions (why is it happening). Further to this, both Garland and 
Sparks (2000) and Fielding (2002) argue that criminology can benefit from 
engagement with existing social theory. In addition to the evaluation and potential 
revision of existing theory, the findings from the exercises outlined above allow 
for the identification of possible policy implications which will form the focus of 
the next, and final, chapter. 
2. Towards a Model for the Public Order Policing of Community-Based 
Events 
The aim of this section is to present a model that outlines the processes associated 
with the public order policing of community-based e\'ents. This modeL outlined 
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by figure 4, is a culmination of the grounded approach as discussed in chapter 
three. However, it must be reiterated that this represents a perspective on the 
public order policing of community-based events, rather than an attempt to put 
forward a definitive account of the phenomenon under investigation. Before 
exploring existing analytical accounts and positing a potential new framework for 
understanding public order policing, it is worth outlining each component of the 
model and the impact it has on contributing to the maintenance of order and safety 
at the observed events. This will in effect summarise the findings and themes 
originating from the previous four empirical analysis chapters but present them 
within a holistic context. By outlining them at this stage of the chapter, it will be 
possible to account for these findings from existing and new perspectives. 
The first component of the model to be considered is stage one, event history / 
context. A running theme throughout the previous four analysis chapters is that the 
police, organisers and community organisers have been able to draw on previous 
experiences of planning and staging for the observed events. This served two 
purposes. Firstly, there was a precedent whereby all the observed events had been 
staged previously without disorder. The nature and length of this precedent varied 
across the events. For example, the Solstice event had been characterised by 
disorder / disruption until 2000 although since this date the event has been staged 
successfully through a process of "managed open access'. In comparison, Pride, 
Mela and the Multicultural Festival have staged a number of events without 
disorder. The event history therefore provides a baseline to work from: experience 
and knowledge (in some cases from the organisation of other types of events) 
have been accumulated and working practices were developed with the goal of 
minimising disorder / disruption prior to the planning of the observed events. The 
second function that the event history provides is an element of consistency. This 
was most marked in relation to Solstice where the majority of personnel (police, 
organisers and community organisers) had been involved in the event since the 
introduction of managed open access and in some cases before. With regards to 
Pride, Mela and the Multicultural Festival, this consistency was more evident in 
relation to organisers and community organisers with new police personnel 
becoming involved in the observed planning phases. 
Figure 4. Model for the Public Order Policing of Community-based Events 
Police 
1. Event History / 
Context 
Organisers Community 
Organisers 
2. Event Planning Through 
Partnership: 
Meetings, Table Top Exercises, 
Consultations etc 
3. Staging the Event: 
Fragmented / Partial Joint Control 
/ Joint Control Approaches 
4. Order and Safety Maintained 
at Event: 
Potential Post Event Benefits for 
Police / Organisers / Community 
Organisers 
5. Updated Event History / 
Context 
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The event context relates to the awareness of potential 'threats' to order safety , . 
and / or the event future at Solstice, Pride, Mela and the Multicultural Festi\Cal. As 
with the event history, the nature of these potential 'threats' varied across the 
events. For Solstice and the Mela, these threats were 'external' to the planning 
groups, representing potential protest and gang-related violence respectively. The 
biggest threat at the observed Pride event related to concerns, predominantly 
raised by the local LGBT community and community organisers, that the policing 
would be insensitive. Finally, there were concerns at the Multicultural Festival 
that internal politics amongst community organisers would create tensions as the 
event evolved from the Mela that was staged the year before. The important point 
to make about the event history / context is that it impacted on the planning and 
staging phases of all the observed events. The culmination of knowledge / 
working practices gained from previous events and awareness of potential threats 
therefore both permeated and informed the entire process. 
Stage two in the model refers to Event Planning through Partnership. During this 
stage, the police, organisers and community organisers came together and worked 
to plan for the staging of the observed events. The processes involved during this 
stage were documented in chapter five. In summary, it was noted that the overt 
function of such planning was to prepare safe and successful events. In this 
respect, the majority of decisions taken were not complicated or contentious and 
they were related to routine logistical issues (e.g. running order for the events etc). 
However, the planning phase also allowed for the identification and subsequent 
reduction of the various threats associated with each event. This process reflected 
a number of factors. Firstly, decision-making was informed and guided by the 
event history / context. For example, at Pride the new police personnel involved in 
the planning were aware of what had occurred at the previous event in relation to 
accusations of insensitive policing. The planning stage therefore presented an 
opportunity for the police to rectify previous errors. The officers who liaised with 
the organisers and community organisers acknowledged what had gone wrong 
previously and promoted a policing style to address their (and the LGBT 
community) concerns. 
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Secondly, and in relation specifically to Pride and Solstice, expenence and 
consistency were important factors. These manifested themselves in two ways. At 
Pride, organisers and community organisers had experience of planning previous 
events. The police personnel involved in the observed planning. whilst new to 
Pride, were affiliated to a specialist events planning department so they also had 
relevant experience. This was reflected through the establishment of a Pride 
specific Safety Advisory Group (SAG) which is encouraged as 'good practice' for 
event planning by ACPO (1999). At Solstice, all the organisers, including the 
police and community organisers, had experience of planning and staging 
previous events. This experience was therefore supplemented by consistency: 
people knew each other and had worked together to previously stage successful 
events. The impact of both these factors is best appreciated in the context of Pride. 
The main police liaison made a pledge to all the other organisers that he would be 
involved in policing the event to ensure that a consistent approach was 
maintained. This was in contrast to the previous year where different police 
personnel had been involved in the planning and staging phases and this factor 
had been identified (by police and other organisers) as contributing to the 
problems associated with this event. 
The culmination of this expenence and consistency was a cohesive planning 
process at the observed Pride and Solstice. This allowed for the development of 
trust between all the parties involved in planning these events. The issue of trust is 
best exemplified by the response of Solstice organisers to dilemmas over when to 
stage the event and the potential for protest. In relation to the former, there was an 
open debate and vote concerning which date should be chosen to stage the event. 
The decision taken did not please all organisers and community organisers. 
Indeed, some of the prominent community organisers left the group for the 
observed Solstice but promised to return for the following year. However, the 
majority of organisers and community organisers who voted against the date 
finally chosen did state that a) they would back the decision and b) would remain 
involved in the planning and staging process. With regards to the potential for 
protest, the community organisers stated that they would engage with those 
advocating it, \vith the aim of preventing it from occurring. The police and 
organisers developed contingency plans but were willing to let this engagement 
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take place rather than overtly exclude the potential protestors from the planning 
process via the community organisers. Given that no protest materialised, the 
main police liaison for the event suggested that the actions of the community 
organisers would hold greater credence for the planning of future events. This 
therefore represents the continual building of trust that was associated with the 
planning and staging of the observed Solstice. 
In contrast, there was not the same level of experience and consistency at the 
observed Mela. Although this represented a smaller event logistically, the police 
or organisers had not worked together before. Relative to Solstice and Pride, none 
of the parties involved in the planning process held much planning experience. 
This created tensions during the planning with the event nearly being cancelled 
due to the external threat of gang-related violence. Although this step was not 
taken as a decision was made concerning the numbers of security personnel, the 
planning process at this event could not be described as cohesive. The situation 
improved with reference to the planning for the Multicultural Festival. Not only 
had experience been gained from the previous year but more organisers and 
community organisers were drafted in who held event planning experience. In 
addition, the main police liaison for this event had been directly involved as an 
organiser in a previous Mela event. This led to an increased frequency in meetings 
and a broader knowledge base to consult from. The main threat to this event -
potential disruption due to internal politics amongst community organisers - was 
also avoided during the planning process by successfully changing the constitution 
and focus for the event away from the Mela and towards the wider remit of a 
Multicultural Festival. 
A final point to be made concerning the planning process relates to the roles of 
specific individuals. Again, this is best reflected in relation to the observed Pride 
and Solstice. Through exposure to the event history / context, key individuals 
were sensitive to the nature of the events. At the observed Pride the main police 
liaison introduced a number of initiatives (e.g. having the parade led by officers 
from the local Gay Police Association rather than a generic police van) to 
facilitate an effective and appropriate policing response to the event. Both the 
main organiser and police liaison at Solstice accommodated the debate over dates 
217 
and consented to community organisers engaging with potential protestors. The 
sensitivity demonstrated by these individuals was therefore an important factor 
that was acknowledged by other organisers and community organisers as being 
influential in the staging of successful events. 
Returning to the model, the nature of the planning process associated with each of 
the observed events was closely mirrored at stage three: staging the event. This 
part of the process has been detailed in chapter six. From the police perspective, a 
common theme across all the observed events was the adoption of 'low key' (but 
not necessarily 'low profile') policing styles. This culminated in a low number of 
arrests being made at Solstice with no event-related arrests being made at Pride, 
Mela or the Multicultural Festival. Despite this 'low key' policing style, there 
were contingency plans at all the events for a sizeable and specifically tasked 
police response to any disorder / disruption to public safety. None of these police 
contingencies were called upon. At all the observed events, private security 
personnel and stewards supplemented the police presence and performed order 
maintenance / crime control tasks (e.g. facilitating access to the events; avoiding 
crowd congestion; confiscating drugs). 
The actual staging of the observed events incorporated both the policing and 
management of logistics (e.g. opening times; ensuring that entertainment was 
running smoothly). The police, organisers and community organisers were all 
involved in this process, albeit to varying degrees. Chapter six outlined that this 
process manifested itself through three forms: 
• A Joint Control Strategy (i.e. Pride) 
• A Partial Joint Control Strategy (i.e. Solstice) 
• A Fragmented Strategy (i.e. Mela, Multicultural Festival) 
The above relate to the integration (or otherwise) of the police. organisers and 
community organisers during the staging of the observed events and they fall 
along a spectrum. At one end, the joint control strategy associated with Pride 
incorporated all the parties involved during the planning process working closely 
on managing all aspects of the event, including the policing. This was 
characterised by regular meetings, shared communication and a joint event control 
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location. The partial joint control strategy at Solstice allowed for major decisions 
to be made through consultation between the police, organisers and community 
organisers. However, the police and organisers were located in different control 
centres and had separate communication systems hence the partial nature of this 
strategy. Finally, Mela and the Multicultural Festival were characterised by a 
fragmented strategy: the police and organisers / community organisers did not 
work together in managing the event. Instead, the police simply carried out their 
duties (e.g. regular patrol) whilst the organisers / community organisers focussed 
on managing event logistics. There were separate communication systems and no 
joint control location: the only time these parties came together was for a briefing 
prior to the official opening of the event. 
The combined result of the planning and staging process leads to stage four, order 
and safety maintained at the event. All the observed events, whatever the form of 
planning and event management, were perceived as a success by the police, 
organisers and community organisers. The threats that arose and were associated 
with the event history / context never materialised. At this stage it is important to 
acknowledge that the planning / staging distinction is in some ways artificial. The 
agencies involved were working towards orderly and safe events during both the 
planning and staging phases. In terms of minimising threats, it is difficult to 
attribute with certainty whether the processes associated with the planning or 
staging phases were most important. It was probably a combination of the two at 
Pride (i.e. planning and then implementing an appropriate policing strategy) whilst 
the planning phase contributed heavily to reducing the threat of protest at Solstice. 
With regards to Mela, there was a perception that the threat of gang related 
violence was reduced due to the nature of the event (i.e. family oriented and 
therefore not conducive to violence) rather than processes explicitly linked to the 
planning or staging phases. 
Though order and safety was maintained at the observed events, the different 
strategies utilised highlight important differences. These became evident post 
event when the agencies embarked on a process of debriefing (see chapter seven). 
The joint control strategy was characterised by cohesive and consultative 
decision-making by virtue of the police, organisers and community organisers 
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working together. This was also evident at Solstice to an extent but there were 
identified problems concerning communication between the police and different 
agencies. The fragmented approach to the staging of the Mela and the 
Multicultural Festival did not impact on order and / or safety. However, had there 
been disorder / disruption it is a moot point whether these arrangements would 
have been as effective or efficient at responding to it compared to the joint / 
partial joint structures evident at Pride and the Solstice. 
Further to reflecting on the planning and staging processes, the debriefing / 
feedback process highlighted ways in which the events could evolve. For 
example, at the observed events there was awareness that key personnel would no 
longer be involved in the planning / staging of future events. It was therefore 
acknowledged that there would need to be an effective 'handover' process to 
inform newcomers of the dynamics associated with each event and therefore 
maintain some form of consistency. Problems were highlighted with elements of 
the planning / staging process and it was also acknowledged that these would 
require addressing to enhance success at future events. Although most of these 
related to event logistics (e.g. changing the "theme' at Pride; having a two day 
Multicultural Festival; event costs), there was reflection on improving the event 
management strategies to increase cohesive decision-making. The predominant 
factor in respect of this related to improving communication between various 
agencies during the staging of the events. Finally, benefits were identified from 
the planning and staging processes that went beyond the events. For example, the 
successful staging of Pride highlighted potential benefits in increasing wider trust 
between the police and resident LGBT community. The police at Solstice 
suggested that the methods associated with planning the event could be 
successfully employed to build links with the local traveller community, where 
relations were tense. At Mela / the Multicultural FestivaL it was acknowledged 
that the event could enhance the processes associated with the broader goals of 
community cohesion (e.g. Community Cohesion Unit 2002). 
All the mentioned stages therefore culminate in stage five. an updated e\'(!nt 
history / context. This stage recognises that the observed events are not occurring 
in an isolated vacuum. The practices and processes associated with the planning 
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and (successful) staging are incorporated into the event history and context, to be 
drawn upon in the future. Of importance is the fact that additional experience and 
knowledge is available: the police, organisers and community organisers have 
successfully minimised a host of potential threats that did not exist prior to the 
observed events and identified relevant shortcomings. This is all information that 
is likely to inform and guide the planning and staging of future events, regardless 
of what 'new' threats may emerge. 
The purpose of this 'holistic' model has been to demonstrate the processes 
associated with the public order policing of community-based events. This model 
is rooted in the data collected from observational fieldwork and interviews and 
reflects the findings that have been presented in the previous four empirical 
analysis chapters. Chapter two argued that this public order context (i.e. festivals) 
is under-researched compared to political/industrial protest and community 
disorder. The model therefore sheds light on the processes associated with this 
context and answers 'exploratory' (i.e. what is happening) questions. However, to 
effectively answer 'explanatory' questions (i.e. why are these processes 
happening) requires evaluation of existing analytic accounts relating to public 
order policing and wider social theory. The first of these tasks, namely the 
evaluation of existing public order related analytic accounts, will be the focus of 
the next section. 
3. Evaluating Existing Public Order Related Analytic Accounts 
Chapter two highlighted a number of analytic accounts relating to public order 
policing. The aim of this section is to consider the empirical findings outlined in 
this thesis in light of these accounts. This exercise will aid in understanding the 
public order policing of community-based events and it will highlight potential 
limitations / opportunities that are inherent within these existing analytic accounts. 
The section starts by considering the 'paramilitarism' and 'flashpoint' accounts 
presented by Jefferson (1987, 1990, 1993) and D Waddington et al (1987. 1989) 
respectively. This will be followed by exploring the influential work of P.A.J 
Waddington (1994a). Finally. there is reflection on more recent accounts, for 
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example, social movements (P .AJ Waddington, 2003), social psychological 
perspectives (e.g. Reicher et aI, 2004) and the work of Barton and James (2003). 
The first account to evaluate is Jefferson's (1987,1990,1993) work on the 'rise of 
paramilitarism'. Chapter two noted that this analytic account incorporated a four 
stage model (preparation, controlling space, controlling the crowd, and clearance) 
arguing that 'paramilitary' police strategy and tactics (e.g. the use of riot shields) 
leads to a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' and 'amplification' of disorder (Jefferson, 
1987, 1990). This perspective also argues that public order policing is conducted 
at the expense of those being 'policed'. The first important point to make is that 
this account focuses on public order policing and overt contention. Jefferson 
(1987, 1990) bases his model on disorder on three examples of political protest (a 
Manchester University Student Union protest, 1985); industrial dispute (Orgreave, 
1984) and community disorder (Broadwater Farm, 1985). This account was 
criticised by P.AJ Waddington (1987, 1993) for, amongst other things, not 
representing the wide and often orderly context in which public order policing is 
practiced. 
The findings from this thesis dispute the relevance of elements from this analytic 
account to the public order policing of events where contention is minimal. 
Further, it could be argued that the model presented in the previous section 
represents the 'amplification' of order rather than disorder: the closer police, 
organisers and community organisers worked together during the planning and 
staging of the events, the more likely potential threats to order / safety were 
minimised. However, one element of Jefferson's 'paramilitarism' argument is 
worth commenting upon. The threat to the observed Pride related to a perception 
of insensitive policing. Specifically, this involved 'intrusive' techniques such as 
the overt filming of the crowd by Evidence Gathering Teams (EGTs) which. as a 
relatively recent technique, could be construed as an example of 'paramilitarism·. 
This issue will be commented upon further when evaluating social psychological 
accounts (e.g. Reicher et aI, 2004) and as the chapter develops. 
Rather than focus on Jefferson's (1987, 1990. 1993) paramilitarism arguments. it 
is more illuminating to reflect on his recommendations concerning the 
"deamplifying' of this process in public order policing. These recommendations 
were noted briefly in chapter two but to re-iterate there were eight in total and 
many facets of the observed planning and staging process meet them. These are 
summarised below in light of the general findings from this thesis: 
Recommendation One: The police should analyse incidents with a view to a) 
being aware of their working practices and their potential in the "amplifying 
process' and b) monitoring the number of unnecessary arrests made. 
Findings: The employment of 'low key' policing styles at all the observed events 
demonstrates a level of self-awareness which appreciates that an inappropriate 
policing strategy could potentially increase the possibility of disorder / disruption. 
This is particularly relevant to the policing at Solstice. 
Recommendation Two: The police should monitor arrests and complaints, and 
identify any patterns of bias / discrimination if necessary. 
Findings: Although large numbers of arrests have not been associated with the 
observed events in recent years, the police at Pride did respond to complaints 
made during the previous year. This culminated in a new policing strategy for the 
observed Pride event. 
Recommendation Three: Developing a "success criteria' (i.e. "trouble free' public 
order policing with low arrests, complaints and injuries) and rewarding it. 
Findings: Each of the observed events consisted of 'trouble free' policing 
strategies that were appreciated by organisers and community organisers. In the 
case of Pride, the main police liaison involved in the planning and staging of this 
event received an award for his efforts from the local LGBT community. 
Recommendation Four / Five: Changing the recruitment policy for specialist 
public order units: "this means choosing women, rather than men, the "steady' 
rather than the "active', the older rather than the younger, and so on' (Jefferson. 
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1990, P 144). Officers should be encouraged to undertake foot patrol rather than be 
stationed in police' carriers'. 
Findings: Although specialist public order units were part of contingency plans 
for all the observed events, they were not actually deployed in this capacity. The 
majority of officers involved in policing the events were not specifically public 
order trained and their duties encompassed normal patrolling and minor traffic / 
crowd management. Interestingly, members of the local Gay Police Association 
had a proactive role during the policing of Pride (e.g. leading the parade). 
Recommendation Six: Officers should use 'standby time' to focus on achieving 
'trouble free' policing of public order. 
Findings: During the briefings conducted at the observed events, officers were 
encouraged to interact with crowd members to help ensure safe and orderly 
events (e.g. the analogy used at Solstice of 'policing a big village' using 
community policing techniques). 
Recommendation Seven: A genuine dialogue should be established with groups 
and communities being 'policed', with the police 'being prepared to listen and 
learn' (Jefferson, 1990, p 144) from these groups. 
Findings: Despite the varying levels of planning associated with each of the 
observed events, the police engaged with organisers and community organisers at 
all of them. With regards to Solstice and Pride, the police have been proactive in 
listening and learning from these other organisers and the community, 
culminating in 'successful' policing operations. Even though there was not the 
same level of contact between the police and organisers at the Afela, there was 
still communication between these agencies during the planning of the event. The 
subsequent Multicultural Festival demonstrated a greater police commitment to 
the planning process (i. e. through attending more meetings,' having a liaison 
officer who had experience of planning previous ~\fela en!nts) ·which suggests thaI 
they were learningfrom the experiences of the previolls year. 
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Recommendation Eight: The police should encourage 'an open, participatory. 
reflexive and above all experimental approach to all practices'. culminating in 
'non-discriminatory, trouble-free and acceptable (to the policed) policing of public 
order' (Jefferson, 1990, p 144). 
Findings: The aspirations that Jefferson holds reflect the aim of the police 
involvement to the observed events. There is consultation during the planning, and 
reflection occurs post-event on what could be improved (e.g. better 
communication strategies at Solstice,' the police focus at Pride post the problems 
associated with the previous year). The staging process is also 'open and 
participatory', albeit to different degrees, by the implementation of partial-joint 
and joint control strategies at Solstice and Pride that incorporate other agencies / 
community organisers into the policing process. 
An evaluation of Jefferson's account on public order policing would suggest that 
'paramilitarism' and the 'amplification of disorder' is not a dynamic in relation to 
the types of events that formed the fieldwork for this thesis. Instead, the empirical 
findings suggest that Jefferson's recommendations are a reality for this public 
order context. The key issue is whether these practices can be applied to other 
public order contexts (e.g. protest / industrial disputes, community disorder). This 
will be discussed in the next, and final, chapter. 
The next analytic account to be evaluated is the 'flashpoints' model (D. 
Waddington et a11987, 1989; D Waddington, 1992). As with Jefferson's account 
this model is most closely associated with accounting for different types of 
disorder. Chapter two outlined that the flashpoints model consisted of six stages: 
structural, political/ideological, cultural, contextual, situational, and interactional 
(D Waddington et aI, 1989; D Waddington, 1992). Through these different levels. 
the 'flashpoints' model acknowledges that public order policing occurs in a wide 
and often complex social/political context. The importance of taking into account 
such variables informed the analysis in this thesis where there has been a focus on 
understanding how the event history / context both informs and guides the 
planning and staging phases of the observed events. This is anal)1ically useful and 
demonstrates unequivocally that the observed events do not occur in a social / 
political vacuum. 
However, as there was no disorder / disruption at any of the observed eYents. the 
potential of this particular analytic account is reduced: it is simply redundant to 
attempt specifying a single incident that signifies that orderly events would occur. 
D Waddington et al (1989) does analyse events where disorder did not occur from 
the 'flashpoints' perspective but he is left to speculate on general processes, rather 
than specific incidents, that caused this to happen. For example, in relation to a 
'Thatcher Unwelcoming' rally in Sheffield that passed off peacefully. D 
Waddington et al (1989) are left to conclude that the organisers successfully 
conveyed a message to demonstrators that disorder was not in the wider interest of 
their cause whilst the crowd was managed through the adoption of a 'festive' 
atmosphere (e.g. provision of entertainments). In addition, the policing was low-
key and the political composition of the crowd meant that neither the organiser 
nor police decision-making was challenged (D Waddington et ai, 1989). At a 
more general and macro level, D Waddington (1992) argues that that the potential 
for 'flashpoints' can be reduced by implementing a host of changes to policy (i.e. 
improving the policing of public order along the lines suggested by Jefferson 
above, establishing a less inflammatory and reactionary press, government 
investment in areas of deprivation / social inequality). 
It is not the intention to rehearse the criticisms made of this analytic account by 
P.AJ Waddington (1991, 2000b). However, it is rather lacking in respect of the 
findings from this thesis: the model presented in the previous section would 
appear to represent a series of processes that undermined the potential for a 
"flashpoint' occurring from this perspective. Beyond this, it is difficult to gauge 
with precision which processes were more important and why. A combined 
evaluation of 'paramilitarism' and 'flashpoint' analytic accounts suggests that 
they are limited in accounting for public order policing where overt and clear 
'contention' is missing from the equation. This is not to make a value judgement 
on their collective worth to understanding other public order contexts. although 
the methodological and conceptual criticisms of P.AJ Waddington (1987, 1991. 
1993, 2000b) must be acknowledged. Rather. they are limited in offering 
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extensive insight into why the observed processes, as outlined in the previous 
section, contributed to the maintenance of order and safety at Pride. Solstice. Mela 
and the Multicultural Festival. 
Of all the analytic accounts presented in chapter two, the work of P .AJ 
Waddington (1994a) is acknowledged as being the most applicable to the general 
policing of public order (e.g. della Porta and Reiter 1998). Although the 
predominant focus of this account is on the policing of contention, P .AJ 
Waddington argues that the under-enforcement of the law and facilitation / 
negotiation are key factors in contributing to the maintenance of order during the 
majority of public order operations. The factors that P.AJ Waddington (1994a) 
outlines are relevant to the findings from this thesis. For example, the police 
engaged with the organisers / community organisers through negotiation during 
the planning stages of the observed events and compromise was present (e.g. 
negotiating conditions of entry to Solstice and stewarding / security numbers at 
Mela). In addition, the law was rarely, if ever, evoked to dictate decision-making 
in the police's favour. 
These factors would therefore suggest a consistency between P.AJ Waddington's 
(1994a) account and the findings of this thesis, despite a different focus (i.e. the 
policing of 'festival' community events as opposed to protest / industrial dispute). 
However, there are noteworthy limitations within P.AJ Waddington's (1994a) 
account that need to be addressed. D Waddington (1998) rightly notes that P.AJ 
Waddington's analytic account tends to relegate the perceptions of organisers in 
the context of public order policing. Chapter three argued that by taking into 
account the views of organisers, this thesis would negate similar charges. The 
inclusion of the organiser and community organiser perspectives could lead to a 
beneficial revision of P.AJ Waddington's (1994a) analytic account and will now 
be discussed. 
Firstly, the concept of avoiding 'trouble' from a police perspective is central to 
P.AJ Waddington's (1994a) argument. The empirical findings from this thesis 
would appear to support this assertion: a key motivation of the police involvement 
in the observed events could be construed as avoiding both 'on-the-job' (e.g. 
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having to make large numbers of arrests at the events) and "in-the-job' trouble 
(e.g. alienating local communities through inappropriate and misjudged policing 
operations). P .AJ Waddington's argument is that 'trouble' is minimised the more 
control police have over proceedings and that this is achieved by negotiation and 
compromise. What the findings of this thesis suggest is that similar processes 
might apply to the organisers and community organisers. For example, the main 
organiser at Solstice held legal responsibility for organising a safe event. This 
represented the ultimate goal and to achieve this required careful negotiation and 
compromise with the police and community organisers. Likewise, the community 
organisers at Solstice had to negotiate between the police, organisers and potential 
protestors during the planning phase. This exercise could potentially have led to 
consequences that are analogous to • on-the-job' (i.e. day to day engagement with 
individuals hostile to the intentions of the police and organisers) and 'in-the-job' 
trouble (i.e. dealing with the potential consequences of alienating these individuals 
in the long term). Rather than being an issue solely for the police, the avoidance of 
trouble in this context is a collective enterprise. The planning and staging 
processes at the observed events encapsulated negotiation and compromise from 
all the parties involved as they endeavoured to stage safe, orderly and successful 
events. 
The importance of this collective enterprise raises a second issue in relation to 
P.AJ Waddington's work. In response to Jefferson's (1987, 1990, 1993) 
'paramilitarism' account, P.A.J Waddington (1993) argues that a disciplined and 
coordinated police response to public order policing a) decreases the potential for 
disorder and b) minimises injuries etc should disorder occur. Part of this response 
involves a structured command process (i.e. the 'metallic hierarchy'). It has been 
noted that the partial-joint and joint command strategies at Solstice and Pride 
respectively involved the organisers / community organisers in addition to the 
police, albeit to varying degrees. In the context of these events it was not just the 
police who were involved in a coordinated approach to minimising disorder: 
again, it was a collective process. The model presented in the previous section and 
the findings reported in chapter six suggest that greater integration of the police, 
organisers and community organisers (i.e. a joint control strategy) during th~ 
staging process led to more efficient and effective event management. Further 
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consideration of both 'trouble' and methods associated with staging events would 
suggest that P.A.J Waddington's analytic account could be revised in respect of 
the organiser / community organiser perspective. These points are raised in the 
context of 'festival' events although it would no doubt be interesting to explore 
these perspectives in relation to other contexts (i.e. political protest / industrial 
protest). P.A.J Waddington's (l994a) analytic account is certainly relevant to the 
findings of this thesis but there is definitely the scope for additional development. 
An evaluation of more recent analytic accounts concerning public order policing 
is also worth consideration. For example, social movement theory has been 
applied to the policing of contention (P.A.J Waddington, 2003). As discussed in 
chapter two, this analytic account argues that a combination of political 
opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes represent a complex 
dynamic that can lead movements from protest, possibly incorporating violence, 
to wider public legitimacy (e.g. the American civil rights movement). This 
account can be applied to understanding the broader context of Solstice and Pride. 
Starting with Solstice, an important component of the event history / context has 
been a shift from disorder / disruption during the 1980s and 1990s to a process of 
'open managed access' in 2000. This particular Solstice, and all subsequent 
events, have been characterised by a lack of disorder / disruption. This shift can be 
understood from a social movement perspective. The prolonged lack of public 
access to Solstice gradually led members from the druid and pagan communities 
to work with the organisation that manages the location and the police in finding a 
workable solution to resolve this issue. This resulted in compromise between these 
communities and the authorities (i.e. druids and pagans forsaking the wish for a 
lengthy festival in return for shorter, but open, access to the Solstice location). 
These efforts resulted in 'open managed access' although the observed Solstice 
revealed that there were tensions amongst those who celebrate the event (i.e. the 
potential for protest). Although these tensions never materialised, they 
demonstrate the ever-evolving dynamic that is associated with this event. 
Social movement theory also provides appropriate context in relation to Pride. The 
observed Pride represented a large celebration and is one of many held across 
various towns and cities in the UK. Tatchell (2003) argues that there is greater 
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general acceptance of the LGBT community compared to as recently as the late 
1980s when this community was subject to overt discrimination. Tatchell (2003) 
also suggests that direct action through groups such as OutRage! have been 
influential in raising the profile and grievances of the LGBT community 
culminating in this more general acceptance. This shift is perhaps best exemplified 
by the decision to allow openly gay police officers the right to march at London 
Pride in 2003 (Tatchell, 2003). The observed Pride has grown as an event over 
this period of time, and this growth could be interpreted as social movement 
theory in action. To reflect the dynamism associated with this theory, Tatchell 
(2003) notes a number of contemporary issues (e.g. opposing a ban on same-sex 
marrage) where direct action could be employed. Although protest was not a 
central component of the observed Pride, these issues could create the potential 
for protest at future events. In respect of this, it is interesting to note that Peter 
Tatchell 1 believes that Pride as a general concept has become . conformist' to a 
new Labour agenda and has forsaken its radicalism so this potentially could lead 
to splinter organisations / events where the emphasis is on the political rather than 
the celebratory which would again be consistent with the tenets of evolving social 
movements. 
Applying social movement theory to the Mela / Multicultural Festival is more 
difficult. Mela events are celebratory and staged all over the country and the 
evolution to a Multicultural Festival is specific to one location. It is important that 
the event history / context of the observed Mela and Multicultural Festival is 
appreciated but the origins of these events are not as explicitly connected to 
contention relative to Solstice and Pride. Therefore, social movement theory is 
applicable to understanding some of the context to the observed events, albeit at a 
broad level. In particular, it demonstrates the evolutionary nature of the driving 
forces behind Solstice and Pride. In summary, this perspective might inform the 
history / context associated with the observed events but it is not conducive to 
analysing the micro elements (e.g. the event management strategies) highlighted 
through the model in the previous section. 
I The Independent, 6th July, 2002. 
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The social psychological perspective of Reicher et al (2004) also focuses 
predominantly on the policing of contention. Chapter two highlighted that this 
perspective centres on police strategy during public order operations and argues 
that interaction with the crowd coupled with the minimising of controlling and 
disciplinarian tactics will reduce the potential for disorder. This perspective is 
informed by the arguments of P.AJ Waddington (1994a) and Jefferson (1987, 
1990, 1993). The empirical findings from this thesis suggest that these processes 
are equally applicable to the planning stages. The model presented in the previous 
section argues that interaction during the planning stage allows trust to build, 
which is an important component of Reicher et aI's analytic account. The policing 
operations evident during the staging of the observed events encompassed the 
strategies that Reicher et al (2004) advocate: crowd interaction was encouraged 
and controlling / disciplinarian tactics were not employed. To emphasise the 
importance of this approach, it is worth reflecting on the police tactics at Pride one 
year prior to the observed event. The policing operation at this event encompassed 
the deployment of Evidence Gathering Teams (EGTs) which was construed as 
insensitive and inappropriate. Rather than 'enabling' order, this tactic created 
tensions that went beyond the policing of the event (i.e. the deterioration of wider 
police / LGBT community trust relations). The efforts of the police at the 
observed Pride event were channelled on resolving the difficulties that this 
operation had created with the aim of restoring lost trust. Although the social 
psychological perspective of Reicher et al (2004) relates to the policing of 
contention, it does present policy implications for 'good practice' which will be 
explored in the next chapter. 
The final analytic account to be evaluated concerns Barton and James' (2003) 
exploration of the policing at a 'Run to the Sun' event. Consideration of this 
account is important as this event represents a festival that is characterised as 
lacking in overt contention / disorder. The most interesting finding from Barton 
and James' account concerns the mechanisms for accountability: the police found 
themselves having to negotiate between the local resident and business 
communities in devising an appropriate policing strategy. From this case study, 
Barton and James (2003) argue that these two groups represented divergent 
interests (i.e. community vs. entrepreneurial) and that in tum this presents a 
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challenge to contemporary public order policing in the context of festival events 
where overt contention is minimised. The key questions posed concern what 
forms of interest will dominate in this context and why. 
This is a relevant contemporary perspective but it also requires some revision. The 
police at the observed events negotiated between different groups but the 
commercial interest was not a dictating factor. There was sponsorship at Pride and 
Mela / Multicultural Festival but this was supplemented by other forms of income 
(e.g. local government funding). The Solstice event was not subject to any form of 
commercial sponsorship. In contrast to Barton and James (2003), the major factor 
at the observed events was the community interest. To develop an analytic 
perspective for festival events requires recognition of the accountability issues that 
Barton and James (2003) note but it must also acknowledge a range of interests in 
addition to local resident and business communities. 
This section has provided an evaluation of existing analytic accounts that are 
pertinent to public order policing. All of these accounts provide some potential 
explanation to understanding the processes outlined in the previous section. 
However, the focus of these accounts is mainly concerned with understanding 
public order policing in the context of protest / industrial dispute or community 
disorder. It is therefore appropriate to suggest that a new approach is developed 
which can incorporate the analytic opportunities presented above but also address 
a number of limitations. This will be presented in the following section. 
4. Developing an Analytic Account for the Public Order Policing of 
Community-Based Events 
With reference to the empirically based model presented in section two. 
developing an analytic account for the public order policing of community-based 
events requires consideration of macro (e.g. event history / context) and micro 
(e.g. the role of individuals) factors. It also needs to consider how these processes 
interact with each other, culminating in the observed phenomenon of safe. orderly 
and successful events. An opportunity to achieve this arises from the work of the 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and more specifically his reflections on the 
concepts of the 'field' and 'habitus'. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) argue that 
the 'field' represents a social space which encompasses conflict and competition 
as participants compete over various forms of capital (e.g. cultural authority, 
scientific authority). In addition, the 'field' is never a static entity: the very act of 
conflict and competition leads to evolution and therefore a changing structure. To 
understand why this occurs, it is important to outline the concept of 'habitus'. This 
refers to individual processes which are internalised and informed by external 
structures (e.g. past experience, cultural knowledge, an appreciation of 'the rules 
of the game'). The key process concerns the interplay between these two concepts: 
'Both concepts of habitus and field are relational ... they function fully 
only in relation to one another. A field is not simply a dead 
structure ... but a space of play which exists as such only to the extent 
that players enter into it who believe in and actively pursue the prizes 
it offers. An adequate theory of field, therefore, requires a theory of 
social agents... Conversely, the theory of habitus is incomplete 
without a notion of structure that makes room for the organized 
improvisation of agents.' (Bourdieu and Wac quant, 1992, p 19) 
The implication is that both field and habitus impact, and hold consequences, for 
each other which in turn creates an evolving dynamic. This evolving dynamic 
represents a heuristic that can be applied to the four observed events. For example, 
the debate surrounding when to stage Solstice was informed by the individuals 
involved in the SPG and SCG, and culminated in a form of structure (i.e. the 
chosen date) which in turn dictated subsequent events beyond these meetings (e.g. 
planning preparations, the threat of protest). Likewise, the pledges of the main 
police representative at the first PPG meeting created a structure that dictated the 
planning and staging of the observed Pride (e.g. the utilisation of a sensitiye 
policing style). The dissolution of the Mela committee created the opportunity for 
the expansion of the planning group and marked the evolution towards a 
Multicultural event format. These examples reveal the minor histories associated 
with the events that emerged during the field research process. Hov.;ever. these in 
turn were influenced by prior factors (e.g. eyent history / context) and hold 
implications for the future. To understand in greater detail how these processes 
operate requires a greater exploration of Bourdieu' s concepts. 
The concepts of habitus and field have been applied to understanding various 
aspects of policing (Chan 1997; Bigo, 2000; Bowling, Phillips. Campbell and 
Docking, 2004). As an example of this approach in action, Chan (1997) argues 
that field and habitus can aid in understanding police culture and racism. With 
regards to the field, Chan (1997) suggests that the social and political status of 
minorities, discretionary police powers, and legal protection against police abuse 
represent significant components. When outlining the habitus, Chan (1997) makes 
reference to four different dimensions of • cultural knowledge': 
• Dictionary Knowledge - i.e. how the police categorise different groups; 
• Directory Knowledge - i.e. how police work is 'normally' done; 
• Recipe Knowledge - i.e. how things should, or should not be done, in 
certain situations; 
• Axiomatic Knowledge - i.e. relating the above to the general rationale of 
policing (e.g. the police mandate). 
Chan (1997) argues that understanding the field and habitus in this context can 
illuminate why racism occurs. It is also argued that successful reform can only 
occur if both the field and habitus change: this therefore requires addressing the 
macro (i.e. social, political, economic and legal) and the micro (e.g. internal 
reform) context in which policing is conducted. To apply this approach to the 
findings of this thesis requires developing a framework which outlines the 
composition of the relevant field and habitus. This procedure also provides greater 
explanation of the processes identified in the model in section two. 
4.1. The Field 
At the macro level of the field, it is important to identify common factors across 
all the events as these represent the social space under investigation. This reveals 
three broad factors that could be construed as representing the field in relation to 
the public order policing of community-based events. The first of these factors is 
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conceptualised by the event history / context. The observed events shared different 
event histories but the common theme, as related in section two, is that these 
informed the practices of participants involved in the planning and staging 
processes. In relation to Solstice and Pride, social movement theory offers a 
potential explanation as to the form and nature that contemporary events take (i.e. 
the process of political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing 
processes). However, what is of critical importance is an acknowledgement that, 
whatever the origins, it is inevitable that the event history / context will register 
some form of impact on contemporary processes. If this factor were to be 
extrapolated across other events / public order contexts, the key task facing the 
analyst would be a) identifying whether there is a specific history, b) locating its 
origins (e.g. past contention or simply following the zeitgeist) and c) evaluating 
the nature of its impact on the processes that they observe. This process would 
also reveal important contextual information relating to the nature of the 
relationships between the different parties involved and possible individual 
motivations. Further, it allows for the identification of previous working practices 
in relation to planning and staging events and it can also reveal insights into the 
wider police / community relationship (e.g. the police and local Asian community 
at Mela / Multicultural Festival). Finally, general event characteristics can be 
ascertained such as previous crowd numbers or the length and format of an event. 
The second factor relates to policy and legislative procedures that are openly 
available to the participants. For example, the policing at the observed events 
encompassed a form of command structure that followed the 'metallic hierarchy' 
which is based in national policy (e.g. ACPO, 2001). It is also recommended that 
public event safety is prioritised through Safety Advisory Groups (ACPO, 1999). 
Although this was only utilised at the observed Pride, this information existed in 
the public domain during the planning of the other events. Equally, the organisers 
could access relevant health and safety advice from the public domain (e.g. HSE. 
1999) prior to and during the planning process. These sources also contain 
legislative information. ranging from the acquisition of public entertainment 
licences (HSE. 1999) to the application of Human Rights legislation when 
developing a policing strategy (ACPO, 2001). 
The third factor relates to the 'changing architecture of policing' (D Waddington, 
1996). Occurring extraneously yet simultaneously with the planning and staging 
of the observed events are relevant processes which impact on all aspects of 
policing. For example, multi-agency partnership working is practised in respect of 
crime reduction and community safety through the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
(e.g. Phillips, 2002) which in tum represents increased pluralisation in policing 
(Loader, 2000). This process of pluralisation is also demonstrated through the 
increasing use of private security personnel in a public order context (e.g. Button 
and John, 2002). Once again, an analyst who wishes to extrapolate the second and 
third factors to other events / public order contexts would need to be attentive to 
the possibility that these will be modified or changed as time passes. To 
summarise, these three factors represent an external structure that is associated 
with the observed events. They inform what is possible but also impose a set of 
limitations in that they dictate what is lawful and realistic when planning and 
staging events. The next task is to understand the various forms of habitus within 
this macro context. 
-1.2. The Habitus 
Chan's (1997) exploration of four dimensions of 'cultural knowledge' is relevant 
to understanding the habitus associated with the observed events. The factors 
listed above that comprise the field will impact on dictionary, directory, recipe and 
axiomatic forms of knowledge. To fully appreciate these concepts it is important 
to examine them at two levels. The first level refers to the different roles of 
participants in the planning and staging of the events. Chan (1997) applies these 
forms of cultural knowledge to the police but in the context of this thesis it is 
equally valid to apply them to the organisers and community organisers. Given the 
diversity of participants involved in the planning and staging process, it would be 
impossible to list specific individual habitus but Figure 5 demonstrates some 
general properties. 
1~6 
--) 
Figure 5. Applying Different Forms of Cultural Knowledge to the Police, Organisers and 
Community Organisers in the Context of Community-based Events 
Knowledge Police 
Type 
Dictionary Based on knowledge / 
experience of group and / 
or policing the relevant 
community / working 
with organisers in 
another context. 
Directory Negotiation and recourse 
to law and police 
policies. 
Recipe Based on previous 
experience with group 
and / or general police 
experience. 
Axiomatic To maintain order and 
safety. 
Organiser 
Based on knowledge / 
experience of group and / 
or other policing / 
community contexts. 
Negotiation and recourse 
to law and organisational 
policies 
Based on previous 
experience with group 
and / or general working 
experience. 
To maintain safety. 
Community Organiser 
Based on knowledge / 
experience of group and / 
or other contexts in 
which exposed to police / 
organisers. 
Negotiation and recourse 
to wider community 
resources. 
Based on previous 
experience with group 
and / or general 
community experience. 
To stage a successful 
event for their 
community. 
Figure 5 represents a general overview of habitus and the categories should not be 
viewed as concrete. For example, the community organisers at all the events were 
interested in issues of safety and order even though the rationale for their 
involvement centred on staging a successful event. However. in addition to 
demonstrating the general range of possibilities that represent the habitus. figure 5 
reveals a second level from which to appreciate this concept. The coming together 
of the police, organisers and community organisers creates a collecth'e habitus. In 
this context, the dictionary, directory, recipe and axiomatic forms of cultural 
knowledge are predominantly informed by past experience of the collectin~ and 
the process of negotiation. This collective habitus is analogous to a meso stage 
and as such represents a conduit for the interplay between the micro habitus and 
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macro field. It is at this level where both habitus and field are informed and 
shaped by each other. 
The phrase collective habitus is deliberate as it presents an opportunity to move 
beyond the "everything is relevant' phase that potentially hinders theory 
development (Fielding, 2002). The planning and staging processes at the observed 
events mirrored each other. For example, the PPG was characterised by regular 
meetings and close cooperation between the police, organisers and community 
organisers. This process culminated in a joint control strategy where there were 
similar levels of cooperation. In contrast, the MPG was characterised by few 
meetings and tensions between the organisers and the police. There was little 
collaboration between the parties during the staging phase leading to fragmented 
event management. This allows the possibility to distinguish between different 
levels of collective habitus. At one extreme the police, organisers and community 
organisers are working closely together or, as one participant from Pride (Chief 
Inspector AC) succinctly stated, "everybody was singing from the same hymn 
sheet'. It has been systematically documented that the level of collaboration and 
cooperation achieved at Pride were not established to the same extent at Solstice 
or the Mela / Multicultural Festival. It has also been documented that greater 
collaboration and cooperation leads to the development of consistency, trust, 
cohesion and flexibility. Within this context, the personalities of key individuals 
are allowed to flourish. The boundaries between the police, organisers and 
community organisers become less discrete: the planning group and joint 
command symbolise the sharing of collective aims and objectives. This 
collaboration and cooperation also leads to an extensive pool of cultural 
knowledge, in all its forms, that can be accessed and acted upon. 
As the cooperation and collaboration increase, the dynamic of the social space 
(i.e. the events) evolves. There is also greater awareness of the opportunities and 
limitations presented by the field. The event history / context is enhanced, alerting 
all participants to its content and meaning, whilst policies and regulations that are 
potentially unique to one group are shared and understood. In the absence of a 
"flashpoinf for order, it is reasonable to suggest that the greater the collective 
habitus, the more likely potential threats to order, safety or the event future can be 
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averted. In terms of changing the field, these collective processes form an updated 
event history / context to be drawn upon in the future. This process is facilitated 
through procedures such as handovers, debriefings and feedback from the 
community. There is also the possibility that good practice can be extrapolated 
and used to inform new policy and / or regulation.2 At this most developed level, 
the collective habitus therefore represents the widest culmination of cultural 
knowledge and awareness of the field which in turn increases the possibility of 
safe, orderly and successful events. The least developed collective habitus was 
evident at the Mela. Despite this, the event still passed off without incident. This 
indicates that some form of collaboration and cooperation during planning / 
staging is better than none and this is best demonstrated with reference to the 
Pride that occurred previous to the observed event. 
The current and previous chapters have outlined that this particular event was 
problematic in relation to the policing strategy and tactics that were utilised. The 
police representative during the planning was due to take an active role in the 
staging of this event but was removed due to extraneous factors. New personnel 
who were not involved in the planning process took charge of policing the event 
and failed to consult or inform the organisers or community organisers of their 
plans. They then implemented a policing operation based along 'traditional' 
public order lines with officers proactively and overtly filming the crowd. This 
resulted in complaints from event attendees and the wider LGBT community. The 
reason for this can be tracked to a considerable fissure in the collective habitus -
essentially a key element (i.e. the police involvement in planning) was removed 
which resulted in a break in consistency. The operation could therefore not 
ascertain important nuances in policing Pride that would have been accessible 
through the collective habitus. The consequences of these actions ingrained 
themselves in the event history / context to the extent that they threatened police / 
LGBT relations at future Pride events and amongst the resident community. This 
episode acts as a warning to the potential consequences of not opting for 
collaboration and cooperation. It is only possible to speculate as to how the 
various forms of planning and staging strategies would have responded to more 
2 This is stressed as a possibility as none of the planning / staging practices from the observed 
events was submitted as good practice to agencies such as Aepo or the Health and Safety 
Executive. 
substantial threats than were present. However, this analytic framework would 
hypothesise that the greater the collaboration and cooperation (and by implication, 
the breadth of the collective habitus and what this represents), the more minimal 
any potential threat would be to safety, order or the event future. Therefore, the 
strategies utilised at the observed Pride not only present the best methods for 
maintaining safety, order and the event future but they also represent a position 
from which the police, organisers and community organisers can respond most 
effectively to any potential threats. 
This analytic account offers an appreciation of macro, meso and micro factors in 
relation to the public order policing of community-based events. It remains at a 
framework stage as more fieldwork would have to be conducted to test the central 
hypothesis that greater collaboration and cooperation - as identified at the 
observed Pride - present the best opportunity for safe, orderly and successful 
events. In its favour, this analytic account has developed Bourdieu' s concepts of 
the field and habitus to supplement the empirical and grounded research findings. 
It also recognises that all agencies involved in the planning and staging process 
have an important role to play. Figure 6 outlines how these processes manifest 
themselves and lead to the observed phenomenon. 
However, care would be required in extrapolating these ideas to another context 
and this would almost certainly result in revision. For example, the policing of 
political protest would need to factor in the level of overt contention as a feature 
of the field. This in turn would alter the dynamic of the dimensions of 'cultural 
knowledge' if organisers / community organisers were to be replaced by 
'protestors'. Equally, the policing opportunities and limitations would change (e.g. 
the potential requirement for a 'high profile' policing strategy). However, the 
processes might remain consistent: greater collaboration and cooperation during 
the planning and staging between the police and other groups would result in a 
larger pool of collective habitus and therefore enhance the potential for order. To 
conclude, further development and testing across other community events / 
contexts would inevitably lead to developments / revision but this analytic account 
presents the potential for greater understanding of contemporary public order 
policing. 
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Figure 6. Applying Bourdieu's Concepts to the Public Order Policing of 
Community-Based Events 
MACRO 
MESO 
MICRO 
5. Conclusion 
THE FIELD 
Event History / Context 
Law, Policy and Regulation 
The Changing Architecture of Policing 
COLLECTIVE HABITUS 
Levels of Collaboration and Cooperation 
Achieved by Police, Organisers and 
Community Organisers 
1. Informed by collective dictionary, 
directory, recipe and axiomatic 
knowledge. 
2. Associated with trust, cohesion, 
flexibility, individual personality and 
consistency. These are exhibited in 
line with the level of collaboration 
and cooperation achieved. 
HABITUS 
Police, Organisers and Community 
Organisers 
1. Informed by group specific dictionary, 
directory, recipe and axiomatic 
knowledge. 
This chapter concludes the analytic process associated with this thesis. Together 
with the preceding four chapters, this chapter has presented empirical research 
findings in relation to understanding the form and nature of the public order 
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policing of community-based events. There has also been the opportunity to 
evaluate these findings in light of existing public order related analytic accounts. 
This exercise demonstrated the need for a new analytic approach that offers 
explanatory potential in relation to the empirical findings. To achieve this, the 
work of Pierre Bourdieu was drawn upon to account for a host of micro, meso and 
macro processes occurring in an evolving dynamic that encapsulates the four 
observed events. It was also suggested that the processes associated with this 
account could potentially be applied to other contexts although some revision 
would be required. 
Indeed, the central hypothesis that increased collaboration and cooperation will 
lead to a reduction of the impact of threats to safety, order and event futures 
requires more development and testing through additional research. In addition, it 
must be noted that what has been presented over the last five chapters represents a 
perspective. As P .A.J Waddington (2000b) correctly argues, this is all that is 
logistically and realistically possible given the complexities associated with 
planning and staging any form of public event. Despite this, the empirical findings 
and subsequent analytic account do offer prospects for a greater understanding of 
contemporary public order policing. They also present the opportunity to identify 
relevant policy implications and this will be the focus of the final chapter. 
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Chapter Nine: Policy Implications and Thesis Conclusions 
1. Introduction 
The previous five chapters have addressed the majority of research aims as stated 
at the end of chapter two. This has culminated in exploring and understanding the 
public order policing of community-based events. The final research aim, to be 
addressed in this chapter, concerns the identification of good practice for both the 
police and organisers in respect of the type of events that formed the basis of the 
fieldwork. It also states that, where applicable, good practice should be identified 
for other public order contexts. As was highlighted in chapter three, an important 
component of the CASE PhD structure relates to generating relevant policy 
findings. The first part of the chapter will therefore focus on achieving this aim. 
To accomplish this, consideration is given specifically to the observed events. 
This is followed by the identification of 'post-event' policy that holds potential 
ramifications which originate from, but impact beyond, the observed events. 
Finally, consideration is given to how these policy implications might be relevant 
for other public order contexts. Interwoven with these policy implications are 
reflections on how and where future research might be conducted to develop the 
ideas presented throughout the thesis. The second part of the chapter represents 
the conclusion of the thesis. It will draw on the research aims and consider the 
subsequent findings and theorising from empirical analysis and policy 
implications. From this position it is possible to speculate on the prospects for 
contemporary and future public order policing. 
2. Policy Implications: Planning and Staging Community-Based Events 
The most important policy implication to emerge from the findings of this thesis 
relates to the planning and staging phases associated with community-based 
events. One would echo Sexton (2003) in recommending that some form of 
legislation, possibly entitled 'Public Event Management and Safety Act 2007', is 
implemented that makes it a statutory requirement for event organisers to work 
with the police / council in addressing health and safety issues. The working 
format for conducting this important exercise already exists through the Safety 
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Advisory Group (SAG) (ACPO, 1999). Therefore, the format and principles 
associated with the SAG format should be a cornerstone of any such legislation. 
Before outlining the benefits of such legislation, it is relevant to draw on Walker 
(2000) in relation to police governance. As highlighted in chapter two, Walker 
(2000 argues that good governance should be both constraining and enabling. This 
principle should apply to any future event safety legislation. The ethos of 
partnership working and the aim of staging a safe and successful event are the key 
components that need distilling into potential legislation. Care would then need to 
be taken to ensure that this approach could be applied to a diversity of event 
contexts. For example, such legislation could impact on the small village fete 
which might possibly attract 500 people through to a pop concert / festival 
attracting over 100,000 people. Within this range there would also be different 
forms of religious / cultural festivals or events that bring their own dynamics and 
requirements. The balancing act lies in making sure that police, organisers and 
community organisers are aware of their responsibilities and the importance of 
health and safety whilst being encouraged to pursue creative approaches to 
tackling a multitude of potential circumstances (e.g. the role of the SCG III 
conjunction with the SPG at the observed Solstice). 
The SAG format was utilised to good effect during the planning of the observed 
Pride. Taking this as a template, the local council should take the lead through a 
department which holds the remit for event planning. This is entirely logical as 
these personnel will have access to, and knowledge of, relevant policy and 
legislation that are requirements for staging a safe event. The nature of the event 
will dictate the police involvement. As a baseline, there must be police 
representation if they are to be involved in any aspect of staging the event. 
Beyond this, the police should respond creatively to the dynamics of the event. 
For example, it would be logical to include public order specialists if it is 
anticipated that there will be a large crowd and / or requirement for a considerable 
police presence as these personnel will again bring knowledge of relevant policy 
and legislation. In contrast, it might be more appropriate to involve a local 
community officer in the planning process for a relatively small event such as a 
village fete. Finally, if it is an event that is aimed at minority communities, it 
might be applicable for officers who are members of that community to become 
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involved at some juncture of the planning or staging (e.g. as the local Gay Police 
Association did at the observed Pride). With regards to the last option. it should be 
clearly ascertained that such officers would a) want to be involved and b) have a 
useful contribution to make (e.g. tactical advice on the policing). This should be 
stressed to discourage tokenism. 
The emphasis is currently on the event organisers to be proactive in alerting the 
council to their planned event. This would remain the case in light of any future 
legislation. What is important from this perspective is that the right organisers are 
involved in the planning (and subsequent staging) process. The number and roles 
of organisers will be determined by the nature of the event but it is important that 
representatives who attend SAGs hold the capacity to make logistical and 
financial decisions that are relevant to event safety. The nature of the event will 
also reveal other organisers who should become involved in the process. For 
example, at a community event representatives from that community should be 
encouraged to participate. If it is a large event, representation from the other 'blue 
light' services (i.e. fire and ambulance) and private security should be involved. 
The list of possibilities is potentially endless: what is critical is that the right 
people are involved and that the SAG is event specific. 
This collective and collaborative approach offers a number of potential benefits. 
Within the context of planning events, regular meetings can potentially increase 
cohesive decision-making: discrete occupational barriers will be broken down 
between the police and organisers if the shared aim is to stage a safe and orderly 
event. Each party is exposed to the 'cultural knowledge~ of the other organisers 
and this can be pooled to create a 'collective habitus~ of dictionary. directory~ 
recipe and axiomatic knowledge. This facet of the planning process could be 
subject to future 'teacher-learner' oriented research (Pawson and Tilley. 1997). 
This approach would allow participants involved in the planning of e\'ents to 
reflect and expand on the meaning and nature of how the 'collective habitus' 
impacts on the effectiveness of their work. The empirical findings suggest that the 
'collective habitus' is in turn related to the development of trust and consistency 
as personnel start to know each other's roles, expertise and rationale for being 
present during the planning stages. The culmination of these factors is tlexibility: 
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the greater the • collective habitus', the more enhanced the number of potential 
options to respond to any significant issue that threatens safety. order and / or the 
event future. 
The observed Pride and Solstice highlighted that the processes present during the 
planning stage were incorporated into staging the event. The observed Pride offers 
additional good practice in relation to this. The collaborative and cooperative 
ethos of the SAG format transferred to a "joint control strategy' that was utilised 
to stage the event. This strategy involved the same personnel who had participated 
in the planning. In the staging context, the group were again acting as a collective 
by holding regular meetings, and sharing a command location and 
communication. Although no threat emerged to safety or order at the observed 
Pride, this working arrangement promoted further trust, cohesion, and flexibility. 
By default, this also encouraged consistency because the same personnel were 
involved. Rather than being enshrined in legislation, the 'joint control strategy' 
should be recommended as relevant to the staging of large or complex events. It 
should be characterised as encompassing the same personnel that are involved in 
the planning, and event specific protocols should be developed (i.e. a shared 
communication strategy / a joint command post). The mechanisms for achieving 
this are available through the "metallic hierarchy' (ACPO, 2001) and this might be 
employed by the organisers in addition to the police. The police and organisers of 
smaller / less complex events should be aware of this joint control strategy but 
circumstances might deem it unnecessary (e.g. if the event requires minimal 
police / organiser input). 
The key to achieving this level of good practice lies in effective dissemination. 
Jefferson (1990, p 144) argues that " trouble-free' public order policing requires" an 
open, participatory, reflexive and above all experimental approach to all 
practices'. This advice can be applied to organising and staging safe and orderly 
public events. Whilst relevant advice is available in the public domain (e.g. HSE, 
1999; ACPO, 2001), it would be of benefit to all police and organisers to establish 
a centralised and easily accessible resource which can guide the planning and 
staging of safe events. Individual councils offer varying levels of advice but it 
would make more sense to adopt a centralised approach through the de,"dopment 
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of an internet site. Such a site could list the contents of the 'purple guide' (HSE, 
1999) and the rationale behind the SAG process. A message board could also be 
created which would allow event organisers to share and consult with reaards to 
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advice and experience from around the country. Another possibility concerns 
rewarding good practice. This could be achieved by following the template 
associated with the 'Tilley Award,l with SAG / planning groups submitting how 
they overcame problems and successfully managed an event. These submissions 
could then be evaluated by the Health and Safety Executive and / or ACPO and 
the winning entry would be rewarded: a suitable prize might be a small funding 
contribution towards the planning and staging of any future event. This process 
would also allow for the development and further dissemination of good practice. 
In retrospect, the formalisation of the SAG process and wider access to event 
planning guidance could have minimised some of the difficulties associated with 
the Mela and Solstice. For example, an accessible resource such as that mentioned 
above would have avoided the problems concerning steward numbers at the Mela. 
At the observed Solstice, closer collaboration and cooperation between the police 
and organisers - which is advocated through a joint control strategy - would have 
facilitated better communication between the police and organisers (i.e. through a 
shared communication strategy). Outlining these benefits demonstrates that the 
SAG / Joint Control Strategy should be encouraged for large events and 
considered by smaller events. The next task is to focus specifically on how the 
empirical findings might enhance the policing at these types of events. 
A common theme across all the observed events was the utilisation of 'low-key' 
policing styles that operated under the 'metallic hierarchy' principle. A consistent 
finding was that the chosen policing styles, which incorporate strategy and tactics. 
were appreciated by the organisers and community organisers. In this respect. 
each policing operation matched the nature and requirements of the four observed 
events. The function of the police at the observed events included a mixture of 
patrolling and minor traffic / crowd management duties. At the larger events (i.e. 
Solstice and Pride), these roles were supplemented by specialist officers (e.g. 
1 This was established to reward good practice in relation to problem oriented policing. See 
http://www.crimereduction.gov.uklawards.htm#tilley for further details. 
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traffic) but the consistent trend was one of low, if any at all, arrest rates. There 
were opportunities for the police to make arrests (e.g. drug taking at Solstice and 
Pride) but this was avoided. This echoes P.AJ Waddington's (1996) observation 
that, in a public order context, the police will be inclined against making arrests to 
avoid the possibility of antagonising the crowd. This is relevant to Pride and 
Solstice where the event history embodies previous tensions between the police 
and the event attendees. The findings would support the principles advocated by 
Reicher et al (2004) that the right policing style (i.e. incorporating negotiation / 
interaction) will develop trust between the police and a crowd and effectively 
enable it to police itself. 
The policing style will be dictated by the nature and scale of an event but it must 
be developed prior to the staging of an event and involve consultation with the 
organisers and community organisers. By accessing the collective habitus, there is 
a greater chance that the police will be aware of particular nuances and 
sensitivities which can be incorporated into the policing style. Had this been 
achieved at the Pride prior to the observed event, it is likely that community 
organisers could have warned of the tensions that overt filming of the crowd 
would create. To echo Jefferson (1990) again, there is no barrier to experimenting 
with elements of the policing strategy / tactics provided there is consultation 
during the planning stages. For example, the main police liaison at the observed 
Pride could not identify a reason for taking the "traditional' approach of having 
the parade led by a police van. Instead, the decision was taken to lead with a 
police car driven by officers from the local Gay Police Association who openly 
displayed a Pride flag. Demonstrating that the policing was going to be different 
compared to the previous year represented the logic behind this decision. As with 
compiling good practice in relation to SAG / Joint Control Strategies, any 
evidence of effective experimentation should be widely available and accessible 
for consultation. This could be achieved through liaison between the Public Order 
Unit within the NCOF and forces across the country. 
The empirical findings also present an opportunity to comment on the nature of 
the police command structures at the observed events. There was adherence to th~ 
"metallic hierarchy' at Solstice and Pride with designated and operational Gold, 
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Silver and Bronze commanders. This is not surprising given that this is an 
established method for policing across a number of different contexts in addition 
to large public order operations (e.g. major incidents) (AepO, 2001). This 
structure existed at Mela but only a bronze commander was operational: there 
were 'silver' and 'gold' commanders but they were 'on-call' and not consulted or 
needed during the staging of the event. There was no metallic command structure 
at the Multicultural Festival. 
The first point to make is that this command structure is not needed for every 
public event that involves the police. If an event is small in nature and police 
involvement is minimal, patrolling officers can be briefed accordingly to their 
roles and responsibilities. However, it is important that officers are aware of 
contingency plans and procedures should a major incident occur if there is no 
explicit metallic command structure at an event. The events which did operate the 
metallic hierarchy did not exhibit problems associated with 'arcing' such as, for 
example, the gold commander making tactical decisions after consultation with 
bronze and effectively leaving silver out of "the loop' (P.A.J Waddington, 1991). 
The system worked most effectively at Pride where the gold devised the 'policing 
plan' for the event and silver implemented it off-site. Supplementing this were 
two bronze commanders: one held responsibility for policing the parade whilst the 
other directed the operation at the park. The only problem to arise from this 
arrangement concerned the role of the bronze commander at the parade. It was 
decided that this bronze commander would work closely with the parade director 
(one of the community organisers) as part of the joint control strategy. At the last 
PPG meeting, a 'table-top' exercise was conducted to run through hypothetical 
situations that could arise and all the commanders bar this bronze attended. 
Therefore, on the day of the parade, the director and corresponding bronze did not 
know each other and this exacerbated a problem with regards to managing the 
parade effectively (see chapter seven for more details). 
The key issue here relates to communication. Within a joint control strategy. it 
would be beneficial to all parties if the police commanders meet the organisers / 
community organisers prior to the staging of the event. The table-top exercise 
offers an ideal opportunity to achieve this and it can potentially increase cohesive 
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decision-making if the organisers / police commanders are due to work closely 
with each other. Even when a joint control strategy is not utilised, it would again 
be beneficial if the police commanders meet the organisers prior to the event as it 
at least increases familiarity in relation to roles and responsibilities. 
Communication also represented an important factor in the policing operation at 
the observed Solstice. The command strategy employed a gold and silver who 
were based off-site (silver command) but an additional silver was present on-site 
(silver control). As chapter seven documented, this created problems for the 
bronze commanders as they did not know which silver they should be 
communicating with as the operation unfolded. Therefore, if two silvers are to be 
used at an event the distinction between the two should be explicit and 
communicated through the briefing process. This also relates to any modification 
away from the tradition of one gold and one silver commander for the policing of 
public order. In contrast, the officers at the observed Mela were clear about the 
command arrangements as this was clearly communicated to them via the briefing 
process. 
The problems of communication at the observed Solstice were also compounded 
as a) radios did not work on the site and b) there was no joint communication 
strategy. Although silver control was aware of the actions of security / organisers, 
bronze commanders were at times left unsure as to what was happening. For 
example, if an ambulance came onto the site there was no immediate method to 
establish if it was attending an incident which required police assistance. The 
bronze commanders had to decide which silver they needed to contact and then try 
and ascertain communication through mobile phones. The same problem was also 
evident for private security personnel and other organisers (hence the partial joint 
control distinction in comparison to Pride). Regardless of the size or nature of the 
event, it is recommended that the police / organisers develop a shared system of 
communication. This could take the form of a joint control strategy at a large 
event or simply be the sharing of communication devices (e.g. radios) at smaller 
events. This would increase the ability to share and act on information as the event 
progresses and minimise confusion and the potential impact of any incidents. 
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The main priority for organisers and community organisers is to stage a successful 
event. Within this remit there will be discussion of health and safety issues and the 
planning process should act as an interface to relate these to the police. 
Translating these efforts into the staging phase of an event again relies on 
effective communication. The most obvious conduit for this is the briefing 
process. This presents an opportunity for all personnel involved in the staging of 
an event to be made aware of the relevant processes (e.g. the aim of an event, the 
roles of the police and organisers, the communication strategy). The key 
organisers / community organisers involved in the planning stages must contribute 
to this process. This will ensure that the work conducted during the planning 
stages is communicated to personnel who have not been privy to this process. The 
aim of such an exercise is to minimise ambiguity and promote cohesion (i.e. 
everybody knows their own role and responsibility and those of others). 
Of relevance to policing the event is the function of private security / stewards. 
These were a component at all the observed events and had an important role in 
order maintenance and elements of crime prevention (see chapter six). The 
briefing should emphasise how these personnel will work with any police 
involvement at an event. It has been noted that these personnel represent evidence 
of the contemporary pluralisation of policing (Loader, 2000) and their presence 
during the staging of an event will impact on the policing operation. The decision 
to be made during the planning process relates to the extent that private security / 
stewards should be used at an event. This issue may be forced by logistical 
considerations. For example, it could be cheaper to employ private security / 
stewards compared to police officers (the next section will cover the issue of cost 
in more detail). This could be an attractive option in light of recent legislation that 
requires private security personnel to be licensed which ensures a baseline and 
standardised level of competence in relation to criminal and civil law, 
communication skills and conflict management.2 However, it is important to note 
that this legislation does not apply to unpaid (i.e. volunteer) stewards. 
2 See SIA (2005) for further information. 
The task facing organisers concerns clarifying the number and roles of private 
security / stewards for an event. In relation to numbers, guidance exists through 
the 'purple guide' (HSE, 1999) although role definition will rely on the discretion 
of the organisers and the capabilities of any private security firm that they employ. 
A benefit of these personnel is that they are potentially more approachable for 
event attendees compared to the police. This was highlighted in chapter seven in 
relation to the observed Pride and this is not surprising given the problems 
associated with the policing during the previous year. Private security / stewards 
could therefore represent an important interface in interacting with a crowd which, 
as Reicher et al (2004) argue, could enable the crowd to police itself. In terms of 
role definition, stewards could be employed to provide information whilst private 
security might have a more proactive order maintenance / crime prevention role 
(e.g. managing crowd flow, confiscating drugs). Whatever form this component of 
an event takes, it is important these personnel are aware of their roles and where 
they fit within an overall staging strategy. This in turn can be transmitted through 
the briefing process and a joint control strategy would enhance communication 
between these personnel and the police / other organisers. As with approaches to 
planning and the police input into staging events, experimentation (e.g. such as the 
use of 'peace' stewards at the observed Solstice) and good practice must be both 
encouraged and disseminated. 
There is also a proactive role for community organisers in contributing to the 
policing of an event. At the observed Pride, a member of the local LGBT 
community attended the table-top exercise and then acted as an advisor to the 
silver commander during the staging of the parade and celebration on the park. 
This situation occurred in response to the policing problems experienced during 
the previous event. The rationale behind this position was simple: this individual 
could advise and inform the silver commander on aspects of the policing operation 
as it progressed and relate any concerns over sensitivity. The police would at least 
have been aware of the potential consequences of overt filming had such a 
position been adopted at the previous Pride. 
The position of a community advisor in this capacity would be analogous to that 
of a public order trained tactical advisor who accompanies commanders during the 
policing of event (ACPO, 2001; NCOF, 2002). Each commander at Solstice and 
Pride had access to a public order trained tactical (or "tac ') advisor although their 
advice was not required due to the ultimately safe and orderly nature of the 
observed events. A community advisor could therefore usefully supplement the 
policing operation at the silver level, especially if there is a history of tension 
between the police and the wider community. If an event is focussed on a minority 
community, this role could be filled by an officer who is knowledgeable about that 
community (e.g. from the Gay Police Association, the Black Police Association 
etc) or a relevant community organiser. It is important that such an individual has 
some involvement in the planning process so that they are familiar with the aim 
and logistics associated with the event. Although acting in an advisory capacity, it 
would also be desirable that the inputs of a community advisor are noted in the 
command log for the purposes of auditing (ACPO, 2001). 
The final aspect of good practice that arises in the planning and staging processes 
concerns the debriefing process. This exercise was conducted at all the observed 
events and presents an opportunity for the participants to reflect on what had gone 
well and identify areas for improvement. For example, it was acknowledged at 
Pride that there would have to be contact between the parade director and his 
bronze counterpart at any future event. At Solstice, it was acknowledged that the 
communication strategy would require revising in light of the problems that were 
experienced. The observed Mela presented the opportunity to consider the 
consequences of this process: it was identified that the focus of the event had to 
change and that a wider number of organisers from the community and other 
agencies were required to a) plan for a bigger event and b) take the emphasis away 
from certain community organisers with party political agendas. This culminated 
in a re-drafted constitution and the emergence of the concept of the Multicultural 
Festival. 
The nature of the feedback from the debriefing process will take many forms 
depending on what has occurred. If an event is successfuL the feedback might 
focus on relatively minor logistical concerns (e.g. car park opening times). If there 
are problems, the debriefing offers the most effective method of noting them and 
marks the start of attempts to resolve them. In terms of good practice, this process 
should involve all the key personnel who are involved in the planning and staging 
phases of an event. It should also ideally be conducted as soon as possible after 
the staging of the event. Related to this process are 'handover' procedures: if a 
key member is not to be involved in the planning or staging of future events, it is 
important that their replacement is briefed prior to them engaging with future 
planning and / or staging. This applies to the police, organisers and community 
organisers. The processes of debriefing and 'handover' should form an important 
component of the planning and staging of any event, especially if it is to be 
repeated in the future. 
This section has identified potential avenues of good practice that are associated 
with the planning and staging of community-based events. The key 
recommendation from this exercise relates to the instigation of the Safety 
Advisory Group at a statutory level. It is crucial that the police, organisers and 
community organisers meet to identify and plan for any health and safety 
concerns. The continuation of close working through a joint control strategy at the 
staging of an event also offers potential benefits to ensuring order and safety. This 
could be effectively instigated at large and / or complex events that require a large 
number of personnel to stage them. Experimentation should be encouraged in 
relation to these approaches to successfully cater for the diverse forms that events 
can take. Effective communication is also an important factor in minimising the 
impact of any issues that arise during the planning and staging process. Finally, 
debriefing and, where relevant, 'handover' processes are important to allow for 
the identification of issues that require addressing before the planning and staging 
of any future event. The outcomes associated with the above should also be 
disseminated to a wider audience so that other event planners can learn from good 
practice / problem resolution. If these policy recommendations are implemented in 
respect of community-based events then the prospects for safety and order can 
only be enhanced. 
Before exploring 'post-event' policy implications, it is pertinent to address the 
opportunities for further research. A flaw in this research concerns a lack of 
consideration in relation to canvassing the opinions of the actual communities that 
the four observed events were aimed at. This is an important area which requires 
further investigation, especially in relation to representation.3 The community 
organisers involved in the planning and staging of Pride were also members of an 
elected LGBT committee so were in a position to take onboard the views of the 
local LGBT community. At Solstice, the community members were not elected on 
behalf of any specific community although they represented the perspective of 
pagans and druids. Importantly, any member from these communities could 
partake in the SCG if they wished. The community organisers were a problematic 
aspect of the observed Mela as it was perceived they were using the event for their 
own party political purposes. This was remedied to an extent by the election of 
new community organisers to the MFPG who were active amongst the local Asian 
community. However, it was acknowledged after the staging of the Multicultural 
Festival that greater effort would be required in recruiting more community 
organisers to ensure greater representation of the local community. 
Future research could assess the extent to which the VIews and actions of 
community organisers actually reflect the community that the events are aimed at. 
Jones and Newburn (2001) argue that "community leaders" who are often 
consulted by the police, do not necessarily reflect the views of their community. 
Future research could therefore ascertain whether this is a valid concern in relation 
to community organisers. The perspective of the wider (e.g. resident and business) 
community should also be addressed as they may hold no interest in an event but 
they could be affected by it (e.g. parking regulations). These perspectives could 
illuminate accountability issues such as those noted by Barton and James (2003). 
Such future research could also lead to the generation of further good practice 
guidelines that enhance the prospect of order and safety at community-based 
events. 
3. 'Beyond the Event' Policy Implications 
The planning and staging of community-based events also present policy 
implications that go "beyond the evenf. The best example of this concerns the 
observed Pride where the policing strategy was aimed at both ensuring safety and 
~ This could be achieved be canvassing the views of event attendees through qualitative and / or 
quantitative techniques. 
order and rebuilding damaged trust and links with the resident LGBT community. 
This occurred out of necessity due to the consequences of the policing strategy 
from the previous year. This example raises two important issues that will be 
explored in this section. Firstly, it must be acknowledged that the policing at these 
types of events can have wide-ranging consequences beyond the event. This 
marks a subtle but important difference between the policing of community-based 
events and the policing of protest. A protest event could focus on a location (e.g. 
central London) with protestors attending from all over the country. The eyent 
would be policed and the crowd will disperse thus effectively marking the end of 
police / crowd contact. Whilst this dynamic occurs to an extent during a 
community-based event (i.e. event attendees come from around the country / 
world), the police could come into future contact with locally based attendees in 
different policing contexts. From the empirical research findings, this was 
particularly the case for Pride, Mela and the Multicultural Festival. This then 
raises the second issue of how the police can use the event as an opportunity to 
connect more widely with the community and improve the delivery of their 
service. In addition, the procedures and practices associated with the observed 
events also hold policy implications for different policing contexts. 
An important factor that organisers need to consider in relation to staging an event 
is the potential cost of the policing. Although the policing at the observed events 
was free, this is an important aspect of the staging process that is set to change. 
ACPO (2005) provides policy guidance to chief officers in relation to the levels of 
charging that should be applied to policing an event and the intention is that all 
forces will adopt this policy by 2008. A decision matrix is supplied to assist chief 
officers in deciding when to apply charges. For example, all policing costs should 
be recovered from a commercial event such as a music festival or sporting 
occasion. 50% of costs should be recovered from a community or charitable 
events whilst no charge should be applied to "de minimus' (i.e. minimal impact) 
events. A "de minimus' must demonstrate two characteristics: it should not be 
commercial in nature or require more than 24 policing hours (howeyer deployed) 
in total (ACPO, 2005). Crucially, ACPO (2005) acknowledge that a chief officer 
(or BCU commander in the context of "de minimus' events) rna\' use their 
discretion in deciding when to apply charges although a 'decision matrix ~ IS 
provided to assist in this matter. 
One factor that chief officers / BCU commanders may want to consider in respect 
of charging is the benefits that an event may hold for the police. Any potential 
benefits should be viewed in the context of the National Policing Plan (Home 
Office, 2004) which states that the police must reduce overall crime and provide a 
'citizen focussed' service. The mechanisms for achieving this can be located in 
• proactive , policing strategies. Examples of such strategies include community 
policing, intelligence-led policing, problem oriented policing and zero tolerance 
policing (Johnston 2000; Tilley, 2003). With regards to intelligence-led policing. 
the National Intelligence Model (NIM) has been adopted by all forces (Home 
Office, 2004). A potential benefit of policing an event is that it can generate new 
and useful intelligence. This could be acquired from either the planning or staging 
phase and may take many forms. John and Maguire (2004) argue that the lack of 
input from partner agencies hinders the effective implementation of NIM. 
Working closely with organisers / community organisers therefore presents an 
opportunity to address this gap and gain a wider perspective for intelligence 
purposes. 
Potentially of greater significance are the reassurance benefits that may arise from 
the policing of a community event. For example, the police at the observed Pride 
acknowledged that the event presented an opportunity to develop trust and closer 
links with the resident LGBT community. The methods for promoting reassurance 
policing are based on the concept of 'signal crimes' (Innes and Fielding. 2002) 
and are currently being evaluated.4 These methods include identifying and 
addressing crime and disorder issues that are most pertinent to a community with 
the net result of reducing crime and increasing public confidence. The process of 
working with organisers and community organisers can alert the police to 
potential 'reassurance gaps' (e.g. the identification of hate crime as an issue). In 
addition, community events may present an opportunity to promote public 
confidence through high visibility policing and / or the dissemination of relevant 
4 Results from this evaluation are due in December 2005. Sec the \:ational Reassurance Policing 
Project for further information (www.reassurancepolicing.co.uk). 
infonnation (this could range from the distribution of literature concerning local 
police policy through to specific police recruitment stalls). 
The opportunities will vary according to the nature and form of an event but it is 
important that the police consider what 'beyond event' intelligence / reassurance 
benefits may arise from the planning and staging processes. The fiscal cost of 
policing services should be considered in light of these potential benefits. A case 
could be made to lower costs if it is judged that intelligence / reassurance benefits 
may be considerable to the police. To assist this process, future research could 
attempt to track and evaluate the extent to which the police gain additional 
benefits from the planning and staging of community-based events. Again, this 
may generate additional good practice that could be disseminated to a wider 
audience. It is also important to acknowledge that community events may provide 
benefits to a community that go beyond the planning and staging process. The 
Mela and Multicultural Festival were identified by organisers and community 
organisers as potentially enhancing community cohesion. Festivals are recognised 
as a possible way of promoting understanding and cooperation in diverse 
communities (Community Cohesion Unit, 2002) and future research could 
contribute to evaluating any wider positive impacts in respect of this. 
The planning and staging of community events also presents benefits for other 
policing contexts. Community-based events such as Pride and the Multicultural 
Festival offer the potential to promote recruitment opportunities for regular and 
special constabulary police positions, and Police Community Support Officer 
(PCSO) posts. In addition, the police liaison at the observed Solstice recognised 
that the rationale behind engagement with community organisers at this event 
could be applied to partnership working with other communities (e.g. the traveller 
community). The ethos of consultation and cooperation that has been identified as 
a key factor in successful event planning could therefore be applied to other 
contexts, for example engaging with 'hard to reach' groups (Jones and Newburn, 
2001), with positive benefits. These processes might also help partnership 
working in the context of crime reduction and community safety. Although the 
aims are different (i.e. three year strategies, as opposed to staging an event), 
genuine consultation and cooperation could help build trust and foster more 
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effective partnership working between different agencies. This would help avoid 
• structural conflict' (i.e. the different occupational ethos and cultures) that is 
evident in the multi-agency crime reduction and community safety context 
(Crawford, 1997, 1998). 
This section has identified how the police might identify "beyond the event 
benefits. This is an area that requires more research to ascertain the extent to 
which intelligence / reassurance benefits can be identified and implemented in 
different contexts. Further research could also assess whether the techniques 
associated with planning and staging successful events are applied to other 
contexts (e.g. crime reduction and community safety partnership working). As 
with the previous section, any good practice that is identified in respect of these 
areas should be widely disseminated to aid and improve both the policing of 
community events and other policing contexts. 
4. Policy Implications for Other Public Order Contexts 
Yin (2003) suggests that care should be taken in making generalisations from a 
small set of case studies. When this is coupled with the fact that this research 
represents a 'perspective' (P.AJ Waddington, 2000b) on the policing of 
community-based events, caution should be taken in applying the empirical 
findings to other public order contexts. The lack of contention is an important 
factor underlying the planning and staging of the observed events. However. there 
are some general considerations that may be relevant to both the policing of 
protest / industrial disputes and community disorder which this section will 
present. 
P.AJ Waddington (2001. p7) argues that "the aim of public order policing should 
lie in the avoidance of confrontation, rather than winning any confrontation that 
might arise.' In this respect, the ethos of partnership working prior to the staging 
of protest / industrial disputes is important. This process is ~xt~nsi\ely 
documented by P.A.J Waddington (1994a) and the findings from this research 
broadly support his view that negotiation and compromise are key elem~nts in 
enhancing the prospect for order. The obvious policy implication from this 
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research is that this process can be further enhanced if the police / protestors can 
work effectively and closely prior to an event. This process rna\' culminate in a 
collective aim to plan and ultimately stage a safe and orderly event. It could be 
more difficult to engage with protestors if their particular cause is contentious. 
Jefferson's (1990) assertion that experimentation should be an element of public 
order policing policy is relevant in this case. For example, the police liaison and 
community organisers at Solstice engaged with potential protestors through the 
internet. From the police perspective, some form of engagement was deemed 
better than none at all. If it is difficult to contact / work with protestors in person, 
then dialogue through the internet possibly offers an option to break down 
barriers. Whatever the context, the police should be proactive in trying to pursue 
engagement with protestors prior to the event. The work done during planning 
will ultimately help in avoiding " in-the-job ' and . on-the-job ' forms of trouble 
(P.A.J Waddington, 1994a). 
With regards to the actual policing of protest / industrial disputes, the findings 
from this research would echo the perspective of Reicher et al (2004). In sum, 
interaction and engagement with the crowd should be the aim of the police and 
disciplinarian and controlling tactics should be avoided whenever possible. Even 
in a relatively non-contentious context, the implications of adopting the wrong 
strategy and tactics (i.e. at the Pride prior to the observed event) can have negative 
and wide-ranging consequences. This could be amplified in relation to the 
policing of contention. The empirical findings from the four observed events 
would suggest that the policing of a protest / industrial disputes can be aided by 
the involvement of protestors during the planning and staging phases. For 
example, protestors, stewards and / or private security could be implemented into 
a joint control strategy (e.g. a member from the protesting body working alongside 
bronze commanders). Even though some circumstances might dictate that this is 
not possible, this option should at least be explored in relation to the policing of 
protest / industrial disputes as this thesis suggests that this process impro\'es the 
prospects for safety and order. 
The empirical findings from this thesis also present avenues for minimising the 
impact of community disorder. Firstly, the identification of potential community 
260 
tension IS enhanced if the intelligence / reassurance possibilities are realised 
during the planning and staging of an event. If the event history / context suggest 
that wider tensions are possible between the police and relevant community then 
proactive steps can be taken to address these during an event (e.g. information 
provision etc). Again, experimentation is important and the number of options will 
be increased if the organisers and community organisers are involved in this 
process. A second avenue arises from the contacts made with community 
organisers during the planning and staging of events. The NCOF (2002) state that 
effective community consultation represents a key component in minimising 
community disorder and community organisers may present wider consultation 
opportunities to achieve this aim. In the worst case scenario of having to manage 
community disorder, these community organisers may also represent important 
links that can be utilised in attempts to minimise disorder (e.g. advising police 
strategy, communicating with crowds). To assess whether these recommendations 
for the policing of protest / industrial disputes and community disorder have any 
positive impact requires future research that focuses specifically on these contexts. 
The previous three sections have outlined the policy implications arising from this 
thesis that can enhance safety and order at community events. The key theme for 
good practice centres on close and consistent working relationships between the 
police and organisers / community organisers during the planning and staging 
process. Therefore, an 'ideal' method for achieving this would consist of the 
following elements: 
• 
• 
• 
The utilisation of a Safety Advisory Group during the planning phase to 
identify relevant health and safety issues. Ideally this would become a 
statutory requirement for event planning; 
The employment of a joint control strategy during the staging of an event. 
Embedded within this approach is a briefing procedure, the establishment 
of clear lines of communication, and a shared command and control 
location; 
A debriefing process to identify any issues arising from the planning and 
staging of an event. If key personnel are not to be involved in future 
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events, they should ensure that a "handover' occurs to pass on their 
knowledge and experience. 
To supplement this method there should also be identification of potential "beyond 
the event' benefits; dissemination of good practice and an accessible resource 
consisting of procedures / policies that the police and organisers can consult for 
advice. This 'ideal' method is not intended to be prescriptive as community events 
can take many forms and sizes. Therefore, experimentation should be encouraged 
as a response to this diversity of circumstances. However, this method does 
represent an ethos that should be acknowledged and explored by the police and 
organisers prior to the planning and staging of any community event, whatever the 
format. Likewise, this method might also be explored by the police in relation to 
other public order contexts. To conclude in relation to policy implications, future 
research represents the best approach to evaluating whether this method can 
impact to the benefit of the police, organisers / community organisers, and the 
wider community. 
5. Thesis Conclusions 
This thesis has provided an empirical and theoretical 'perspective' on the public 
order policing of community-based events. The observed events presented a 
variety of challenges to the police and organisers but ultimately safety, order and 
the event future were secured at all of them. To understand why this should be the 
case, the planning and staging processes have been examined in detail. This has 
revealed a multitude of processes that represent contributory factors in enhancing 
the prospects for safety, order and the event future. At a macro leveL the planning 
and staging is informed and guided by the event history / context. This reveals 
that, compared to other public order contexts, contention (P.AJ Waddington, 
2003) is relatively absent. Instead, the focus for the police represents th~ 
maintenance of "general' (i.e. the safety of event attendees). as opposed to more 
challenging and contested "specific' forms of order (\Valker, 2000). 
At a meso and micro level, the planning and staging phases are dictated by the 
nature of the inputs and working relationship bet\\'~en the police and th~ 
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organIsers / community orgamsers. At its most developed, these factors can 
culminate in an on-going collective ethos which is both generated and informed 
by close partnership working. The observed Pride event represented this approach 
and it was manifested through a Safety Advisory Group and joint control strateoY b. 
during the planning and staging respectively. The benefits of this included the 
development of trust, cohesion, flexibility and consistency between all the 
individuals and agencies involved. These factors were also associated with the 
other observed events but were not evident to the same extent (e.g. the 
employment of partial joint and fragmented control strategies). Despite this, order 
and safety were maintained at these events although post-event reflection / 
feedback revealed a greater number of problematic issues arising from the 
planning and staging compared to Pride (e.g. the communication failings at 
Solstice). With regards to the research aims listed at the end of chapter two, these 
findings therefore provide valuable insight into the roles and inputs of the police 
and organisers at these types of events. This helps to partially address a missing 
perspective from the general literature on public order policing. 
In respect of accounting for these findings in a theoretical context, existing public 
order related analytic perspectives provide a useful resource. Social movement 
theory may inform the shaping of an event context / history whilst the work of 
P.A.J Waddington (1994a) allows for an appreciation of the motivation of the 
police and organisers to avoid different forms of 'trouble'. Even those 
perspectives that are based in accounting for disorder provide insight. The 
'flashpoint' model (D Waddington et ai, 1987; D Waddington et ai, 1989; D 
Waddington 1992) highlights the importance of considering the broader social, 
political and legal context that public order policing is practiced in whilst 
Jefferson (1990) presents a series of recommendations for 'de-amplifying' the 
impact of 'paramilitarism' that can be scrutinised and contrasted with the 
outcomes of public order policing. 
However, an evaluation of these accounts also reveals a number of 
methodological and conceptual limitations, and this is characterised by debate on 
the ideological motivations of the proponent of each account (JetTerson. 1993: D 
Waddington: 1998, P.AJ Waddington. 1987, 1991, 1993. 2000b). To O\'ercome 
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this, the work of Pierre Bourdieu was dra\\TI upon with specific reference to the 
concepts of habitus and the field. From this it is possible to develop an analytical 
framework that appreciates, a) the involvement of the police and organisers, b) the 
impact of micro, meso and macro processes and, c) the ever-evolving 
circumstances that encapsulate the public order policing of community-based 
events. This framework suggests that collective habitus at the level of planning 
groups and event management strategies represents the key factor in enhancing 
the prospects for safety and order. The pool of cultural knowledge that forms the 
collective habitus is most potent when the police and organisers are working 
closely together (e.g. as demonstrated at the observed Pride). The concepts 
contained within this analytic account could be tested and further developed by 
future research on both the public order policing of community-based events and 
in other contexts. 
A consequence and benefit of this analytic account is that it offers various good 
practice avenues. These have been subject to detailed discussion in this chapter 
but in summary the principle and mechanism of the SAG should be established on 
a statutory basis. Whatever the form of a public event, the joint control strategy 
should be explored as a method of managing the staging phase. There are also 
potential "beyond the event' benefits that should be identified and addressed 
during the planning and staging. Finally, the principles of dissemination and 
experimentation should be encouraged. This could possibly be achieved through 
an internet resource that police and organisers can consult for examples of good 
practice and general event planning / staging advice. As with the presented 
analytic framework, these policy implications can be developed and tine-tuned 
through future research. In addition, such research could determine whether they 
are applicable to other public order contexts. 
The arguments and ideas presented thus far in this set of conclusions address the 
research aims outlined at the end of chapter two. The final task of this thesis is to 
speculate on what these reveal in relation to the prospects for contemporary and 
future public order policing. Chapter one started with a quote bemoaning the lack 
of media interest in a large scale Mela held in Bradford during the summer of 
2001. This thesis signifies an academic perspective on the mechanisms associated 
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with such events and offers an account explaining why they are characterised by 
order and safety. To re-work Reiner's (2000a) cycling analogy. it is hoped that the 
consideration of why 'the wheels stay on' in this public order context can 
enlighten and supplement the work that has been conducted in relation to the 
(more contentious) public order policing of political protest / industrial disputes 
and community disorder. 
Further research into public order policing should be encouraged, whatever the 
context. From a contemporary perspective, Reiner (1998) is correct in linking the 
evolving nature of protest to the fragmentation and globalisation of society. The 
community disorder in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford during 2001 demonstrates 
that this particular phenomenon is not just a remnant of the 1980s. It is therefore a 
requirement for academia and practitioners to respond to these issues and aid the 
police in developing the most appropriate public order response. In addition, 
academics and practitioners should be proactive in identifying the nature of future 
public order concerns that result from, for example, the impacts of terrorism 
(P.A.J Waddington, 2003) or the pluralisation of policing (Loader, 2000). 
Although this thesis has less dramatic concerns, it demonstrates the need for a 
constant review of existing analytic accounts. The ethos of experimentation that 
Jefferson (1990) advocates in devising public order policy should be applied to 
those who wish to critique it. Such experimentation and subsequent revision in 
relation to all public order contexts offers the potential to inform and shape 
effective 21 5t century public order policing practice and policy. 
'6-
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ACPO 
APA 
BPA 
CASE 
EGT 
FIT 
GPA 
HMIC 
HSE 
LGBT 
MFPG 
MPG 
NCOF 
NCPE 
NIM 
NPOIU 
PPG 
PSU 
SAG 
SCG 
SIA 
SPG 
Glossary of Acronyms 
Association of Chief Police Officers 
Association of Police Authorities 
Black Police Association 
Collaborative Award for Science and Engineering 
Evidence Gathering Team 
Forward Intelligence Team 
Gay Police Association 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 
Health and Safety Executive 
Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual and Transgender 
Multicultural Festival Planning Group (See page 116 - 117 for 
details) 
Mela Planning Group (See page 112 for details) 
National Crime and Operations Faculty 
National Centre for Policing Excellence 
National Intelligence Model 
National Public Order Intelligence Unit 
Pride Planning Group (see page 106 for details) 
Police Support Unit 
Safety Advisory Group 
Solstice Consultation Group (see page 97 for details) 
Security Industry Authority 
Solstice Planning Group (see page 97 for details) 
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Appendix A: Interview Information and Consent Form 
RESEARCH TITLE: THE PUBLIC ORDER POLICING OF COMMUNITY-BASED 
EVENTS 
The purpose of this form is to convey a little background information about the interview 
and to make sure that you are still happy to participate. It is anticipated that the interview 
will last no longer than 60 minutes. I would like to tape record the interview so that I do 
not miss anything you say. At any stage of the interview you can ask me to tum the tape 
recorder off or rewind the tape to erase anything you have said. Everything that you do 
say will be kept in confidence and will not be disclosed to anyone else. I will be 
publishing and presenting findings from my research and this may include extracts taken 
from your interview, along with others. It is important to point out that your identity will 
be kept anonymous and any details that may identify you will be excluded from any 
published I presented findings. You are also free to decline from answering any questions 
or stop the interview without having to give a reason for doing so. 
If you wish, after I have transcribed the interview I will send you a copy along with a pre-
paid self-addressed envelope that will enable you to review and remove I add to any of 
the comments you have made. If you request it, I will also provide you with a copy of the 
interview tape. 
More information on my research can be found at: 
www.geocities.com/francispikeuklphdresearch.html 
If you have any questions or queries about the interview or research, please feel free to 
contact me at: 
E-mail: f.pike@surrey.ac.uk 
Telephone:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
If you are happy to proceed with the interview, pleas~ sign. below and p~int your name. 
Signing this form does not affect your right to stop the mterview at any pomt. 
I consent to being interviewed for the purpose of this research study 
I consent to the interview being tape-recorded . 
I consent to my views and words being included in published or presented matenal 
provided that my identity is kept anonymous . 
I understand that I can stop the interview at any stage and do not have to gIve a reason 
for doing so. 
SIGNATURE: __ ---------DATE: -------
FULL NAME (BLOCK CAPITALS): __ -------
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